PSI: OPERATIONAL EXPERT GROUP MEETING IN PARIS,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 115964 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL SUBJECT: PSI: OPERATIONAL EXPERT GROUP MEETING IN PARIS, FRANCE (SEPTEMBER 25-26, 2008),PART 2 OF 2. REF: A. STATE 115935 ¶B. STATE 115948 SUMMARY ¶1. The seventeenth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting took place in Paris, France on September 25-26, 2008. Delegations from the 20 OEG countries participated. Information contained in this cable is provided for Posts' information and is not to be passed to host governments. OBJECTIVES AND ACTION REQUEST ¶2. REFTEL A provides a non-paper to pass to host nation governments of all PSI-endorsing states to keep them abreast of developments in the PSI community. REFTEL B contains part 1 of 2 of OEG reporting cable. Posts are requested to provide assessments of what PSI outreach activities (including exercises, table top exercises emphasizing a national response plan for WMD-related interdiction, commodity identification training, etc.) might provide value-added capacity-building effects to the host country. Email replies to POC are acceptable, following delivery of REFTEL non-paper. ¶3. Continuation of Chairman's Statement: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING PARIS, FRANCE September 25-26, 2008. PART 2 OF 2. Training - Outreach ¶4. France presented the outreach event she organised in cooperation with the Djiboutian authorities in March 2008 (Guistir). This event aimed to raise awareness in North African and Red Sea countries that are considered to be in strategic areas but not yet completely familiar with the PSI. OEG and local countries' interagency teams exchanged on the whole scope of PSI issues in a genuinely interactive manner. This seminar was followed by a live exercise at sea and in the harbour. The event showed how a country with considerable local knowledge but with limited means can effectively cooperate and act with an experienced country offering its expertise. ¶5. New-Zealand outlined its week-old Maru exercise. Its objectives were to improve the capabilities and interoperability of regional PSI partners, improve the collective understanding within the PSI community of disposition and liability issues, and encourage a greater understanding of the PSI within the Asia-Pacific region. Eight OEG members participated and 20 countries - including six OEG members and 10 from non-endorsing countries - sent obervers. The exercise focused on post interdiction issues, including the response to legal challenges to justify a course of action, liability, ownership and disposition of the goods seized, prosecution and media strategy. ¶6. Canada gave a presentation on the PSI inject into the "PANAMAX 08" exercise. This was a multinational exercise that brought together partner nations to address the security concerns and defence issues vital to the region. A PSI component was inserted: missile-related components transiting from a Middle-Eastern country, via France, through Canada, to a Latin American country. The exercise's impact was significant in terms of education, raising awareness, and outreach. The PSI inject into Panamax 08 was effectively leveraged and led to three main recommendations: 1. encourage inserting PSI components into general exercises, 2. leverage participation in appropriate exercises for PSI experience and 3. outreach opportunities. ¶7. Portugal announced the release of the Portuguese version of the national response plan, available to all PSI-endorsing states. Prospective Break-Out Group Reports Future of OEG Meetings Break-Out Session ¶8. Under New-Zealand chairmanship, participants STATE 00115964 002 OF 008 considered several issues and made proposals to strengthen the initiative's efficiency. With regards to the pace of OEGs, delegations said they would be comfortable with an annual global OEG meeting, and having at the same time more frequent regional OEGs with flexible formats and agendas. A number of countries stressed the need to ensure substantial discussion especially at regional OEGs. Membership -- There was general support to maintain the OEG's composition in its current format, while leaving open the possibility to enlarge participation on a case-by-case basis. The possibilities of inviting "special guests" to "20 members"-OEG, if needed, will also be kept under review. It was generally agreed that there could be more flexibility regarding membership or attendees in regional OEG meetings (including invitations to non-PSI endorsees). Continuity -- Regarding the issue of ensuring a better continuity between the meetings, the idea of a troika (past, current and upcoming chairmanship) for OEG meetings was discussed, as well as that of having a permanent chairmanship or co-chairing arrangements for the break-out groups. The United Kingdom, France and the United States, who compose the current troika, pointed out the relevance of such a mechanism and agreed to work on that format. Participants are invited to provide the current troika with ideas on how that mechanism should be implemented. New Zealand and Denmark volunteered to provide a first paper, the mechanism will be reviewed at the next OEG meeting. Communication -- The need for more effective communication among the OEG members was stressed, as was the need for better communication with non OEG PSI supporters. New Zealand offered to publish a PSI newsletter with contributions from partners. Outreach-Exercises