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08STATE118905 2008-11-07 16:48:00 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State
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      EUR-00   OIGO-00  FAAE-00  FO-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    
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DRAFTED BY: DS/DSS/CC:JBACIGALUPO -- 11/07/2008  571-345-3132
                  ------------------F72CB3  071658Z /38    
P 071648Z NOV 08
					  S E C R E T STATE 118905 


E.O. 12958: DECL: MR

Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources

Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:
November 6, 2008

1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, November 7, 2008

2. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 5-8

3. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 9-24

4. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 25-32

5. (U) Significant Events

6. (SBU) AF - Guinea - Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
Conakry convened November 6 to review the U.S. Embassy,s
security posture. The committee decided to remove travel
limitations during daylight hours for Mission staff,
continuing to ensure all employee travel during nighttime
hours is conducted with prior RSO concurrence. Post will
maintain increased security patrols around residences,
facilities, and vehicle routes used by Mission staff. No
direct threat to American or foreign citizens has occurred.
(Conakry 0680)

7. (SBU) EAP - New Zealand - Approximately 24 individuals
arrived at U.S. Embassy Wellington November 6 to peacefully
protest the war in Iraq. The individuals gathered outside the
front gate. New Zealand police presence was adequate, and all
necessary Mission security measures were in place for this
event. The protest ended without incident. (RSO Wellington
Spot Report)

8. (S//NF) SCA - Pakistan - EAC Peshawar convened November 5
to discuss threat reporting and recent incidents within the
Peshawar area affecting U.S. Consulate operations. There have
been several incidents within 2 km of Mission residential and
off-compound facilities in recent days. On November 1, an
explosion at a Peshawar police substation killed one police
officer and injured several others. On November 3 and 4,
several explosions occurred on the airfield serving Peshawar
International Airport and Pakistani Air Force Ninth Aviation.
The EAC concluded that current threat reporting and recent
incidents warrant continuation of Post,s heightened security
posture. (Appendix source 1)

9. (U) Key Concerns

10. (SBU) EUR - Hungary - Bomb threats include U.S. Embassy
Budapest: On November 6 at approximately 12:20 p.m., the
Hungarian police notified RSO Budapest that the U.S. Embassy
was mentioned in a telephonic bomb threat called in to the
Budapest ambulance service. A female caller speaking in
Hungarian warned of the bomb and gave her name, but provided
no further information; police believe the name given by the
caller is a fake identity. Embassy Budapest local guards,
Marine guards, and RSO personnel conducted a sweep of all
common access spaces and Post,s perimeter security zone, and
a police explosive ordnance disposal dog team and bomb
technicians conducted a sweep of the perimeter and adjacent
vehicles; no suspicious devices were discovered. Two
additional telephonic bomb threats were made against
Hungarian Government (HG) offices the same day -- Budapest,s
Fourth District Police headquarters and the governing
Hungarian Socialist Party,s (MSZP,s) office, also in the
Fourth District; a sweep revealed an unexploded pipe bomb at
the MSZP building, just two weeks after the discovery of a
hand grenade at the same site. DS/TIA/ITA notes there is no
information indicating any specific reason for a threat to
the Embassy. As for the threat against the government and
police, for the past two years, right-wing extremist groups
have demonstrated violently against the governing party and
its party members over domestic political issues, using such
tactics as Molotov cocktails and other incendiary devices,
burning cars, and once ransacking the Hungarian Television
building. Threat information and anti-HG activity peaked in
late October, the commemoration of the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution; although, demonstration activity was far less
than experienced during the previous two Octobers. To date,
the USG has remained mostly separated from the fray, but for
the proximity of Embassy Budapest to the Hungarian Parliament
and several controversial memorials. Post and parliament are
both located in the Fifth District of central Budapest,
several miles south of the Fourth District (jpest). (Open
sources; Budapest 1064)

11. (S//NF) AF - Mali - Belmokhtar learns of U.S. troops
arrival: Tearline from November 6 reads, &Al-Qa,ida in the
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar
was aware that American, British, and German troops had
arrived in Mali on November 5. Belmokhtar discovered that the
troops had two helicopters, and they were there to conduct
training in Timbuktu and Gao.8

