RUSSIAN FIRM SELLING INTEGRATED OPTICAL CHIPS AND

S E C R E T STATE 108236

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS PK CH
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FIRM SELLING INTEGRATED OPTICAL CHIPS AND
GYROSCOPES TO ENTITIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN IN
PAKISTAN AND CHINA (S)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),
(C),AND (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Moscow,
please see paragraph 6.


2. (S) Background/Objectives: The United States
Government has information indicating that since at
least early 2007, the Russian firm Optolink facilitated
the sale of integrated optical chips (IOCs) to the
Advanced Engineering and Research Organization (AERO),
the commercial arm of Pakistan's Air Weapons Complex.
The Air Weapons Complex is subordinate to the National
Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM),the
entity that coordinates the activities of Pakistan's
nuclear and missile programs. Additionally, a recent
Department of Commerce end-use check of AERO determined
that the company is not a reliable recipient of U.S.
technology. AERO is also identified on the website of
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)
as an end-user of proliferation concern. We understand
that Optolink worked with a representative of the
Pakistani intermediary Blue Ridge Enterprises to effect
the IOC transaction, and believe that the IOCs are
intended for use in fiber optic gyroscopes, which
potentially could be installed in Pakistan's MTCR
Category I missiles.


3. (S) In separate activity in August 2008, Optolink
also sold MTCR-controlled gyroscopes to a Chinese firm
that was using the name Beijing Comfort Technology and
Development Co., Ltd. We believe this name was used to
obscure the identity of the actual end-user, a cruise
missile-related institute.


4. (S) We want to share this information with Russian
officials, and ask that they investigate this activity,
as it appears that Optolink is acting as a supplier of
sensitive technology to several entities of
proliferation concern.


5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Moscow approach
appropriate Russian authorities to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report
response. Talking points also may be provided as a
non-paper.


6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//RUSSIA)

-- We would like to raise with you a matter of
proliferation concern and request your government's
assistance in investigating this activity.

-- The U.S. has information indicating that since at
least early 2007, Yuri Korkoshko of the Russian firm
Optolink has worked to facilitate the sale of
integrated optical chips (IOCs) to Pakistan's Advanced
Engineering and Research Organization (AERO).

-- AERO is the commercial arm of Pakistan's Air Weapons
Complex, which is subordinate to the National
Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM),the
entity that coordinates the activities of Pakistan's
nuclear and missile programs.

-- We believe that these IOCs are intended for use by
Pakistan's Air Weapons Complex in fiber optic
gyroscopes.

-- Ultimately, these IOCs could be used in Pakistan's
MTCR Category I missiles, which are inherently capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

-- We understand that Optolink conducted business with
AERO via Shahid Rehman of the Pakistani intermediary
Blue Ridge Enterprises.

-- As you are aware, the U.S. does not support
Pakistan's MTCR Category I missile or space launch
vehicle programs and works actively to impede
Pakistan's access to sensitive equipment and material
for its Category I development efforts.

-- We know your government appreciates the risks to
international security posed by the transfer of
missile-related equipment to South Asia and urge you to
investigate this matter to ensure Russian entities are
not assisting Pakistan's Category I programs, even
inadvertently.

-- In a separate matter, we wish to advise you of
activity involving Optolink's supply of guidance and
navigation equipment to an entity of proliferation
concern in China.

-- Specifically, we understand that as of early August
2008, a Chinese entity using the name Beijing Comfort
Technology and Development Co., Ltd (BCTD) had
purchased three-axis rotation and single-axis
gyroscopes that are controlled by the MTCR from
Optolink.

-- We believe that the name Beijing Comfort Technology
and Development Co. may have been used to obscure the
identity of the actual end-user, a cruise missile-
related institute.

-- We are providing this information to support your
export control enforcement efforts as it appears that
these transactions were intended to circumvent your
regulatory controls.

-- We look forward to continued cooperation with your
government on nonproliferation and export control
matters, and would appreciate learning the results of
any actions you take in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper.


7. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann
with any questions or follow-up issues related to this
case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and
slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR.


8. (U) A word version file of this document will be
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE