CFE: NOV 5-7 ROMANIAN-HOSTED HLTF OFF-SITE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 120660 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013 TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO OSCE SUBJECT: CFE: NOV 5-7 ROMANIAN-HOSTED HLTF OFF-SITE: ALLIES EAGER FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP ON CFE REF: A. (A) STATE 96113 SEP 11 HLTF GUIDANCE ¶B. (B) STATE 109281 OCT 16 HLTF GUIDANCE ¶C. (C) USNATO 398 OCT 16 HLTF REPORTING CABLE Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Office Director. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. At the November 5-7 Romanian-hosted off-site HLTF, Allies discussed the current situation regarding CFE; examined options for a unified way forward; and agreed on themes for NAC communique language on CFE to deliver a solid NATO message at the upcoming NATO and OSCE Ministerials. Not surprisingly, Allies rehashed a litany of familiar national positions. But they also took on tough CFE issues, and discussion revealed a number of common themes: -- Preserve CFE. Allies are unified behind a primary goal: to preserve the CFE regime. The preferred means is to find a way to achieve entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty, ideally with Russia as a fully implementing Party to the Treaty. However, several Allies argued that CFE without Russia would still be of tremendous value because it would automatically make the regime the basis for any future arms control steps. Uniformly, either in the plenary sessions or on the margins, most expressed the view that we will never be able to negotiate the equivalent of CFE or adapted CFE. -- Keep the Parallel Actions Package alive. Allies stand behind the Parallel Actions Package as the "only show in town" and, for now, are looking to the U.S. to find a way to take it forward They are fully seized of the fact that Russia's military actions in Georgia have complicated a solution to the CFE impasse. They believe Russian forces will be in South Ossetia and Abkhazia for a long time, and would welcome a way to use CFE to help address this so long as it doesn't involve making the relationship with Russia more difficult. It was clear, however, that some Allies are developing ideas with a slightly different focus: the Germans said flatly that CFE has value with or without the "principles" Allies view as integral to the Treaty (e.g. the need for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces) and that NATO must engage in a dialogue with Russia on CFE and the Medvedev proposal or risk undermining those in Moscow (namely the Foreign Ministry) who support arms control and cooperative approaches to security. -- Continue implementing CFE. The vast majority of Allies are determined to maintain the moral high ground by continuing to implement CFE despite Russia's continued "suspension"; they stressed that NATO should not take any retaliatory or punitive steps that could further undercut the Treaty or give Russia an excuse for pulling out of the regime. They want to send a clear and firm message at the Ministerial that emphasizes the merits of the "generous" Alliance position while criticizing Russia's unconstructive approach. -- Medvedev proposal seen as interesting, albeit vague. The Medvedev proposal loomed large in this brainstorming session. Despite Russia not having provided any true substance, a number of Allies were explicitly open to new ideas and more details, while also insisting that any new architecture must be based on the current Euro-Atlantic framework with NATO, the OSCE and human rights at the core. Others underscored the Medvedev proposal,s lack of substance noting the irony of Russia calling for a new security Treaty when it is destroying CFE. On the margins, non-Quad Allies told members of the U.S. team that the U.S. needed to lead by telling Allies what Washington thinks of the Medvedev approach, and by shaping a unified NATO response. Some claim to be under pressure from Russia directly (through its diplomatic push throughout Europe) and from France (in the EU) to express openness to the Medvedev proposal. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) HLTF Head of Delegation Deputy Assistant Secretary Karin L. Look led the U.S. delegation. The delegation was comprised of State/EUR/RPM Laurendeau, DOD/OSD Perenyi, DOD/JCS, Col Hartford, State/VCI/CCA Lt Col Ducceschi and State/USOSCE Jules Silberberg. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Options for a unified way forward - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) No Ally was optimistic about Russia returning to implementation of the current CFE Treaty. But throughout the discussions, all said they place the highest value on CFE as the critical foundation of conventional arms control in Europe. They want the stability and confidence provided by the regime. There was broad support at the off-site for the U.S.-expressed view that Allies should maintain a thoughtful, measured approach ) without concessions or red lines ) that served NATO's interests, especially as it would be impossible to negotiate a CFE equivalent. Only the Czech Republic expressed openness to the idea of NATO retaliating in the near-term against Russia's suspension, by matching it. The other Allies who addressed the issue argued to avoid any retaliatory or punitive measures. Several repeated a common concern that Russia might use such measures as a "reason" to withdraw from the Treaty altogether. Allies' primary goal is still to achieve entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty, ideally with Russia as a fully implementing Party, but "not at any price." Allies, with the possible exception of Germany, are not prepared to forget the Istanbul commitments or abandon Georgia. But they are not happy about the situation Russia's suspension and invasion of Georgia has created. -- Comment: A decade of relentless support for implementation of the Istanbul commitments as the trigger for ratification of Adapted CFE has had its effect: most Allies view host nation consent as a key principle that NATO cannot sacrifice. Georgia has put that position to the test. Many Allies (not just the Germans) view Georgia's actions in South Ossetia as irresponsible, and they are angry that this has placed CFE and the stability it represents in greater peril than before. End comment. ¶4. (C) In a telling moment, Allies agreed that it would not be useful to define what NATO meant in its Bucharest communique by indicating that Allies would not continue unilaterally to implement CFE "forever." They want to bring Russia back to CFE, the sooner the better, but otherwise they want to establish CFE as the single available basis for any future arms