CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): HOST COUNTRY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 112672 SIPDIS THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL KTIA CWC CA SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): HOST COUNTRY AGREEMENT WITH CANADA ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS (SBU) REF: STATE 163675 Classified By: ISN/CB Office Director Robert Mikulak. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Action Request in Paragraph 8. -------------- OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (C-REL CANADA) Department requests Embassy to pursue the following objectives: -- Work with the Government of Canada to negotiate a Host Country Agreement (HCA) on the conduct of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspections. -- Set up a meeting between U.S. and Canadian officials during the CWC Conference of the States Parties scheduled to take place December 2-5, 2008. -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶3. (U) Embassy should report results of discussions with Canadian officials by cable to ISN/CB Eugene Klimson NLT November 14, 2008. -------------- POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶4. (U) Please contact ISN/CB Eugene Klimson at (202) 647-5165 or via email for any further background needed to meet our objectives. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶5. (C-REL CANADA) The United States and Canada have been negotiating a Host Country Agreement (HCA) on the conduct of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspections since ¶2005. In October 2005, The United States delivered a Draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Canada. ¶6. (C-REL CANADA) After several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations, Canada provided the U.S. delegation with a copy of the U.K./Canadian draft HCA in November 2007. The delegation (which included Mr. Louis-Phillippe Sylvestre and Grant LoPatriello from the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Adrian Ghita-Duminica of the Department of National Defence) indicated that if the United States was willing to pursue negotiations through the short-memo approach, they would make every effort to process the memo quickly in their system (REFTEL). ¶7. (C) Washington has reviewed the Canadian example and has revised it to meet U.S. interests. Washington is now seeking to get the draft delivered to Canada in sufficient time for Canada to review and be ready to hold discussions at the CWC Conference of the States Parties scheduled for December 2-5, 2008 in The Hague. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶8. (C-REL CANADA) Drawing on the background and talking points, Embassy Ottawa is requested to deliver the talking points in paragraph 9 and the draft HCA text in paragraph 10 to the appropriate Canadian officials and report the results of these discussions to Washington by November 14, 2008. -------------- TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶9. (C-REL CANADA) Talking points for delivery: - The United States appreciates Canada's continued cooperation in working towards the conclusion of a Host Country Agreement (HCA) in the event of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspection involving both U.S. and Canadian assets. - During the CWC 2007 Conference of the States Parties in The Hague, our representative, Dr. Deborah Ozga, met with your delegation to discuss the prospect of continuing our negotiations on a CWC HCA. - At that time, your delegation provided us with a sample text for a Diplomatic Note which your government preferred to use as a basis for negotiating a Host Country Agreement. - The United States has reviewed the text and has formulated a proposal based upon that draft model. - We ask that you consider our proposal. - We will have expert representatives in The Hague for the Conference of the States Parties scheduled for December 2-5, ¶2008. We would welcome a meeting to discuss our proposal at that time. We would also welcome any preliminary comments you may have before then. - We look forward to bringing this matter to a conclusion. End of Talking Points. -------------- DRAFT TEXT -------------- ¶10. (C-REL CANADA) Text for Delivery to Canadian Officials: Mr. James A. Junke National Coordinator Canadian National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 125 Sussex Drive Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K6 Dear Mr. Junke I have the honor to refer to the discussions between the United States and Canada concerning challenge inspections under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). The United States proposes that a set of arrangements and principles for the conduct of challenge inspections under the Convention apply to the conduct of any challenge inspection in the territory of one Participant in which the assets of the other Participant may be within, or in the vicinity of, the inspection site. Nothing in these principles should be interpreted as altering in any way any agreements in force between the United States and Canada. These principles should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Convention and any agreements entered into between either Participant and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the event there is a conflict between the provisions of the Convention or any agreement between either Participant and the OPCW and this arrangement, the provisions of the Convention or such agreement with the OPCW should take precedence. In this regard, the United States understands that the Canadian National Authority has informed the Director-General of the OPCW that, in accordance with Canadian domestic legislation, Canada will be the sole inspected State Party for any challenge inspection on its territory except for cases in which a sovereign vessel or aircraft of another country is the subject of the inspection. Canada understands that the United States does not have domestic legislation similar to Canada's that would require that the United States be the sole inspected State Party for any challenge inspection on its territory. The arrangements and principles may be amended in writing by the United States and Canada. If the principles and arrangements set out in the Annex below are acceptable to the Government of Canada, I have the honor to suggest that this letter and your reply to that effect will place on record the understanding of the United States and Canada in this matter that will come into effect on the date of your reply and will remain in effect until 90 days after the receipt of notice of termination by either Canada or the United States. Yours sincerely, Robert Mikulak National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention Department of State Washington, D.C. USA End text. ¶11. (C-REL CANADA) Begin Annex: Annex Principles and Arrangements Concerning the Conduct of Challenge Inspections Pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) For the purpose of these principles and