Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE118181
2008-11-05 23:39:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - ENRICHMENT AND
O 052339Z NOV 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STATE 118181
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM TRGY KS
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - ENRICHMENT AND
REPROCESSING (ENR) NON-PAPER
Sensitive but unclassified; protect accordingly.
UNCLAS STATE 118181
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM TRGY KS
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - ENRICHMENT AND
REPROCESSING (ENR) NON-PAPER
Sensitive but unclassified; protect accordingly.
1. (SBU) This is an action cable. Paragraph 3
contains the text of a non-paper on the issue
of reaching consensus on the criteria-based
approach to amending the Nuclear Suppliers
Guidelines to strengthen controls over the
export of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
facilities, equipment, and technology. This
issue was discussed by ISN DAS Hayward with
ROK interlocutors during bilateral meetings
with MEST and MOFAT officials on the margins
of the US/ROK Joint Standing Committee on
Nuclear Energy Cooperation, October 20-23,
2008. This non-paper is to follow up with
ROK officials, urging ROK support for going
to closure on the criteria-based approach as
proposed by the United States in May 2008,
including the criterion regarding ENR
recipients who are party to an agreement
related to ENR (as amended by the Berlin
NSG Plenary in May 2008).
Embassy is requested to provide the non-paper
as soon as possible to appropriate MOFAT and
MEST officials, including Joon OH, Deputy
Minister Of MOFAT for Multilateral, Global
and Legal Affairs, noting that a copy was
also provided to the ROK Embassy in Washington
via email and fax on November 5. Note also
that the cover letter to the ROK Embassy in
paragraph 2 requests a reply by Wednesday,
November 12.
2. (SBU) Text of cover letter to the ROK Embassy:
Minister Kim,
On behalf of ISN Acting Assistant Secretary McNerney,
please find attached the Enrichment and Reprocessing
(ENR) non-paper AA/S McNerney spoke of during last
Thursday,s meeting. A hard copy of the attached
non-paper has also been faxed to the ROK Embassy
here in Washington.
A copy of the non-paper will also be made available
to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul for transmission to MOFAT
and MEST.
Please let me know if you have any difficulty receiving
the document. We would greatly appreciate a reply by
next Wednesday, November 12th.
Best regards,
Thy Nguyen
End text cover letter.
3. (SBU) Begin text Non-Paper
Non-paper
Reaching Consensus on a Criteria-based Approach in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group
The United States seeks to achieve consensus at the
November 19, 2008 meeting of the Consultative Group
(CG) of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on a revised
U.S. criteria-based proposal for NSG control of
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
equipment and technology. Achieving consensus is an
important U.S. foreign policy objective.
The United States has taken note of the Republic of
Korea,s (ROK) concern with the U.S. proposal to include
the following language in Paragraph 6(b)(iv)of the NSG
Guidelines:
&Whether the transfer is consistent with existing
domestic and international obligations related to
enrichment or reprocessing to which any Government
associated with the transfer is a party.8
This aspect of the criteria is one of many factors
to be considered by a supplier State in deciding
whether to authorize a transfer of enrichment or
reprocessing technology. It does not constitute
a criterion that all NSG members have committed
to apply in determining whether to authorize supply
of trigger list items, such as those criteria
proposed for Paragraph 6(a) of the guidelines.
The U.S. proposal to further restrict enrichment
and reprocessing transfers by strengthening the
NSG guidelines is intended to prevent the further
spread of sensitive technologies and is consistent
with our joint efforts to strengthen the global
nonproliferation regime, including our work to
denuclearize fully the Korean Peninsula in the
context of the Six-Party Talks. We are concerned
that the current position of the ROK undermines
its principled position within the Six-Party Talks
and will undercut the September 19, 1992 Joint
Declaration, which reflects the commitments
undertaken by each of the Six Parties. Specifically:
- The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the
Six Party Talks includes the statement,
&The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and
implemented.8 The January 20, 1992 Joint
Declaration states that, &The South and the North
will not possess facilities for nuclear
reprocessing and uranium enrichment.8 By
incorporating into the agreement this language
from the 1992 Joint Declaration, the agreement
reflects the unambiguous commitment by South
Korea that nuclear reprocessing and uranium
enrichment will not be permitted on the Korean
Peninsula.
- The Six Party endorsement of the 1992 Joint
Declaration is an essential element of our
efforts to achieve the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
in a peaceful manner.
The ROK,s stated position on the United States,
proposed language in the NSG, if maintained,
would significantly undermine and weaken the
ROK,s commitment to uphold the 2005 Joint
Statement. The United States is very
concerned by the ROK,s position, which runs
contrary to the ROK,s long-established
commitments and could cause serious damage
to our coordinated efforts to achieve
success through the Six-Party Talks.
The United States would be concerned by any
attempt by the ROK to weaken Seoul,s
nonproliferation commitments under the 1992
Joint Declaration, the 2005 Joint Statement,
and the Six-Party Talks process.
As the United States recently discussed with
the ROK, we are prepared to move forward on
our proposal for continued cooperation in
research and development of pyroprocessing
technology, which we have shared separately,
in order to determine jointly with the ROK
whether pyroprocessing is feasible on a
technical and economic basis and acceptable
on nonproliferation grounds.
To evolve such proposals, we must continue
to work together to advance our broader
nonproliferation objectives and maintain
progress in the Six-Party Talks. To this
end, we strongly urge the ROK to reaffirm
its commitment to refrain from pursuing
reprocessing or enrichment capability,
and endorse the changes to the NSG
Guidelines as proposed by the United States.
