Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE112544
2008-10-22 17:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):

Tags:  MTCRE PARM MNUC KSCA ETTC TSPA AS 
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O 221759Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 112544 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2033
TAGS: MTCRE PARM MNUC KSCA ETTC TSPA AS

SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):
GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE
NOVEMBER 2008 MTCR PLENARY (U)

REF:
A) STATE 106288 (PLENARY PROPOSALS)
B) STATE 67437 (SMALL GROUP)
C) STATE 26726 (SMALL GROUP)
D) STATE 34976 (RPOC GUIDANCE)
E) 04 STATE 070817 (MEMBERSHIP)
F) STATE 106631 (IE MACHINE TOOLS)
G) STATE 107020 (IE SHIPPING)
H) STATE 104882 (IE PERCHLORATES)
I) STATE 105029 (IE DPRK)
J) STATE 105103 (IE IRAN)
K) STATE 105132 (IE CHINA)
L) STATE 105464 (IE SYRIA)
M) STATE 112061 (IE CASE STUDY)
N) STATE 109138 (IE RISK TECHNOLOGIES)
O) STATE 109845 (IE BROKERING)
P) STATE 88861 (LEEM PLANS)
Q) STATE 112053 (LEEM MACHINE TOOLS)
R) LEEM OEE PRESENTATION
S) LEEM ICE PRESENTATION
T) LEEM CASE STUDIES
U) 07 STATE 132312 (TEM UAV/CM PROPOSAL)
V) STATE 110013 (NON-PARTNER REPORT)


