Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE110380
2008-10-15 23:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

ARAB DIPLOMATIC REENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ: MANAGING

Tags:  PREL PGOV XF IZ 
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INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 110380 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV XF IZ
SUBJECT: ARAB DIPLOMATIC REENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ: MANAGING
EXPECTATIONS FOR SUPPORT

REF: BAGHDAD3218

Classified By: NEA PDAS Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 110380 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV XF IZ SUBJECT: ARAB DIPLOMATIC REENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ: MANAGING EXPECTATIONS FOR SUPPORT REF: BAGHDAD3218 Classified By: NEA PDAS Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Over the last year, the USG has strongly encouraged the Arab countries to reengage with the Government of Iraq. This effort remains a top policy priority and is now bearing fruit, with a string of recent high-level Arab visits and commitments by Arab governments to open embassies in Baghdad. The U.S. has a strong interest in facilitating these developments, as they underline greater regional confidence in Iraq's future and signal a tipping point in Iraq's regional reintegration. ¶2. (C) While the USG intends to support these Arab governments as they reengage in Iraq, there are limits to how much our Embassy colleagues in Baghdad can do. Some recent Arab delegations have arrived in Baghdad expecting a high level of support from our Embassy, and thus were significantly under-prepared and nearly completely reliant on USG assistance. With additional delegations now due to arrive in Baghdad, providing them with extensive security, transportation, and life support will not be possible as this would significantly stress Embassy Baghdad's already limited and overstretched resources, and would shift responsibility for such support from the sending government and from the GOI, where it rightly belongs. Embassy Baghdad is pressing the GOI to delegate more resources to the task of assisting these new diplomatic missions. In this context, when responding to requests for support, or as embassies become aware host governments are preparing to send missions to Iraq, addressees should draw from the points in this message to advise host governments and ensure realistic expectations. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) When approached by a host government on the issue of USG support for its efforts to send an Ambassador to or open an Embassy in Baghdad, Posts should encourage such steps and reiterate the importance the USG attaches to Arab engagement with Iraq. At the same time, it is important to manage host government's expectations of the level of USG support that can be provided in Baghdad. As necessary, Posts should draw from the points in paragraph 4-8 in responding to requests for advice or assistance. ¶4. (SBU) The USG strongly encourages states planning to reopen embassies in Baghdad, send ambassadors, or organize &#x
000A;high-level visits to work directly with the Iraqi MFA. Ambassador Srood Najib, the GOI official designated to handle these issues, can be contacted by email at sroodmofa@yahoo.com or by phone at 790-192-2265. In addition, Embassy Baghdad is prepared, where necessary, to advise our Embassies in Arab capitals concerning appropriate Iraqi government contacts or private companies that may be of administrative or security assistance as governments seek to engage diplomatically with the GOI in Baghdad. U.S. Embassy points of contact for such advice or assistance are Sam Kotis at KotisS@state.gov, Rebecca Fong at FongRA@state.gov, and Steve Walker at WalkerSC@state.gov. ¶5. (SBU) Security: In general, all transportation/security to/from Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and within the International Zone (IZ) should be arranged directly between the third country government and the GOI. Embassy Baghdad RSO can share threat information, as appropriate, and offer advice on a range of security issues as well as facilitate contact with private security companies. (SBU) Additionally, RSO can offer the following types of security assistance to third country governments: -- Perform Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO),as we do for other friends and allies. STATE 00110380 002 OF 002 -- Conduct security assessments/surveys to help them improve their security posture. -- Share non-classified threat information on a normal basis, and classified threat information on a case-by-case basis if it involves them. -- Meet with them, as we do with other friends and allies, and liaise with their security elements to provide background on security conditions in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq. -- Assist them in establishing security agreements with the GOI to improve security support from the GOI. -- Provide, on a resource available basis, along with DoD, incident response and contingency management support. -- Potentially include them in training offerings that we have (e.g., Hostage Awareness, WMD Awareness, etc.). -- Share our Public Announcements, Travel Advisories, Consular Information Sheets, and Warden Notices with them. -- Support their requests for MNF-I and other badges/ID to facilitate their travel in/out of the IZ and Baghdad. -- Provide them with guidance on best security practices for facilities protection in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq. -- Advise and support their efforts to join various information sharing forums, such as the Diplomatic Protective Liaison Working Group (DPLWG). -- Support their interest in the PSD working group; support them, or their chosen private security provider, in the private security contractor forum. ¶6. (SBU) MILAIR: As a general rule, regularly scheduled commercial flights or civilian charter flights should be the main modes of transporation in and out of the country. If third country governments are concerned about the security of these flights, MNF-I can facilitate flight clearances and other logistical requirements at BIAP so governments can operate their own aircraft. We can consider allowing third country diplomats to fly on U.S. MilAir on a case-by-case basis if the circumstances absolutely demand it. ¶7. (SBU) New Embassy Sites: The Embassy is working closely with the MFA to turn over IZ properties currently in USG possession to the GOI, including prospective new embassy sites in the diplomatic zone. Third country governments need to work directly with the MFA to identify and prepare the specific sites for their new embassies. This is already happening and should continue. All inquiries on the process should be referred to Ambassador Najib at the MFA. If requested, the Embassy can offer suggestions of trusted and qualified contractors; these contractors could be hired to renovate and prepare Embassy sites. ¶8. (SBU) Access to the New Embassy Compound (NEC)/Use of Embassy Facilities: Unfortunately, the U.S. will not be able to offer special access to the New Embassy Compound. These facilities are already being used by twice the number of people that they are designed for. RICE

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