12. (S//NF) A body of previous tearline from over the last
several months has also highlighted Belmokhtar,s and AQIM,s
monitoring of U.S. troops in northern Mali. DS/TIA/ITA
suspects their interest in the troop movements and
whereabouts likely stems from a desire to practice
operational security, rather than to attack them. Although
two recent reports, stemming from firsthand sources claiming
regular and irregular access, detailed AQIM,s alleged plans
to attack U.S. troops if they conducted reconnaissance north
of Timbuktu, DS/TIA/ITA judges that it would not be in the
best interest of AQIM or Belmokhtar to pursue such actions.
Doing so would bring increased international scrutiny on a
region which AQIM uses as a safehaven and
recruiting/logistics/training point for larger attacks in
Algeria. (Appendix sources 2-4)

13. (S//NF) NEA - Lebanon - Plan to carry out suicide attacks
against LAF and UNIFIL in Lebanon:

14. (S//NF) According to sensitive reporting from late
October, Fatah al-Islam and Jund Al-Sham members in the Ayn
Al-Hilwah camp held a series of meetings to plan attacks
against unspecified Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and United
Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) targets in
southern Lebanon and Beirut. During the meeting, attendees
reportedly agreed to use vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs), explosive belts, and IEDs in the attacks.
The report also alleges a Fatah al-Islam and a Jund Al-Sham
member worked together to dismantle approximately 30 land
mines to extract the TNT, which they separated into 5 kg

15. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes this is the latest in a handful
of recent reports regarding Islamic extremists in the Ayn
Al-Hilwah camp plotting against the LAF, UNIFIL, and other
foreign interests in Lebanon. Recently, Islamic extremist
groups in the camp were preoccupied with settling disputes
among themselves, which put plans to carry out terrorist
attacks on the back burner. While the disputes between the
groups -- particularly Jund Al-Sham and the Palestinian Fatah
-- reportedly are not completely resolved, the groups do
appear to be refocusing on their reason for being, which is
conducting Jihad by carrying out attacks against the LAF and
foreign interests in-country. (Appendix source 5)

16. (S//NF) SCA - Afghanistan - Al-Qa,ida plans suicide
bombing against embassies of the U.S., Germany, and Denmark:
An Arab al-Qa,ida associate in Pakistan named Haji
Abdurrahman (possible variant: Abd al-Rahman) planned to
send suicide bombers to attack the embassies of the U.S.,
Germany, and Denmark in Kabul. The sensitive source with
firsthand access to al-Qa,ida associates in Pakistan claimed
the attack was not imminent and Abdurrahman was waiting for
bombers to arrive from the Waziristan area, Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan. However, the vehicles to
be used in the operation were ready in Kabul.

17. (S//NF) While DS/TIA/ITA cannot corroborate this
reporting, it is of note that the ongoing plot to conduct
suicide attacks against the U.S. Ambassador and Embassy in
Kabul involves al-Qa,ida operatives. A name check on an
al-Qa,ida-associated operative named Haji Abdurrahman was
inconclusive. The stated possible variant, Abd al-Rahman,
is used frequently. One possibility is that, since October
2007, bodies of credible reporting suggested senior
al-Qa,ida leader Abdul Rehman al-Najdi is involved in
targeting U.S. and European diplomatic facilities in Pakistan
with missile and suicide attacks. Another possibility is
Zubayr al-Misri (a.k.a. Wakas, Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) number 12467499), a known al-Qa,ida
operative who uses the alias Abd al-Rahman Hussein Hilal.
Finally, al-Qa,ida terrorist Ahmad Umar Abd al Rahman (TIDE
number 47153), the son of the &Blind Sheikh8 Umar Abd
Al-Rahman, is believed to have previously led rocket attacks
against Shkin base in Paktika Province. (Appendix sources 6-8)

18. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Afghanistan -
Militants plan suicide operations in/around Kabul airport:
Tearline states, &Afghan opposition elements were planning,
as of mid-October, to organize and conduct suicide and
sabotage operations against targets inside the Kabul airport
and in the airport vicinity. The dates and the method of
conducting the operations are unknown. The Afghan National
Security Directorate warned the security forces and police of
the potential attacks, bringing special attention to the
following important, vulnerable points in the vicinity of the
--UK headquarters, which is situated along the airport
Customs Western Road, which ends in the square (NFI);
--the entry door and the internal enclosure, of the Triko
company (spelling not verified);
--a guesthouse used by Americans which is located along the
meteorology organization, road, south of the airport,s
military police guard post;
--the entry to the airport, south of Sarparim (spelling not
verified; NFI) along the airport Customs Western Road; and
--the area which contains oil reserves storehouses.8

19. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes it appears Afghan authorities
mentioned these areas because of particular vulnerabilities
rather than specific information denoting them as targets.
Jalalabad Road and Airport Road lie in the vicinity of the
airport. Direct fire and remote-controlled IEDs continue to
plague convoys on Jalalabad Road. Militants have carried out
six attacks against military and civilian convoys on Airport
Road (a.k.a. Route White, Great Massoud) in the past two
years, with the latest being the March 13 suicide VBIED
attack against a Coalition convoy. There are currently
ongoing threats to ambush the U.S. Ambassador on Airport
Road. The airport is typically targeted with rockets rather
than suicide attacks; however, the increasing use of complex
suicide attacks could breach the layers of security at the
airport, such as the attack on the Ministry of Information
and Culture on October 30 by one suicide bomber accompanied
by one to two other militants with small arms to breach the
facility. (Appendix source 9)

20. (S//NF) Afghanistan - Plans to kidnap UN employee in
Konar Province: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba/Jama,at ud-Dawa (LT/JUD)
commander Zia Rahman tasked Maulawi Ali Khan and 25 Taliban
fighters to kidnap a UN employee who worked at a polling
center in Shigal District, Konar Province. The developing
source also indicated Khan planned to emplace three
remote-controlled IEDs along the main road between Shigal and
Asmar districts in Konar Province.

21. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes a recent tearline also suggested
insurgents in Konar Province intended to target foreigner
workers or possible Afghan working for foreign or Afghan
Government entities: (S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) &Taliban
insurgents reportedly planned in early November a series of
operations within Nawa, Sarkani District, and Khas Konar
District. Within the Nawa region, the Taliban planned on
emplacing mines along the road between Donai and Nawa in the
hope of targeting Afghan and Coalition forces traveling along
this route. They also planned on kidnapping road construction
engineers and contractors. Further, Taliban insurgents also
intended to either assassinate or kidnap foreign workers and
Afghan Government employees in Sarkani and Khas Konar
districts.8 Exposure of UN and Afghan workers to high-risk
environments is likely to increase as the election
registration process and preparations for elections continues
into next year.

22. (S//NF) A name check on Maulawi Ali Khan indicates two
possibly active insurgents in Konar. A sensitive source with
secondhand access reported in late August 2007 that Taliban
commander Ali Khan conducted a rocket attack in Asmar
District, Konar Province. The source claimed Khan was the
Taliban commander for Shigal, Asmar, Ghaziabad, Naray, and
Dangam districts. In early September, the Afghan National
Directorate of Security reported Maulawi Ali Khan
participated in a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, in which
Taliban military commander for Konar Province, Maulawi
Najibullah, ordered attacks on Afghan security forces and the
Coalition base in Asmar. Alternatively, a developing source
reported in September 2007 that Maulawi Ali Khan Gujar from
Naray District attended a meeting of Konar Province shura
members in which an LT commander was also present. A name
check on LT/JUD commander Zia Rahman was inconclusive.
(Appendix sources 10-14)

23. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Afghanistan - Shooting of UN guard
may mark end of security calm in affluent Kabul neighborhood:
Tearline states, &The recent shooting of an unidentified
Afghan guard on duty at a UN security post in Kabul,s Wazir
Akbar Khan area may mark the end of a long quiet period in
this area and is likely to have a significant impact on the
security situation, according to informed sources in early
November. Observers are concerned that the shooting, which
was not fatal, may have been an act of retribution or carried
out by a disgruntled individual. Non-governmental and
international officials, as well as local businesses, are
being warned to acknowledge the considerable dangers now
present in Wazir Akbar Khan and through Kabul -- including
kidnappings, shootings, and bombings -- and to refrain from
circulating unarmed and unescorted.8

24. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes, while this shooting in an
affluent area of Kabul is not a terrorist incident, it is
indicative of the rise in crimes involving foreign entities
and foreigners in Kabul city. The Afghanistan NGO Safety
Office notes at least 18 incidents in Kabul Province this
year in which insurgents and criminals have targeted
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not all included
foreign nationals. Compared to previous years, there has been
a consistently high volume of incidents against foreigners
and an increased frequency in the deliberate targeting of
foreigners. Most recently in Kabul, a female Canadian
journalist was kidnapped, and a female British aid worker was
assassinated. It is still unclear if the murder of the two
DHL executives by a guard on October 25 was due to personal
grievances or a planned criminal/insurgent assassination in
connection with narcotics trafficking. (Appendix source 15)

25. (U) Cyber Threats

26. (U) Worldwide - Criminals capitalize on presidential
election to launch spam campaign:

27. (U) Key highlights:
A spam campaign was launched shortly after President-Elect
Obama,s acceptance speech.
The malicious e-mail messages sent appear to come from
reputable news agencies.
A link in the message directs users to a webpage similar
to DoS, &
Much of the spam traffic detected may have been generated
by a single exploit.

28. (U) Source paragraph: &Experts at (computer security
company) Sophos have discovered a widespread spam attack,
claiming to contain a link to news about the new president.
The e-mails, which have subject lines such as Obama win
preferred in world poll, and claim to come from, have accounted for approximately 60
percent of all malicious spam seen by SophosLabs in the last

29. (U) CTAD comment: As early as 2007, reports surfaced
concerning malicious actors taking interest in exploiting the
2008 U.S. presidential elections. That year, hundreds of
fraudulent websites were crafted to appear as legitimate
sites belonging to the candidates. However, in reality, those
websites were used to underhandedly distribute malicious
software (malware) to unsuspecting Web surfers. Though the
campaigning has concluded and the next U.S. President has
been elected, cyber criminals have continued to exploit the
occasion by launching a new campaign of their own. These
malicious actors have constructed spam e-mail messages
intended to take advantage of individuals interested in
viewing videos relating to election news results,
President-Elect Barack Obama,s acceptance speech, or
interviews with Obama,s political advisers.

30. (U) CTAD comment: According to open source reporting,
less than 12 hours after the acceptance speech was given,
cyber criminals seeking to take advantage of unwary computer
users fashioned a socially engineered malware attack
surrounding the event. The e-mail messages carry a variety of
enticing subject lines, many of them forged to appear to come
from reputable news agencies such as Time Magazine, BBC, and
CNN. The body of the messages contain a link purporting to
send the recipient to the &election results news page,8
where they will be able to view the desired video; however,
the link in fact directs the user to a webpage hosting an
embedded video designed to look like the DoS,
&America.gov8 site -- an online diplomacy tool that
operates as a &platform for the Department, other agencies,
the private sector, and civil society to engage in dialogue
with international audiences.8 Of note, varying descriptions
of attack specifics have been presented by leading computer
security vendors Sophos, Websense, and Cloudmark; however,
screen shots of the attacks provided by Cloudmark and Sophos
are identical. Because of this discovery, computer security
analysts have concluded this may be an indication that a
great deal of the massive amount of malicious traffic seen is
&being generated by a single exploit.8

31. (SBU) CTAD comment: After reaching the deceptive webpage,
the user is instructed to click on a provided link to
download Adobe Flash 9 in order to view the video. Selecting
this link initiates the process for infecting the user,s
computer with a Trojan horse program that installs a
&phishing kit8 onto the victim computer which is used to
collect sensitive data from the compromised system. According
to Websense, &major anti-virus vendors are not detecting
this threat;8 however, Symantec anti-virus solutions
deployed by the DoS do detect the malicious programs.

32. (SBU) CTAD comment: It is not new for cyber criminals to
capitalize on popular current events to deceive users into
unwittingly surrendering personal information. Nonetheless,
the techniques used in their attacks are becoming
increasingly sophisticated. The use of a website designed to
appear as an official USG-sponsored site illustrated in the
aforementioned attack is one of many tactics used to convince
users the provided content is legitimate, ultimately
increasing the likelihood of its success. CTAD strongly
recommends users remain informed about current phishing scams
and avoid clicking directly on links found on webpages and in
e-mail messages. In addition, e-mail messages suspected of
containing harmful links or attachments should be immediately
reported to the information systems security officer (ISSO)
in order to assist in the protection of DoS personnel,
computer systems, and networks. (Sophos
(, Graham Cluley,s Blog, &The
president-elect,s first malware campaign,8 November 5, 2008)

Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.