Session ¶9. Under United States Chairmanship, discussions mainly focused on the ways and means to conduct outreach activities and the way to better coordinate them with exercises or bilateral events. In particular, partners examined the way to develop a tailored approach in outreach activities, the way and means to promote PSI activities for non-member states, the way to improve the tools (the master events list or a lessons identified databases),and the importance of interagency dimension. Partners identified key proposals the plenary should consider: -- Outreach - Exercises Breakout Group be continued at next OEG; -- Consider Lessons Identified database when planning future activities; -- Master Events List (MEL) to be historical record & future planning tool. Outreach to Industry Break-Out Session ¶10. Under British Chairmanship, the following delegations made presentations: -- France (sea carrier group) on the concrete needs and expectations of cargo industry regarding PSI, -- Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark on their national perspective, -- USA on air cargo specific issues. ¶11. All the participants underlined that involving industry and the business sector was essential to achieving success for the PSI. The main targets of the outreach for PSI are the export and transport industries (sea carrier groups and air cargo companies). Apart from PSI outreach, it was reminded that the export industry already obtains some information through outreach activities related to dual-use items export controls. ¶12. Certain countries have already involved the industry in PSI by organising regular meetings with the authorities involved in dual-use items controls and the concerned industries. Well-identified points of contact are considered to be key elements of a good cooperation between industry and authorities. This aspect should be integrated into the national response plans, which can not avoid examining the question of outreach to industry. STATE 00115964 003 OF 008 ¶13. It has to be a "win-win" cooperation: it is crucial that the government explains to the industrials what they have to gain from this cooperation: -- minimising the costs and financial impacts to preserve company interests, -- optimising reaction time of the export or transport industries, -- improving the flow of information from industry to authorities and vice-versa. The group concluded there is a need to bring existing documents and practices into concrete and detailed recommendations. This is a long-term effort but a necessary step at this stage of the PSI,s activities. Break-Out Group Reports Exercise Planning ¶14. Discussions in the Exercise Breakout group centred on the forthcoming events, useful tools for future planning and the lessons learned. Presentations were also given on the exercises to take place in 2009. ¶15. Forthcoming events The schedule was updated for 2009: -- OEG with regional participation in the United States (May) -- regional OEG in Poland (June) -- exercise organized by the US (October) -- exercise organized by Singapore (November) Italy enquired about inserting into the master events list the possibility of a tentative PSI activity in spring 2009 (April, TBC). As to 2010: -- the US will reiterate PSI inject in Panamax exercise (August); -- Australia is considering organizing a regional event (details to be confirmed). -- Australia gave a short presentation of the PSI Master Events List (MEL). This tool, to be posted on the PSI website hosted by Germany, will be coordinated by Australia until 2010. Participants were requested to update the list of point of contact and events to be included in the MEL. Future exercises ¶16. The group pointed out the need for OEG members to identify special targets to focus on. But it was also agreed that this process should be achieved on a flexible basis, depending on the objectives chosen. Participants were encouraged to further work on this specific issue, by determining each OEG country preferred area of influence. Lessons learned ¶17. Dealing with the matrix of lessons learned, participants agreed that it would be very useful to post it on the website in the future. In the while, this would only be the case for the ten lessons that had been identified in previous OEG meetings as priorities, switched into recommendations for future exercise planning. Exercises ¶18. Poland gave a presentation on a PSI simulating game system called "Hamster" intended to develop the idea of table top exercises. This training system would not require specific computers on participant side and would allow partners to work together without requiring them to be in the same location. Poland would be ready to provide the OEG with a demonstration of the application during the US OEG in May 2009. ¶19. Singapore gave a presentation on its forthcoming exercise to take place in November 2009. This exercise could consist of a table top exercise, a maritime interdiction phase and port search phase. It is intended to allow sharing knowledge and capacity building with PSI partners and outreach to non-PSI partners. OEG members participation was encouraged. ¶20. The US made an introduction to its exercise "Leading Edge 2010" scheduled for October 2009. With a table top exercise and a maritime exercise, "Leading edge 2010" STATE 00115964 004 OF 008 will explore integration of Customs, Law Enforcement, military actions and assets in interdicting shipments of WMD proliferation concern. US objective are to maintain "international flavour" and involve all relevant agencies. It will take place in the Gulf region. 