NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 116428 SIPDIS UNVIE FOR IAEA GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018 TAGS: AORC AS BR CA CH EG ENRG FR ID JA KNNP MNUC NZ PARM, PGOV, PREL, SF, UNGA, ZB, SW, NPT, IAEA SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE REF: 1. STATE 103725 Classified By: Amb. Marguerita D. Ragsdale. 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of the UN General Assembly,s First Committee meeting in New York, ISN/MNSA Director Marguerita Ragsdale, joined by Deputy Director Scott Davis, held informal bilaterals on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) issues October 13-15 with Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Zimbabwean Chair of the 2009 NPT next Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). Ambassador Ragsdale reiterated long-standing U.S. NPT priorities, such as strengthening Treaty compliance, and expressed U.S. concerns about the increasing politicization of nonproliferation issues seen at recent PrepComs and the 2008 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference (GC) that could carry over into upcoming NPT meetings. Concerns expressed by interlocutors also included the Middle East, as well as the effect of the U.S.-India Civil-Nuclear agreement on the NPT; some averred that NPT Parties should have modest ambitions for the third (2009) PrepCom, citing the setting of the agenda for the 2010 Review Conference as the only decision that is essential in 2009. The Chairman of the PrepCom, Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiki of Zimbabwe, has very little experience with NPT issues and is being engaged by many NPT Party representatives, including Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, in an effort to acquaint him with relevant issues. In a statement before the First Committee, the Philippines representative reiterated his government,s intention, announced in June 2008, to nominate a candidate for President of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). END SUMMARY U.S. PERSPECTIVES ¶2. (C ) Ambassador Ragsdale began each meeting with an overview of the U.S. outlook for the remainder of the NPT review cycle, focusing on the period up to the PrepCom, which will take place May 4-15 in New York. She noted we do not expect several key U.S. NPT priorities to change in the coming year, in particular our focus on the importance of Treaty compliance, dissuading Parties from withdrawing from the NPT, international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and further explanation of our strong record of action to achieve the goals of the NPT,s provisions on nuclear disarmament. Ambassador Ragsdale pointed out that the recent IAEA GC appeared to confirm an increased politicization of nuclear nonproliferation issues, particularly in the Middle East, that we are concerned could carry over to the 2009 and 2010 NPT meetings. She also reiterated U.S. views on modifying the procedures for selection of chairs and presidents of NPT meetings and the imbalanced scale of assessments for member states, funding of the expenses of those meetings. Specific comments from interlocutors are included below, with several expressing concern about the Treaty and its review process, as well as eagerness for U.S. leadership and flexibility. NPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST ¶3. (C) Ambassador Ragsdale told Egypt,s UN Permanent Representative (PermRep),Ambassador Maged Abdulaziz, that the United States hoped politicization of the IAEA GC could be avoided next year. Abdulaziz was clear that Egypt,s main goals are implementing the NPT,s 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and persuading Israel to join the NPT. He said that the Resolution was the main reason Egypt accepted the indefinite extension of the NPT and that some Egyptians are now asking why their country joined the Treaty, given that Israel has not joined after many years. He expressed pessimism about the future of the NPT review process, partly based on what he described as the U.S. position not to accept all elements of the 1995 and 2000 RevCon agreed documents. He opined that the United States is not really affected by the issues in the 1995 Resolution, which explains why the U.S. does not view it as a priority. Ragsdale noted the emphasis the U.S. has placed on the 1995 resolution and specifically the proposal by ISN Deputy Assistant Secretary STATE 00116428 002 OF 005 SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIR Hayward that Egypt, Israel and possibly other partners participate in a technical cooperation workshop. Davis provided further details on the workshop, which would bring together Egyptian, Israeli, and American scientists to discuss technical cooperation relevant to building confidence on regional security (Reftel). Abdulaziz asked figuratively "what,s in the workshop for me" and added that Cairo has not decided on the matter. Abdulaziz noted that Egypt will chair the NAM beginning in July 2009. ¶4. (C) In her discussions on the 1995 resolution,s call for a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East (MENWFZ),Ragsdale emphasized the U.S. view that progress in the peace process is needed before forward movement on such a zone, but that we are very interested in working with Middle East states and others to reach the goals of the 1995 Resolution. Swedish PermRep to the Conference on Disarmament (CD),Magnus Hellgren, averred