Classified by ISN Acting DAS Eliot Kang.
Reasons: 1.4 (B),(C),(D),and (H).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 112544 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2033 TAGS: MTCRE PARM MNUC KSCA ETTC TSPA AS SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE NOVEMBER 2008 MTCR PLENARY (U) REF: A) STATE 106288 (PLENARY PROPOSALS) B) STATE 67437 (SMALL GROUP) C) STATE 26726 (SMALL GROUP) D) STATE 34976 (RPOC GUIDANCE) E) 04 STATE 070817 (MEMBERSHIP) F) STATE 106631 (IE MACHINE TOOLS) G) STATE 107020 (IE SHIPPING) H) STATE 104882 (IE PERCHLORATES) I) STATE 105029 (IE DPRK) J) STATE 105103 (IE IRAN) K) STATE 105132 (IE CHINA) L) STATE 105464 (IE SYRIA) M) STATE 112061 (IE CASE STUDY) N) STATE 109138 (IE RISK TECHNOLOGIES) O) STATE 109845 (IE BROKERING) P) STATE 88861 (LEEM PLANS) Q) STATE 112053 (LEEM MACHINE TOOLS) R) LEEM OEE PRESENTATION S) LEEM ICE PRESENTATION T) LEEM CASE STUDIES U) 07 STATE 132312 (TEM UAV/CM PROPOSAL) V) STATE 110013 (NON-PARTNER REPORT) Classified by ISN Acting DAS Eliot Kang. Reasons: 1.4 (B),(C),(D),and (H). ¶1. (U) The following guidance is provided to the U.S. delegation participating in the November 3-7, 2008, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary in Canberra. OBJECTIVES ////////// ¶2. (C) The delegation should seek adoption during this Plenary of the U.S. proposal to modernize the Regime's technical criteria for controlling exports of UAVs and cruise missiles. The delegation also should remind the MTCR Partners of the importance of Regime members giving priority attention to regional missile proliferation issues and seek support for the U.S. proposals on MTCR Technical Outreach and Machine Tools, as well as other proposals developed by "small group" members to help the MTCR focus on specific areas of priority proliferation concern. In addition, the delegation should support efforts to enhance transparency of MTCR activities and promote dialogue with non-members, especially activities involving practical cooperation on key nonproliferation issues. DISCUSSION OF PLENARY AGENDA ITEMS ////////////////////////////////// ¶3. (C) In discussing Plenary agenda items, the delegation should lead the MTCR Partners to courses of
action that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives, including nonproliferation and national security policy considerations. In particular, the delegation should be prepared to engage in a discussion of the following issues: A) (C) OPERATIONS OF THE POINT OF CONTACT (POC) ///////////////////////////////////////////// // (1) The delegation should indicate that the U.S. believes the Regime's intersessional decision-making process generally works well and should be continued. As appropriate, the delegation should note that, consistent with long-standing Regime practice, all requests to initiate the intersessional decision-making process must be made via the POC. (2) If questions are raised concerning the monthly POC meetings in Paris, the delegation should seek to ensure that monthly POC meetings remain primarily informational and administrative sessions. (3) The delegation should applaud the success of the April 2008 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting and indicate strong support for holding at least one policy-level RPOC meeting in 2009. (4) The delegation should express appreciation for the continued success and evolution of the French-funded ePOC computerized information sharing system. The delegation also should ensure that discussion of the implementation and further development of the ePOC does not result in a financial or administrative burden on the U.S. and that any issues relating to information security are resolved in a manner consistent with U.S. national policy. (5) The delegation should seek to ensure that the French MTCR POC continues to update the Compendium of Regime decisions on an annual basis and that the POC continues to maintain and distribute to MTCR Partners updated lists of Annex-item denials and catch-all denials. (6) The delegation also should support and encourage the POC's efforts to provide Partners with an analysis of trends in denial notifications, lists of end-users of concern, and other relevant information gleaned from past denial notifications and Information Exchange (IE) papers. B) (C) ROLE OF THE MTCR CHAIR /////////////////////////////// The delegation should support a role for the MTCR Chair that includes informing key non-members of missile nonproliferation developments, the results of Plenary meetings, and the purpose and activities of the MTCR. The delegation may also support a role for the Chair in leading outreach activities and other contacts mandated by previous MTCR decisions. The delegation also may support a mandate for the Chair (or Partner countries specifically designated by the Chair) to engage with appropriate regional organizations to promote the MTCR's missile nonproliferation objectives and underscore the need to implement and effectively enforce missile- related export controls. However, the role of the Chair should continue not to include issuing membership invitations without prior approval of the MTCR Partners. C) (C) MTCR AND PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ///////////////////////////////////////// The delegation should continue to support efforts to strengthen the MTCR to address issues related to terrorists attempting to acquire missiles and related equipment and technology. In this context, the delegation may join consensus to mandate the Law Enforcement Expert's Meeting (LEEM),the IE, and/or the Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to give further attention to terrorism-related issues in their respective areas of expertise. D) (C) REGIONAL MISSILE PROLIFERATION /////////////////////////////////////// (1) The delegation should urge the MTCR Partners to build on previous Plenary and RPOC discussions of regional proliferation issues, and to take steps to increase awareness of the missile proliferation threat and address ongoing missile-related activities of concern. (2) The delegation also should urge the MTCR Partners to agree to focus on concrete actions to further operationalize the decisions Partners have taken since 1995 on regional issues. In particular, the delegation should seek support for, and adoption of, measures consistent with the proposals outlined in POC-154-08 (U.S. Proposal on Technical Outreach to Non-Partners) and POC-155-08 (U.S. Proposal on Machine Tools) (REF A). The delegation also should promote adoption of measures consistent with the other proposals agreed by the "small group," including on risk assessment in licensing, outreach to Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and outreach to Indonesia and Malaysia (REF B). (3) The delegation also should urge other Partners to continue to report on their activities to implement previous Regime decisions, as agreed at previous Plenaries. (4) The delegation should encourage further discussion of regional nonproliferation/outreach at the 2009 RPOC meeting. (5) The delegation may support other initiatives in this area consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy and U.S. counterproliferation policy. E) (C) TRANSPARENCY AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES ///////////////////////////////////////////// (1) The delegation should indicate support for efforts to enhance transparency of MTCR activities and promote increased dialogue with non-members. In this context, the delegation should seek support for the U.S. proposal on outreach (REF A). The delegation also may support other outreach and transparency measures that support U.S. interests. (2) As appropriate, and consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals, the delegation may join consensus to hold MTCR-sponsored workshops and/or roundtables in 2009, provided such events have specific mandates that are consistent with U.S. policy objectives, e.g., on risk assessment in licensing (REF C). In addition, the delegation may join consensus on targeted outreach strategies to key countries, consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy objectives. (3) As appropriate, the delegation should report on U.S. contacts with the two non-Partners for which the U.S.has been assigned responsibility by the MTCR Partners for maintaining Regime contact -- Kuwait and