End text of non-paper.
4. Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM TRGY KS
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP - ENRICHMENT AND
REPROCESSING (ENR) NON-PAPER
Sensitive but unclassified; protect accordingly.
1. (SBU) This is an action cable. Paragraph 3
contains the text of a non-paper on the issue
of reaching consensus on the criteria-based
approach to amending the Nuclear Suppliers
Guidelines to strengthen controls over the
export of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
facilities, equipment, and technology. This
issue was discussed by ISN DAS Hayward with
ROK interlocutors during bilateral meetings
with MEST and MOFAT officials on the margins
of the US/ROK Joint Standing Committee on
Nuclear Energy Cooperation, October 20-23,
2008. This non-paper is to follow up with
ROK officials, urging ROK support for going
to closure on the criteria-based approach as
proposed by the United States in May 2008,
including the criterion regarding ENR
recipients who are party to an agreement
related to ENR (as amended by the Berlin
NSG Plenary in May 2008).
Embassy is requested to provide the non-paper
as soon as possible to appropriate MOFAT and
MEST officials, including Joon OH, Deputy
Minister Of MOFAT for Multilateral, Global
and Legal Affairs, noting that a copy was
also provided to the ROK Embassy in Washington
via email and fax on November 5. Note also
that the cover letter to the ROK Embassy in
paragraph 2 requests a reply by Wednesday,
November 12.
2. (SBU) Text of cover letter to the ROK Embassy:
Minister Kim,
On behalf of ISN Acting Assistant Secretary McNerney,
please find attached the Enrichment and Reprocessing
(ENR) non-paper AA/S McNerney spoke of during last
Thursday,s meeting. A hard copy of the attached
non-paper has also been faxed to the ROK Embassy
here in Washington.
A copy of the non-paper will also be made available
to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul for transmission to MOFAT
and MEST.
Please let me know if you have any difficulty receiving
the document. We would greatly appreciate a reply by
next Wednesday, November 12th.
Best regards,
Thy Nguyen
End text cover letter.
3. (SBU) Begin text Non-Paper
Non-paper
Reaching Consensus on a Criteria-based Approach in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group
The United States seeks to achieve consensus at the
November 19, 2008 meeting of the Consultative Group
(CG) of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on a revised
U.S. criteria-based proposal for NSG control of
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
equipment and technology. Achieving consensus is an
important U.S. foreign policy objective.
The United States has taken note of the Republic of
Korea,s (ROK) concern with the U.S. proposal to include
the following language in Paragraph 6(b)(iv)of the NSG
Guidelines:
&Whether the transfer is consistent with existing
domestic and international obligations related to
enrichment or reprocessing to which any Government
associated with the transfer is a party.8
This aspect of the criteria is one of many factors
to be considered by a supplier State in deciding
whether to authorize a transfer of enrichment or
reprocessing technology. It does not constitute
a criterion that all NSG members have committed
to apply in determining whether to authorize supply
of trigger list items, such as those criteria
proposed for Paragraph 6(a) of the guidelines.
The U.S. proposal to further restrict enrichment
and reprocessing transfers by strengthening the
NSG guidelines is intended to prevent the further
spread of sensitive technologies and is consistent
with our joint efforts to strengthen the global
nonproliferation regime, including our work to
denuclearize fully the Korean Peninsula in the
context of the Six-Party Talks. We are concerned
that the current position of the ROK undermines
its principled position within the Six-Party Talks
and will undercut the September 19, 1992 Joint
Declaration, which reflects the commitments
undertaken by each of the Six Parties. Specifically:
- The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the
Six Party Talks includes the statement,
&The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and
implemented.8 The January 20, 1992 Joint
Declaration states that, &The South and the North
will not possess facilities for nuclear
reprocessing and uranium enrichment.8 By
incorporating into the agreement this language
from the 1992 Joint Declaration, the agreement
reflects the unambiguous commitment by South
Korea that nuclear reprocessing and uranium
enrichment will not be permitted on the Korean
Peninsula.
- The Six Party endorsement of the 1992 Joint
Declaration is an essential element of our
efforts to achieve the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
in a peaceful manner.
The ROK,s stated position on the United States,
proposed language in the NSG, if maintained,
would significantly undermine and weaken the
ROK,s commitment to uphold the 2005 Joint
Statement. The United States is very
concerned by the ROK,s position, which runs
contrary to the ROK,s long-established
commitments and could cause serious damage
to our coordinated efforts to achieve
success through the Six-Party Talks.
The United States would be concerned by any
attempt by the ROK to weaken Seoul,s
nonproliferation commitments under the 1992
Joint Declaration, the 2005 Joint Statement,
and the Six-Party Talks process.
As the United States recently discussed with
the ROK, we are prepared to move forward on
our proposal for continued cooperation in
research and development of pyroprocessing
technology, which we have shared separately,
in order to determine jointly with the ROK
whether pyroprocessing is feasible on a
technical and economic basis and acceptable
on nonproliferation grounds.
To evolve such proposals, we must continue
to work together to advance our broader
nonproliferation objectives and maintain
progress in the Six-Party Talks. To this
end, we strongly urge the ROK to reaffirm
its commitment to refrain from pursuing
reprocessing or enrichment capability,
and endorse the changes to the NSG
Guidelines as proposed by the United States.
End text of non-paper.
4. Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text