arrangements, &Host State Party8, denotes the State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of another State Party to this Convention, that are subject to inspection under the CWC. The &non-Host Party8 is the State on whose territory a challenge inspection is not taking place but that may have an asset potentially affected by a challenge inspection. &Inspected State Party8 is used in accordance with the Verification Annex, Part I.12. The &other Participant8 denotes the Participant that is not the inspected State Party. The United States and Canada affirm the importance of the effective implementation of the CWC and intend to work closely and cooperatively together in order to fulfill their obligations concerning the conduct of a challenge inspection under the Convention. The United States and Canada affirm that nothing in this Annex should be interpreted as altering in any way any agreements in force or understandings in effect between the United States and Canada or in a manner that is inconsistent with the Convention, or any agreements entered into between either Participant and the OPCW. ¶I. In the event that a challenge inspection takes place on the territory of the United States or Canada, and that inspection may affect the assets of the non-Host Party, the United States and Canada each intend to: ¶A. Coordinate to ensure that their sovereign rights can be exercised and national interests protected in meeting their obligations under the Convention. ¶B. Make every effort to provide, within two hours of receipt of a notification of a challenge inspection on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), copies of the Inspection Notification and the identity of the Requesting State Observer to the other Participant. In addition, the Inspected State Party intends to provide a copy of the Inspection Mandate to the other Participant when received from the inspectors. The points of contact for notifications to the United States are the United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (telephone 01-202-647-9166, fax 01-202-647-4892) and the U.S. Northern Command Joint Operations Center (01-719-554-2361, fax 01-719-554-2368). The point of contact for notification for Canada is (Canada to provide). ¶C. Exercise full sovereign rights with regard to its government sovereign vessels and aircraft. When government sovereign vessels and aircraft are the sole object of an inspection, the Participant owning or operating such assets should be the inspected State Party. If the Host State Party, not owning these assets, is designated the inspected State Party, the Host State Party should advise the OPCW that the government vessel or aircraft is solely under the jurisdiction and control of the non-Host State Party and that, therefore, the non-Host State Party is properly the inspected State Party. ¶D. Provide each other, as soon as possible after receipt of initial notification, any relevant information about the inspection as such information becomes available. ¶E. Upon receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, consult with each other if any individuals on the list raise concerns, and on the access that should be accorded that individual. ¶F. Consult with each other regarding whether to accept an observer designated by the Requesting State Party whenever assets from both Participants may be within the inspectable area, and on the degree of access that the requesting State Party observer should be accorded. ¶G. Consult with each other concerning the handling of media relations before, during, and after a challenge inspection. ¶H. Reach agreement on the release of any information provided pursuant to these principles and arrangements to any third party. ¶I. Exchange the names of approved inspectors on an annual basis. II. The Host State Party intends to: ¶A. Expedite the entry of the liaison officers, and their equipment and material (possibly including a mobile laboratory) from the non-host State Party into its territory, which may include, but is not limited to, the provision of aircraft and diplomatic clearance, and assistance with customs. ¶B. Manage the conduct of the inspection when taking place on its territory, to take into account the need of personnel from the non-host State Party to travel from the territory of the non-host State Party to the inspection site in order to assist the host State Party in the expeditious conduct of the inspection. III. The Inspected State Party should: ¶A. Allow the other Participant to send representatives to observe and participate in pre-inspection activities, including equipment inspection, and to assist in the preparation of the other Participant's assets that may be subject to inspection. ¶B. Allow the other Participant to observe and participate in perimeter negotiations when its assets may be included in or affected by the inspection. ¶C. Consult with the other Participant on any discussions or clarifications of the requested, alternate perimeter or final perimeter before a position regarding an alternate or final perimeter is offered to the inspection team. ¶D. Not provide access to any area, building, or facility used by the other Participant without prior consultation with the designated representative of the other Participant. ¶E. Not provide access to any citizen, equipment or vehicle owned by the other Participant without prior consultation with the designated representative of the other Participant and an opportunity to prepare its asset. ¶F. Allow the other Participant to implement managed access procedures to its assets in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. ¶G. Coordinate with the other Participant on the provision of access or information to be given to the inspection team concerning an asset of the other Participant. ¶H. Provide the other Participant, on a cost-recovery basis, any administrative support required or requested, including transportation, accommodation, lodgings, meals, communications, and any necessary protective clothing or equipment. ¶I. Ensure that the other Participant, if deemed necessary, has up to 108 hours from the inspection team's arrival at the point of entry before providing the inspection team access to its assets inside the perimeter. ¶J. Provide the other Participant a copy of the Preliminary Inspection Report and Draft Final Inspection Report as soon as such findings are provided to the Inspected State Party by the Inspection Team. ¶K. Provide the other Participant an opportunity to offer comments within 24 hours on the Preliminary Inspection Report hours and similarly offer comments within 48 hours on the Draft Final Inspection Reports with respect to any parts thereof pertaining to the national security interests of the other Participant. ¶L. Consult with the other Participant on any request for the extension of the period of inspection. ¶M. Provide to the other Participant, without delay, all information resulting from the inspection pertaining to the national security interests of the other Participant. End Annex. RICE