that negotiations on a Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone could be expected without greater stability in the region, but that a final settlement of all Arab-Israeli conflicts may not be necessary before such a zone could be created. The UK,s CD PermRep, Ambassador John Duncan, suggested that the Egyptians realize that the 1995 Resolution,s goals and adherence to the NPT by Israel are not attainable in the foreseeable future, and yet they are priorities of President Mubarak, which results in tension and infighting among Egyptian officials. He added that the Egyptians are their "own worst enemy" on these issues and do not have a "bottom line" on how to proceed in addressing them. ¶5. (C) French CD PermRep Eric Danon said the proceedings and outcome of the IAEA GC has created tension between Egypt and France. France, as president of the EU, led EU efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable IAEA GC resolution on safeguards in the Middle East. Danon expressed concern about possible efforts by Egypt to seek a similar resolution at the upcoming 2009 NPT PrepCom. Egypt,s role in creating stalemate at the 2005 RevCon was mentioned by several interlocutors. South Africa,s United Nations PermRep, Leslie Gumbi, noted that it is only the security relationships created by the 1979 Camp David accords that keeps Egypt in the NPT and offered the view that Egypt could seek to &scupper8 the 2010 RevCon to express its displeasure with Israel,s absence from the NPT. He also urged the United States to state publicly that Israel should join the NPT. In reply to Ragsdale,s question about the possibility that Egypt might withdraw from the Treaty, based on comments to her from Ambassador Abdelaziz, Gumbi said Cairo may be posturing, but pointed out that few expected North Korea would withdraw before it actually did so. Canadian CD Ambassador Marius Grinius suggested to Ragsdale that Israel,s policy on nuclear matters is driven by its preference not to rely on others for its security. Many interlocutors - including those from the NAM - recognized the disruptive role Iran has played in NPT meetings, primarily to divert attention from its non-compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. Abdulaziz suggested that direct U.S.-Iranian contacts would reduce such Iranian obstructions, and Gumbi argued that U.S. decisions about engaging Iran will determine the role Iran plays in the NPT. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ¶6. (C) New Zealand,s CD PermRep, Don McKay, said that the NPT is at risk of "death by a thousand cuts" and that polarization is getting worse, largely because non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) believe that the United States overemphasizes nonproliferation and treats nuclear disarmament as "ancillary." Indonesian official Desra Percaya expressed a similar view and asked the United States to commit to the 2000 NPT RevCon,s "thirteen practical steps" to disarmament. McKay strongly urged us not to focus so much on compliance at the expense of disarmament and opined that the international reaction to North Korea,s nuclear weapon test had been muted because the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) perceive that the nuclear weapons states (NWS) "do not take disarmament seriously." ¶7. (C) In outlining New Zealand,s perspective, Ambassador McKay asked why the nuclear-weapon states - especially the United States, France, and the United Kingdom - are "allergic" to institutionalizing transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals. Characterizing the information that the NWS do offer as "drip feeding," he argued that NWS could get more credit for what they do, and push China toward greater STATE 00116428 003 OF 005 SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIR transparency in the disarmament realm, if the process is institutionalized. McKay suggested that all states have a stake in the issue of the readiness of nuclear forces, and asked the United States to engage more with Russia on reducing alert levels, at least as a confidence-building measure. Finally, he opined that legally-binding negative security assurances from the NWS to the NNWS would give the latter more incentive to remain in the NPT, since then they would have greater confidence that the former would not use nuclear weapons against them. ¶8. (C) Both Australian CD PermRep Caroline Millar and Canadian CD PermRep Marius Grinius praised U.S. disarmament outreach efforts at the UN, the CD, and NPT meetings. Swedish CD PermRep Hans Dalgren said that among Sweden,s priorities are CTBT entry into force (as did Millar),as well as greater transparency and lower readiness of NWS nuclear forces. Stating that "words can,t replace deeds," Brazil,s UN Mission First Secretary Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos asked how much more transparency NNWS could expect. Ragsdale stated that the U.S. tries to be as transparent as possible within the bounds of protecting its national security information. Brazil,s CD Counsellor Julio Laranjiera argued that the United States has reinterpreted the outcome of the 1995 and 2000 NPT RevCons. Ragsdale and Davis replied that it is the U.S. view that final documents reflect the intentions of Parties, but are not considered legally binding. ¶9. (C) Millar noted that Australia will serve as CD President from June - August 2009 and urged the United States to be more flexible