21.Although the UK had to cancel its exercise previously planned for April 2009, it was in a position to share interesting views on key objectives for next exercises: multi-agency, outreach different levels, industry involvement (airline, airport, transports by land, etc.). Intelligence Break-Out Session ¶22. The Intelligence group had a discussion on various topics and came up with concrete proposals. -- First cluster of topics relates to understanding the nature of the threat. A presentation on the outcome of the Red Teaming exercise in London shed light on all procurement and shipping methods that may be used by proliferators. They consist of: -- security means to protect and hide procurement operations -- growing complexity of procurement networks -- growing sophistication of the delivery chain to avoid detection and interception -- diversification of sea and air transportation methods. -- The group valued this type of exercice as a way to help us open our minds, focus on new areas and feed the intelligence collection process. This enables us to identify ways and means on how proliferators operate, hence to direct our intelligence collection and analytical work. -- In the course of the discussion, the group had an exchange of views on the growing importance of the trade between countries of concern and emerging economies' trade. Developed countries are losing part of their monopoly on the production of goods, material and technology used and purchased by proliferators. This trend has to be taken into account in identifying new sources of proliferation. -- The group touched upon the possibility for non state actors to become not only providers of CBRN material and technologies, but also end-users (eg, terrorist groups). Though the intent exists, very few actual and significant attempts have been uncovered. The group recognised the difficulty to make CP and CT people work together and combine their respective approaches and knowledge and the need to improve this. -- The second cluster of topics relates to what we have to do to counter proliferation A presentation was made on the analytical work that is the indispensable underpinning of any action. This work should be made at a global level in order to have the best understanding of WMD programmes and procurement networks and methods. This enables us to detect and assess specific cases likely to trigger interceptions. Recent experiences on real cases have shown the value of this dialectic. -- The group heard a presentation on the issue of managing the risk of intangible technology transfer. Australia shared its compilation of OEG responses to the CP ITT Matrix and thanked members for their contributions, encouraging further responses. -- Finally, the group came up with two proposals and two recommendations. Referring to the value of the Red Teaming exercise, the group welcomes the organisation of a similar exercise at the next OEG meeting. It raises the issue of the usefulness of associating people from shipping/transportation sectors. This would contribute to help us understand how they operate and what it means for our work. -- Given that much of the goods and materials sold by North Korea have been shipped by sea, a proposal was made to share information on North Korean owned or operated vessels. This information would be passively collected and shared on a voluntary basis. The group supports this proposal. Practically, information would be exchanged within the intelligence group at each OEG meeting. In the light of how the initiative develops, the group could reflect on other ways and means to exchange that information on a more on-going basis. The group is of STATE 00115964 005 OF 008 the view this is a concrete through modest step towards fostering the sharing of information. -- The intelligence group values the existence of and the work by a group dedicated solely to intelligence - a domain that is key to CP in general and PSI in particular, and has its specificities and areas of competence. -- Finally the intelligence group supports the recommendation that each group would have a co-chair. Combined Legal and Law Enforcement Break-Out Session ¶23. Partners discussed in length the added-value of the 2005 SUA instrument to the PSI objectives. Partners noted that SUA is a tool for state cooperation that could help in countering proliferation by sea. It is the first multilateral instrument dealing with criminalizing the proliferation of any WMD and their means of delivery, as well as the related dual-use items. The options offered by the SUA Protocol with regard to boarding in high sea were reminded. -- A point was made on status of its ratification: among the six states, Spain is the first PSI partner having ratified the SUA amended instrument in July 2008. In doing so, Spain did not meet any specific domestic difficulties in the ratification process. Besides the enactment of a recent act on proliferation issues, the Spanish penal code covers all the new SUA offences in a material way. A number of other PSI partners are in the same process now. ¶24. Partners noted the specific added value of the presentation made by the US delegation which provided a survey of the nine bilateral shipboarding agreements, which are in compliance with the implementation of UNSCR 1540, PSI objectives and the provisions of the SUA Protocol. SUA encourages states parties to conclude such agreements to facilitate law enforcement operations (art 8 bis 13),which is of particular interest to meet the PSI objectives. These bilateral agreements facilitate the shipboarding among states which want to counter proliferation shipments. PSI members had the opportunity during the break-out session to take the measure of the benefits of such agreements, which will be very helpful for the development of internal procedures to deal with boarding operations. The US delegation circulated models of boarding forms that are used to request the authorisation of the flag state to board and, if evidence is found, to request information for disposition. ¶25. Delegations discussed a number of legal issues related to boarding operations in high sea under the 2005 Protocol, including the boarding regime itself and law enforcement procedures, the nature of these standards for this boarding operations (domestic, international with regards to human rights). They also discussed the identification of the competent jurisdiction. The UK delegation stressed that many of these issues are already addressed in the Vienna Convention against drug trafficking (art 17),while recognizing that proliferation issues posed specific challenges. ¶26. As a conclusion, the need to keep discussing in PSI framework the legal issues related to the implementation of the 2005 SUA Protocol was highlighted, in order to help PSI partners finding efficient and operational solutions. A number of delegations expressed their interest in having increased exchanges of experience about real cases to progress in the implementation of the Protocol. It was also mentioned that the provisions of the SUA Protocol should serve as a basis for the discussion under the ICAO to introduce new offences to counter proliferation by air. PSI partners were encouraged, while respecting the sovereignty of any PSI States, to engage and/or accelerate the ratification process of the 2005 SUA Protocol. Media Strategy Break-Out Session ¶27. The break-out group chairman outlined the potential components and objectives of a media strategy. This included examining whether it was necessary to communicate on the PSI, and if so, what form the communication should take to rally all national and international actors to stop proliferation flows. ¶28. All participants felt concerned by the issue of PSI STATE 00115964 006 OF 008 media strategy. Discussions established the necessity of bearing in mind and addressing regional specificities and concerns. France indicated that there are concerns in Europe about the PSI being a secretive group lacking transparency. When addressing these issues, participants emphasised the necessity of elaborating different media strategies targeting specific actors. Thus, any communication strategy ought to be tailored to regional, country, and actor specificities. There was a consensus in acknowledging that the main target is not public opinion - this is usually already dealt with at national level - but rather policy makers in non-PSI countries and key private actors. ¶29. Participants further underlined the difference between communicating on PSI exercises or meetings, and PSI real interdictions. The first is useful for outreach and media strategies already exist - in fact, they have been quite successful. The second is more delicate because of the sensitivity of the information involved. ¶30. All participants agreed on the usefulness of creating a pool of information (for example, a databank, guidelines on responses to media enquiries) on which to draw. Different target audiences exist: the first, official, for general access; the second, restricted, for PSI member states; the third as an external source of information (perhaps a commonly elaborated Wikipedia page). Ultimately, participants noted relevant targets for a communication strategy: a media strategy is relevant in that it influences foreign public opinion and decision makers; a communication strategy also helps in general outreach activities. Although the two are distinct, a link exists - a communication strategy aimed at foreign decision makers in less active PSI member states or states that are not members of the PSI could rest on elements also useful to a media strategy. ¶31. It was agreed that Questions and Answers (Q&A) would be a useful tool on which partners could work. Australia suggested to build on its own set of legal frequently asked questions (FAQs),which France will circulate and work with the US and the UK to integrate OEG member states' comments. Break-out group participants agreed to experiment with the troika format for its work. Legal and Law Enforcement Issues ¶32. Turkey presented the review of its export control legislation, starting with the working group of export control experts who in particular examined best practises in order to transpose them in new pieces of legislation (for example, the consolidated national control list took the EU list as a model). As a result, the draft law on strengthening the export controls of dual use and sensitive goods was submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in June 2008. ¶33. Australia spoke of the progress by ICAO on existing legal framework (updating the Montreal and Hague Conventions). Following the previous Australian presentation at the London OEG, this one pointed out key issues on models of transport of materials offences. In next months, there is an opportunity for improvement in the international legal framework to build on mechanisms for