(S) PSI: NORTH KOREAN VESSEL OF POSSIBLE

S E C R E T STATE 124032 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2033 TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC SN KN SUBJECT: (S) PSI: NORTH KOREAN VESSEL OF POSSIBLE PROLIFERATION CONCERN REF: 06SINGAPORE 3456 Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney and Acting EAP A/S Glyn T. Davies and, Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S//REL Singapore) We have information that a North Korean-flagged vessel, the M/V SO HUNG 1, will arrive at Singapore's Outer Port Limits for bunkering on or around 24 November. Our information indicates that the Singapore-based firm Seabridge Bunkering PTE Ltd may provide bunkering services to the So Hung 1. The vessel is destined for Bandar Abbas, Iran. ¶2. (S//NF) FOR POST ONLY: North Korean vessels have, in the past, anchored at the Outer Port Limits in order to avoid scrutiny from Singaporean authorities. ¶3. (S//REL Singapore) We have indications that KOMID, North Korea's primary weapons trading firm, was preparing to send a possible cargo of cruise missile-related items to Iran in early to mid-November. Certain cruise missile-related cooperation by North Korea with other countries is prohibited under paragraphs 8 (b) and (c) of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. Additionally, exports of certain cruise missile-related items to Iran are banned by paragraph 3 (c) of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737. While we do not know whether this cargo is aboard the SO HUNG 1, we are concerned that the vessel is carrying items of proliferation concern. ¶4. (S//REL Singapore) Singapore is a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) partner and has been very cooperative in past efforts regarding North Korean-flagged vessels of proliferation concern. In 2006, the GOS instructed Singapore-based firms to not provide bunkering services to the North Korean-flagged vessel Bong Hoa Son, which transited Singapore's territorial waters en route to Burma. (REF A). ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶5. (S//REL Singapore) Post should coordinate first with station and country team prior to approaching GOS officials. Post is instructed to approach appropriate host-nation officials and request that in the spirit of our PSI cooperation, that the GOS, consistent with its national law and international law: (1) instruct Singapore-owned or based bunkering service companies not to provide fuel, food, water, or other services to the SO HUNG 1 unless an inspection or related activities have taken place; (2) as an alternative to bunkering, invite the SO HUNG 1 into port to receive these services. (3) inspect the vessel and its paperwork should it enter Singapore's port or stop in Singapore's territorial waters, to determine whether the vessel is carrying cargo proscribed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 or 1737; and (4) share with the USG any information that might be collected from the SO HUNG 1. Post may draw from summary or from objectives and talking points/non-paper below. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶6. (S//REL Singapore) Post is instructed to pursue the following: -- Request that the GOS instruct Singapore-based bunkering service companies to deny services to the SO HUNG 1. -- Request that the GOS offer a port call as an alternative to bunkering. -- Request that Singapore authorities, consistent with its national law and international law, and in the spirit of our PSI partnership, inspect the SO HUNG 1 if it enters Singapore's ports or stops in its waters, and if it is transporting items, equipment, or materiel to or from the DPRK in contravention of UNSCR 1718 (2006) or to Iran in contravention of UNSCR 1737 (2006) or 1803 (2008),request that the GOS impound the cargo pending further disposition. -- Emphasize to the GOS that paragraph 8(a) of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 requires UN Member States to prevent the transfer to or from the DPRK, through their territories, of specified WMD and conventional weapons-related items and technology. In addition, to ensure compliance with this obligation, paragraph 8(f) of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 calls upon UN Member States to take, in accordance with their national authorities and consistent with international law, cooperative action, including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK. -- Also emphasize that paragraph 3 (c) of UN Security Council Resolution 1737 requires UN member states to prevent the transfer to Iran of certain missile-related items. TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER -------------- ¶7. (S//REL Singapore) Begin talking points/non-paper: -- In the spirit of PSI partnership, we would like to inform you of a North Korean-flagged vessel, SO HUNG 1, which is currently carrying a shipment from North Korea and is destined for Bandar Abbas, Iran. The vessel intends to call at the Singapore Outer Port Limits on or about 24 November. The exact nature of the cargo is unknown. -- We know that in the past, North Korean-flagged vessels transporting suspect cargoes have conducted bunkering operations at Singapore's Outer Port Limits, and we appreciate Singapore's past assistance to deny bunkering services to previous suspect vessels. -- We also have information that North Korea's primary weapons trading firm KOMID was preparing to send a possible cargo of cruise missile-related items from North Korea to Iran in early to mid-November. While we do not know whether this cargo is aboard the SO HUNG 1, it is possible that the vessel is carrying items of proliferation concern. -- North Korean exports of cruise-missile related items would be contrary to paragraph 8(b) of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. Additionally, such exports to Iran would be contrary to paragraph 3 (c) of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737. -- Therefore, we request that the GOS instruct Singapore-based bunkering service companies to deny services to the SO HUNG 1, and request that Singapore offer a port visit to the SO HUNG 1 as an alternative to bunkering in order to receive services. -- Should the vessel enter your port or stop in your territorial waters, we request that appropriate authorities inspect the vessel. If items, equipment, or materiel that contravene UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1737, or 1803 are found, we request that the GOS impound the cargo pending further disposition, in accordance with your national law. -- As you know, paragraph 8(a) of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 requires UN Member States to prevent the transfer to or from the DPRK, through their territories, of certain WMD and conventional weapons-related items and technology. We would also note that paragraph 8(f) of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 calls upon UN Member States to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through the inspection of cargo to and from North Korea, as necessary, in order to ensure that North Korea does not transfer any of the proscribed items. -- In addition, paragraph 3 (c) of UN Security Council Resolution 1737 prohibits the transfer of certain missile-related items to Iran. -- We greatly appreciate your assistance, and look forward to hearing the results of any actions regarding the So Hung 1 that you take. REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶8. (U) Post should report results of its efforts by 26 November. POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶9. (U) POC for follow-up information is Mark Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov, and via State Ops Center, ISN Duty Officer on November 22 and 23; and Dan Bischof, EAP/MTS (202) 647-4932, cellphone (202) 297-8272, bishofdr@state.gov. ¶10. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance. Please slug responses for ISN, EAP, and T. RICE NNNN End Cable Text