Taiwan. The delegation also may report on U.S. contacts with other non-Partners since the Athens Plenary, drawing from REF ¶V. (4) The delegation may support efforts to update and modernize the MTCR website consistent with U.S. interests. However, the delegation also should ensure that discussions on the further development of the website do not result in a financial or administrative burden on the U.S. F) (C) MEMBERSHIP /////////////////// (1) The delegation should express views consistent with the positions on specific countries outlined in REF E and U.S. national criteria for MTCR membership. (2) With regard to China, the delegation should continue to support the Regime's 1994 decision to admit China to the MTCR once it meets the specified membership criteria. But the delegation should also stress that China does not meet these criteria and that the U.S. will not agree to Chinese membership until those criteria are met. In this context, and consistent with REF K, the delegation should stress that Chinese entities continue to export to programs of missile proliferation concern and that China has some important export control deficiencies. (3) As necessary and appropriate, the delegation should reiterate how the U.S. national criteria for Regime membership are intertwined with the U.S. view of the future of the Regime. G) (C) EXPORT CONTROL ISSUES //////////////////////////// (1) The delegation should stress the importance of the Partners giving continued high priority attention to export control issues, particularly catch-all controls, controls over the intangible transfer of MTCR-controlled technology, and controls over transit, transshipment, and brokering activities. (2) The delegation also should suggest that Partners continue to report, on a voluntary basis, on their experience implementing intangible-technology and catch- all controls and, for those countries not having catch- all controls, on their efforts to put such controls in place. (3) The delegation also should urge Partners to continue to report, on a voluntary basis, on national enactment of changes to MTCR controls and information on their national export controls, as agreed at the 2003 Buenos Aires Plenary. (4) As previously agreed by the interagency, the delegation may support action on Germany's proposal (POC-134-08) on end-use controls consistent with U.S. nonproliferation and export control policy. (5) The delegation may support action on France's proposal on visa screening (POC-150-08) consistent with U.S. nonproliferation and export control policy. (6) The delegation may support other initiatives in this area consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy. H) (C) SELF ASSESSMENT /////////////////////// In any discussion of MTCR self-assessment activities, the delegation should seek to ensure that the Regime does not engage in introspective activities that divert resources away from real world proliferation problems emanating from non-members like Iran and North Korea. I) (C) INFORMATION EXCHANGE //////////////////////////// (1) As previously agreed by the interagency, the delegation should be prepared to make presentations on the following issues (REFS F-O): --China. --Iran. --North Korea. --Syria. --Brokering. --Interdiction Case Study. --Machine Tools. --Perchlorate Family of Chemicals. --Risk Technologies. --Shipping Operations/Trends. (2) Consistent with established practice, the delegation should support an IE report that consists exclusively of a co-chairman's factual summary of the discussion and a compilation of the 10-line summaries submitted by each country on the presentations it made. (3) In keeping with established practice, the delegation also should recommend that, for future Plenaries, IE meetings do not begin any earlier than the afternoon of the first day of Plenary week. Having the IE begin in the afternoon (vice the morning) of the first day facilitates a more productive exchange of information by giving IE participants time to review and study all of the IE papers and presentations. The delegation should oppose proposals to hold intersessional IE meetings. (4) Finally, consistent with previous Regime decisions, the delegation should recommend that the Partners seek to agree on the draft agenda for the 2009 IE at the 2009 RPOC meeting. J) (C) TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING (TEM) /////////////////////////////////////// (1) The delegation should seek consensus for the U.S. proposals outlined in POC-171-07 (REF U),POC-059-08, and POC-123-08. With regard to the UAV/CM proposal, the delegation should hold bilateral discussions with Partners that remain on reserve, stress that we continue to attach high priority to the proposal, and seek to have it adopted in Canberra. The delegation should remind Partners that the goal of the proposal is to adapt and expand the focus of the MTCR to take into account technological changes to the threat picture. To do so today, we believe the MTCR should strengthen controls on cruise missiles while permitting greater flexibility on UAV exports. In view of ongoing technological advances and the underlying trend lines in both cruise missiles and UAVs, we are convinced the MTCR needs to address this issue now. NOTE: While some editorial changes to our proposed text may be required to obtain consensus from MTCR members, the delegation may not agree to changes that will alter the substance or effect of the proposal. END NOTE. (2) If TEM consensus to recommend adoption of the UAV/CM proposal by the Plenary does not emerge, the delegation is authorized to request that a Technical Working Group (TWG) be held on the proposal at the next TEM. If Partners object to such a narrowly focused TWG, the delegation may support a TWG on the general topic of UAV and cruise missile controls. Additionally, if Partners should object to a TWG that includes discussion of cruise missile controls, the delegation also may support a TWG on the general topic of UAV controls only. However, the delegation may not support a TWG (or other type of meeting) to conduct a fundamental review of the MTCR and all of its control parameters. (3) In responding to proposals from other MTCR Partners to amend the Annex, the delegation should be guided by the decisions of the Missile Annex Review Committee (MARC). (4) As agreed at the 2003 Buenos Aires Plenary, the delegation should continue to insist that all TEM documents be circulated via the French MTCR POC, with additional copies being sent to the national TEM POCs. (5) With regard to any proposal to hold an intersessional TEM in 2009, the delegation should request that Partners follow procedures adopted at the 2002 and 2003 Plenaries, making appropriate allowances in the agreed timeline to account for a November Plenary vice a September or October Plenary, i.e., that a Partner should volunteer to host an intersessional TEM by mid-December; the Partners then would decide by the time of the January POC meeting in Paris whether to go forward with such a meeting; the agenda for the intersessional meeting would be circulated four weeks in advance of the meeting via a 10-day silence procedure; and the only topics to be discussed would be outstanding issues from the 2008 Plenary and any new proposals submitted six weeks in advance of the intersessional meeting. K) (C) ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEETING ///////////////////////////////////// The delegation should participate actively in the MTCR's Enforcement Officers Meeting and seek to use this forum as a means to complement and reinforce Plenary and Information Exchange discussions on ways to address key proliferation problems. The delegation also should be prepared to make presentations on enforcement authorities and case studies, as well as on issues relating to brokering and machine tool licensing per REF ¶P. L) (C) FUTURE PLENARY MEETINGS //////////////////////////////// The delegation should cooperate with other Partners in achieving consensus on the dates and host for the next Plenary. M) (C) PRESS RELEASE //////////////////// The delegation should assist in achieving consensus on a press release, consistent with U.S. policy, which highlights the Canberra Plenary's achievements. END GUIDANCE ¶4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR. RICE NNNN End Cable Text

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