in the next CD session on possible verification provisions in the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Sweden,s Dahlgren called for similar flexibility. Millar suggested that, if the CD cannot begin negotiations on an FMCT, presumably in the near future, at some point consideration should be given to negotiating the proposed treaty in another forum, such as the United Nations. Canada,s Grinius questioned whether U.S. policy on the importance of verification in denuclearizing North Korea contradicts the U.S. proposal for an FMCT without verification provisions. (Ragsdale and Davis pointed out that the agreements and their contexts are very different.) Millar also took the opportunity to discuss the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Commission proposed by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. She said its purpose is to reenergize the NPT and that its distinction will be to bring together prominent individuals from both NPT and non-NPT states. ROLE OF THE P-5 ¶10. (C) The UK,s Duncan took a broad view of the NPT review process, stating that Parties need to "reenergize the NPT" and that tensions among them is apparent. He called the P-5 statement, achieved at the second (2008) PrepCom, forms a "baseline to raise the game" but said a clearer view is needed of where the P-5 wants to go on the NPT. Duncan stated his belief that, in spite of its aggressive new policies, Russia would not be "mischievous" within the NPT. Hellgren took note of the 2008 P-5 statement but expressed concern about the differences in content between the 2008 statement and the statement by the P-5 in 2000, particularly on the "thirteen steps." China,s CD PermRep Wang Qun pointed out that the P-5 and NAM have very different perspectives of the NPT world and that the P-5 need to collaborate, adding that the group should try to agree on another statement at the third (2009) PrepCom. (Comment: Wang displayed a surprising lack of enthusiasm for the P-5 statement at the 2008 PrepCom, indicating at that time only that "we can live with it." End comment) Wang also said the United States has the leading role in the NPT, especially given the importance of negotiations with Russia on nuclear weapons reductions. Japan,s CD PermRep Ambassador Sumio Tarui suggested that the P-5 should focus in 2009 on addressing the outstanding Middle East issue. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ¶11. (C) Duncan pointed out that NPT Parties focus more on civil nuclear energy by "pulling together" various proposals for multilateral measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel. His deputy, Fiona Paterson, said she expects that Iran will focus on asserting its rights to peaceful uses in NPT meetings as part of its effort to divert attention from its noncompliance. Japan,s Tarui cited peaceful uses STATE 00116428 004 OF 005 SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIR as an issue on which NPT Parties might be able to reach consensus in upcoming meetings. Sweden,s Dahlgren described his country,s NPT priorities as centered on multilateral fuel cycle efforts and acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol as the nuclear "safeguards standard." Brazil,s CD PermRep Luiz Filipe de Macedo was cautious about multilateral fuel cycle proposals and said Brazil,s reaction to them is influenced by his countries plans for joint facilities with Argentina. Indonesia,s Percaya offered the perspective, which is widespread among NAM states, that such proposals would restrict their ultimate access to nuclear energy. China,s Wang said the nuclear "have-nots" are not happy with the several multilateral fuel cycle proposals that have been put forward, because of the view that they are discriminatory. ¶12. (C) Some interlocutors, including Egypt,s Abdelaziz, expressed concerns about the implications of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. Abdelaziz envisioned a similar request from Israel to the U.S. for cooperation and technology exchange. Tarui said that, as a result of the agreement, some now see the world in a new era he characterized as "beyond the NPT." Zimbabwe,s Chidyausiki opined that the agreement is a problem for the NPT and that China might now accept nuclear cooperation with Iran in its wake. Macedo said he expects unspecified consequences of the India deal for the NPT, and Percaya said Indonesia "regrets" the agreement. Ragsdale replied that it would strengthen the nonproliferation regime overall and is a recognition that India has acted responsibly as a possessor of nuclear technology and weapons. PROCEDURAL MATTERS ¶13. (C) The question of achievable objectives for the 2009 PrepCom was prominent in the discussions between Ambassador Ragsdale and her interlocutors, with a spectrum of views about how much can be expected in May. Tarui said getting the necessary procedural decisions (agenda and timetable) is a priority for Japan. Chidyausiki and China,s Wang suggested modest ambitions and argued that the PrepCom will be fortunate to agree on an agenda for the RevCon. (COMMENT: This is an important, matter given that a stalemate over the agenda at the 2005 RevCon resulted in Parties losing over two weeks of valuable discussion time in the four week event. The prospect of another such debacle is much dreaded by NPT players. END COMMENT) McKay and Hellgren also said they believe it could be difficult in the 2009 PrepCom to get agreement on an agenda for the 2010 RevCon. Gumbi pointed out that the agenda in 2005 was not "exhausted" and could form the basis for discussion in 2010. His South African colleague Johann Kellerman agreed that the 2005 agenda could be used in 2010, because it is the "practical" solution. China,s Wang was less optimistic that the 2005 agenda could be accepted for 2010. Percaya did not want Parties to get their expectations for the 2009 PrepCom too high but was optimistic about getting agreement on the agenda (as was Wang). Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos made perhaps the most sensible comment on the agenda question: "Delegations will raise what they want to raise, regardless of the agenda." ¶14. (C) According to agreement among NPT Parties in 2000, the third PrepCom is meant to produce substantive recommendations to the RevCon. However, considerable pessimism was expressed by interlocutors about prospects that it would do so in 2009 (the third PrepCom in 2004 did not agree on recommendations). Citing Egypt,s actions in 2004-5 as an example, Percaya pointed out that some delegations do not want a positive outcome unless they can prevail on certain positions. Gumbi said he believed recommendations would be hard to achieve and involve lots of "wrangling," especially because PrepCom chairs "have little control" over proceedings. Kellerman suggested that the process will be harder than in 2000, because more Parties will want to have a say in the outcome. He offered the view that recommendations are not a precondition to PrepCom success (Chang agreed),and that perhaps a short declaration of principles could be made instead. Tarui expressed hope for a similar outcome but said expecting too much would give Iran and possibly Syria more opportunity to "disturb" the PrepCom. McKay,s deputy, Charlotte Darlow, averred that Parties could have agreed on a final document in 2005 if they had not lost so much time in the agenda fight. Tarui and Hellgren both commented that a Chairman,s summary (not adopted by consensus) in lieu of a final document would have no value. ¶15. (C) Concerns about the unlikelihood of recommendations STATE 00116428 005 OF 005 SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIR coming out of next year,s PrepCom, combined with the chance that the U.S. elections would create ambiguity in U.S. policy, led at least three interlocutors to suggest that a fourth PrepCom, probably in fall 2009, should be considered. Chidyausiki, Hellgren, and Millar raised the possibility. Millar said there is a sense among some that the third PrepCom is too soon after the U.S. elections, adding that a fourth PrepCom took place before the 1995 RevCon and worked well. Tarui said he does not like the idea, and Ragsdale strongly resisted the notion of parties banking on such an outcome partly on grounds of cost (the U.S. would bear the largest share) and also on grounds that there would be no guarantee of a more productive outcome than in the 3rd PrepCom. ¶16. (C) The selection of Chidyausiki of Zimbabwe as PrepCom Chairman has provoked considerable efforts by various NPT Parties and groups of Parties, including the NAM, to promote regional issues and concerns in their consultations with him. The UK,s Paterson said she expected the Mason Group (Western countries) to meet with him (subsequently the meeting took place on October 22). She also indicated that many NAM countries seem to realize they made a mistake in choosing Chidyausiki. While affable and capable, they viewed him as lacking in experience on NPT matters. Percaya said Indonesia is unhappy with Chidyausiki,s selection but has arranged for him to participate, with Indonesia, in NPT "training" at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, CA. Gumbi said that, as a fellow African state, South Africa has a special obligation to support the Zimbabwean. ¶17. (C) Canada,s Grinius told us he hosted an October 10 meeting at the Canadian Mission in New York to begin interactions between representatives of a few non-nuclear-weapon-state NPT Parties and Chidyausiki. (Participants included Canada, Brazil, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway.) The meeting seems to have resulted from prodding from UN High Representative for Disarmament Sergio Duarte, from a concern about Chidyausiki,s ability to manage the PrepCom, and from a desire by these states to develop a working relationship with the latter in advance of the PrepCom. Grinius said the group will probably meet at least one more time before the next PrepCom. ¶18. (C) On October 13, the Philippines announced in the UNFC plenary that it would nominate Libran Cabactulan, currently its Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, as President of the 2010 RevCon. This is the first nomination of which we are aware, but in accordance with NPT review cycle practice, the president will come from an Asian NAM country. None of our interlocutors knew anything about Cabactulan. Ragsdale indicated that the United States believes that the procedure for choosing the leaders of NPT meetings should be modified to make it more open to choices from all NPT Parties and that the scale of assessment should be modified to reflect current economic circumstances. Few interlocutors commented on these points, although Wang may have seen the latter as suggesting an increased assessment for China. He pointedly noted that he would report Ragsdale,s having raised the point to Beijing. RICE