control (see below). Many Allies emphasized the need to maintain NATO's current approach of implementing CFE even while Russia does not, at least until the new U.S. administration is in place, holding out for serious Russian engagement on the Parallel Actions Package, and waiting until the spring for serious consideration of any shift in position on implementation. They also recognized that at some point this approach will become untenable. The U.S. noted it would not argue for withholding data in December, and that it found Canada's proposal ) to use the data exchange as a public diplomacy opportunity to make a clear statement of principle as to why Allies continue to implement ) appealing. ¶5. (C) Is a/CFE without Russia an option? Some Allies remarked that the current situation was simply leading to continued erosion of CFE and its eventual death. The Czech Republic, in particular, used this sentiment to continue to push for contingency planning so Allies would be prepared for a "future without the CFE" and the possibility that Russia could withdraw from CFE. -- In the spirit of the "brainstorming" basis of the off-site, this theme resulted in several Allies - with Germany in the lead - opining that a/CFE without Russia would still be of value and could serve as the basis for a future arms control regime. All agreed that it would be impossible to negotiate CFE's equivalent, but advocates of a/CFE even without Russia claimed that keeping the CFE regime alive would mean that Russia could eventually return to CFE (however far-fetched such an idea might be). None addressed the fact that this could amount to setting aside the Istanbul commitments and core principles of the Treaty. Canada and Denmark expressed concerns with the notion of the value of a/CFE without Russia and the Netherlands cautioned that this idea would need further reflection as it would amount to Russia receiving the benefits of CFE without any of the costs. ¶6. (C) Need for a Proactive Approach: The UK highlighted that the status quo was advantageous to Russia, and that Allies should consider ways to make the situation less comfortable for Russia and more comfortable for the Alliance. The U.S. stressed the need to consider a more proactive approach rather than simply biding time until Spring, as some had suggested, and losing an opportunity to take the initiative. The U.S. rep said that CFE being "valuable" is more than a slogan: we need to consider how to apply it to current challenges. Perhaps Allies could develop an approach in keeping with our principles that demonstrates CFE's application to recent events and addresses Georgian security in a way that Georgia finds beneficial. -- Allies expressed openness to such an idea if it could address the situation in Georgia (by way of updating the Parallel Actions Package) and have serious prospects for achieving entry into force of a/CFE. However, they did not have ideas of their own about how this could be achieved. Allies were clear that they stand behind the Parallel Actions Package as the "only show in town," but at this point they are looking to the U.S. for creative ideas that could build Georgia's security and lead to the U.S. resuming engagement with Russia in bilateral talks when appropriate. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Delivering a solid NATO message: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Allies quickly agreed on basic themes for the December NAC communique and OSCE Ministerial. There was agreement that the NAC CFE communique language should draw from elements of the Bucharest language, updated to reinforce a firm message that should underscore the Allies' collective commitment to CFE, growing concern at Russia's continued suspension, condemnation of Russia's actions in Georgia, and the fact that Russia has not been helpful in finding solutions or engaging seriously on the parallel actions package. -- Allies agreed provisionally to focus on NAC communique language rather than a separate statement to mark the anniversary of Russia suspension, which could give it more weight unnecessarily. It would be essential to note that Allies continue to implement their Treaty obligations due to their commitment to cooperative security arrangements and to fulfillment of international agreements, as well as the importance attached to the confidence that results from military transparency and predictability. This statement could then be utilized in Vienna in conjunction with the annual data exchange. -- On the margins quad allies reviewed a draft text that the UK passed to the IS as a starting point. This text will be worked by the HLTF-deputies with the aim of finalizing language for the NATO Ministerial at the upcoming November 21 HLTF. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bilats with Romanian reps - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) In advance of the HLTF Off-site, State/VCI DAS Karin ¶L. Look, accompanied by EUR/RPM Jennifer Laurendeau and VCI/CCA Kathryn Ducceschi, met separately with Foreign Affairs Advisor of the Office of the President Anca Ilinoiu and then with MFA Secretary of State for Strategic and Global Affairs IIulian Buga. Both the U.S. and the Romanians underscored their skepticism about the Medvedev European Security Treaty proposal and the need for a unified NATO position to counter Russia's bilateral efforts to promote it. The Romanians said that Russia's diplomatic push on the Medvedev proposal is having an impact in many European capitals, and that France is pushing in the EU for flexibility. They stressed the need for U.S. leadership, noting that the U.S. needs to make its views known. The Romanians also took the French to task for appearing to promise an OSCE Summit, stressing that substance should drive that decision. The U.S. concurred that there was no need for a Summit when there was no substance and also stressed (both in the bilats and at the off-site) that there was no need for a new architecture when the current system is working and Russia's actions are destroying a key element - CFE. ¶9. (C) On moving forward with CFE, U.S. rep Look advocated for an even-keeled and unified approach that preserves our core principles and would lead to the adapted Treaty rather than starting from scratch. She emphasized the importance of a productive approach that focused on leveraging or influencing Russia to return to implementation and that could also benefit Georgia. Foreign Affairs Advisor Ilinoiu was keen on any approach that could unify NATO, address Georgia's security and preserve our principles while reengaging Russia on the parallel actions package. Romania would be with the U.S. "1000 percent" if we could devise such an approach. RICE