RUSSIAN FIRM SELLING INTEGRATED OPTICAL CHIPS AND

S E C R E T STATE 108236 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2033 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS PK CH SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FIRM SELLING INTEGRATED OPTICAL CHIPS AND GYROSCOPES TO ENTITIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN IN PAKISTAN AND CHINA (S) Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (C),AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Moscow, please see paragraph 6. ¶2. (S) Background/Objectives: The United States Government has information indicating that since at least early 2007, the Russian firm Optolink facilitated the sale of integrated optical chips (IOCs) to the Advanced Engineering and Research Organization (AERO), the commercial arm of Pakistan's Air Weapons Complex. The Air Weapons Complex is subordinate to the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM),the entity that coordinates the activities of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. Additionally, a recent Department of Commerce end-use check of AERO determined that the company is not a reliable recipient of U.S. technology. AERO is also identified on the website of Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) as an end-user of proliferation concern. We understand that Optolink worked with a representative of the Pakistani intermediary Blue Ridge Enterprises to effect the IOC transaction, and believe that the IOCs are intended for use in fiber optic gyroscopes, which potentially could be installed in Pakistan's MTCR Category I missiles. ¶3. (S) In separate activity in August 2008, Optolink also sold MTCR-controlled gyroscopes to a Chinese firm that was using the name Beijing Comfort Technology and Development Co., Ltd. We believe this name was used to obscure the identity of the actual end-user, a cruise missile-related institute. ¶4. (S) We want to share this information with Russian officials, and ask that they investigate this activity, as it appears that Optolink is acting as a supplier of sensitive technology to several entities of proliferation concern. ¶5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Moscow approach appropriate Russian authorities to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET//RUSSIA) -- We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity. -- The U.S. has information indicating that since at least early 2007, Yuri Korkoshko of the Russian firm Optolink has worked to facilitate the sale of integrated optical chips (IOCs) to Pakistan's Advanced Engineering and Research Organization (AERO). -- AERO is the commercial arm of Pakistan's Air Weapons Complex, which is subordinate to the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM),the entity that coordinates the activities of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. -- We believe that these IOCs are intended for use by Pakistan's Air Weapons Complex in fiber optic gyroscopes. -- Ultimately, these IOCs could be used in Pakistan's MTCR Category I missiles, which are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. -- We understand that Optolink conducted business with AERO via Shahid Rehman of the Pakistani intermediary Blue Ridge Enterprises. -- As you are aware, the U.S. does not support Pakistan's MTCR Category I missile or space launch vehicle programs and works actively to impede Pakistan's access to sensitive equipment and material for its Category I development efforts. -- We know your government appreciates the risks to international security posed by the transfer of missile-related equipment to South Asia and urge you to investigate this matter to ensure Russian entities are not assisting Pakistan's Category I programs, even inadvertently. -- In a separate matter, we wish to advise you of activity involving Optolink's supply of guidance and navigation equipment to an entity of proliferation concern in China. -- Specifically, we understand that as of early August 2008, a Chinese entity using the name Beijing Comfort Technology and Development Co., Ltd (BCTD) had purchased three-axis rotation and single-axis gyroscopes that are controlled by the MTCR from Optolink. -- We believe that the name Beijing Comfort Technology and Development Co. may have been used to obscure the identity of the actual end-user, a cruise missile- related institute. -- We are providing this information to support your export control enforcement efforts as it appears that these transactions were intended to circumvent your regulatory controls. -- We look forward to continued cooperation with your government on nonproliferation and export control matters, and would appreciate learning the results of any actions you take in response to this information. End talking points/non-paper. ¶7. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR. ¶8. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. RICE