PREVENTING IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF NEW SUPPLIES OF

UNCLAS STATE 115454 SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EMIN ENRG ETTC IR MNUC PARM TRGY SUBJECT: PREVENTING IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF NEW SUPPLIES OF URANIUM REF: A. STATE 077744 ¶B. ASTANA 001649 07 STATE 119630 07 ¶C. LONDON 2848 ISN A/S ROOD-AUSTRALIAN AMB. RITCHIE DISCUSSION ¶D. 7 AUGUST 2007 ¶E. 07 WINDHOEK 458 ¶F. 07 STATE 093518 ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4. ¶2. (SBU) OBJECTIVES FOR ASTANA AND TASHKENT: -- In coordination UK counterparts in country, Embassies Astana and Tashkent should convey to appropriate host government officials continuing U.S. concerns regarding possible Iranian attempts to procure new stocks of uranium. -------------- BACKGROUND: -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Following our initial effort to encourage the world,s most significant uranium producers against supplying to Iran, the United States is also encouraging partners to deliver similar demarches to reinforce the U.S. effort. (Note: For further background on the uranium issue, see refs A and B.) As a result of these discussions, the United Kingdom has agreed to approach Astana and Tashkent to remind those governments of the risks involved in trade with Iran, particularly in the area of uranium. The UK has asked the US to participate in the UK demarche. The UK also intends to ask Canada to participate, particularly in Kazakhstan where Canada reportedly is developing significant relationships with the Kazakh nuclear industry. -------------- ACTION REQUEST FOR ASTANA AND TASHKENT: -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Posts are requested to closely coordinate with their UK counterparts in capitals and offer to participate in a joint approach as described in para 3. Posts are requested to assist in the delivery of a joint demarche with the UK and possibly Canada, as appropriate, recalling previous discussions described in REFTEL. The demarche should underscore the likelihood that Iran will seek to procure uranium from sources in the near term. Posts should stress with host governments their international legal obligation to prevent the transfer or sale of uranium to Iran. Posts should note that Iran often utilizes front companies and illicit mechanisms for its nuclear procurement, which highlights the need for states and their domestic firms to exercise extraordinary caution in engaging with entities. Posts should recommend that host governments approach any domestic firms involved in uranium production or trade to warn them of the risks of supplying to Iran. Posts should request that, if Iran contacts host government firms/entities in search of uranium, those requests should be denied and reported to the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee so there is greater visibility on Iran,s practices. Posts are requested to monitor the domestic nuclear industry and to report any substantial uranium deals, particularly those that are with unestablished end users. Finally, posts should make clear that if Iran claims it is seeking uranium in order to support a legitimate civil nuclear energy program, the updated P5 1 incentives package provides for nuclear cooperation including a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply. ¶5. (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive responses by 7 November 2008. Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) and Risa Mongiello (ISN/RA, 202-736-4730, MongiellRN@state.gov) are the Department's POC for this activity. RICE