international cooperation. Australia requested OEG states to consider the draft and provide comments. Australia also emphasised the necessity of liaising with industry and, in terms of the way forward, Australia stressed especially the need to explain the proposal and engage broader range of states. ¶34. The US examined disposition and liability with a focus on the question of goods abandoned or unclaimed. It suggested creating a folder in the PSI legal library on the website dedicated to potential solutions for difficult legal issues. The US presented its legal framework relevant to dealing with abandoned or unclaimed merchandise suspected to be linked to WMD. The presentation outlined customs abandonment statutes, issues related to the disposition of abandoned or unclaimed merchandise, and liability. The US concluded that abandonment to the US government is an option where the goods are not subject to seizure. ¶35. France outlined its national legal process relevant to PSI. In particular, France commented on its proliferation response plan, on the global objectives, initial assessment, proposals for improvements and other improvements worth considering in reinforcing its STATE 00115964 007 OF 008 relevant legislation (especially penal procedure, penal laws and customs laws). It concluded by underlining achievements over the last 18 months: a national response plan related to WMD proliferation and associated SOPs, a draft law to reinforce French legislation, new dual-use goods export control mechanisms, and a draft PM directive calling all institutions to take into account WMD counter proliferation. ¶36. The US gave a presentation on law enforcement issues. Dealing with the enforcement operations (information acquisition, analysis and targeting, engaging industry, supply chain security and capacity building),the presentation showed the way ahead: maintain the law enforcement break-out group, adopt a regional approach in capacity building and develop a law enforcement guidelines document. The US hopes to have elaborated this document by the next OEG meeting in May. The document's objective would be to identify law enforcement capabilities towards interdiction, ensure the right law enforcement experts are part of the full national team, and identify areas that need to be addressed as part of capacity building. ¶37. France on the role of customs in control of dual use goods and technology, starting from licensing procedure to offences and penalties. It outlined the basic principles of customs control of dual-use goods: it is based mainly on EU Regulation 1334/2000, which covers products controlled under various international non-proliferation regimes. This Community Regulation set up a community regime for the control of dual-use items and technology exports. The presentation showed that this regulation is fully and directly applicable in French law and that it will be clarified by French customs. France further listed the different licence types used in France, the licensing procedure, the role of French customs in controlling dual-use exports, and the relevant offences and penalties. It concluded by mentioning the French customs intelligence and investigation service in charge of dual-use goods. ¶38. ANNEX: SUMMARY OF OEG ACTION ITEMS -- Delegations will review the current content of the PSI website and notify the German government of any recommended changes or deletions. Delegations will further discuss the content of the PSI website hosted by Germany, the different levels of access and the use of this tool. -- New Zealand will publish a PSI newsletter. -- Delegations will prepare for a new real case debriefing session at the next OEG. -- Delegations agreed that reporting on FATF activity and ICAO process should continue. -- Delegations agreed on further web-based exchanges on possible solutions to legal issues, including further work on disposition and liability issues. -- Delegations agreed on the need to further work on media strategy issues. France will circulate the Australian legal FAQs and work with the US and the UK to integrate the OEG member states comments. -- Delegations agreed to implement a troika process, including the last, the current and the future OEG host nations. UK, France and US agreed to initiate such a process. New Zealand and Denmark will prepare a paper to be circulated to partners on that mechanism. That mechanism will be reviewed at the next OEG meeting. -- Delegations discussed the possibility of having again two separate legal issues and law enforcement break-out sessions. -- Delegations agreed to give further consideration to industry outreach, in particular to bring existing documents and practices together in concrete and detailed recommendations. -- As far as the intelligence working group is concerned, delegates agreed: - To pursue the exchange of information on North Korean vessels on a voluntary basis; - To consider co-chairmanship of this working group. -- Poland will host a European regional meeting in STATE 00115964 008 OF 008 June 2009. -- United States will host an OEG with regional participation in Miami in 12th-14th May 2009. END OF PSI OEG CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT POINTS OF CONTACT ¶37. Please slug responses for OSD GSA (Beth Flores) and State/ISN/CPI (Carlos Guzman). USG POC for PSI Operational Experts Group issues is Beth Flores, OSD/GSA (beth.flores@osd.mil). USG POC for PSI policy issues is Carlos Guzman, State/ISN/CPI (GuzmanCS@state.gov). RICE