A/S FRAZER'S SEPT 26 MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN PM MELES

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 104950 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO KE SO SU SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER'S SEPT 26 MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN PM MELES Classified By: A/S Frazer for Reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles September 26 on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). A/S Frazer raised the need for African nations to urgently push the UN Security Council for a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. Meles noted concern about the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) cohesion and announced that a summit with regional heads of state and the TFG will be held in Nairobi October 6-8. A/S Frazer told Meles the USG would veto an Article 16 motion to delay the indictment of President Bashir of Sudan without tangible efforts by the Government of Sudan (GOS) to improve the situation in Darfur. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) A/S Frazer met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles September 26 on the margins of UNGA. A/S Frazer raised USG concerns about Somalia and Darfur as described below. -------------- Somalia -------------- ¶3. (C) A/S Frazer noted Somalia had been widely discussed during UNGA, including a multilateral meeting chaired by the Government of Netherlands on the humanitarian situation. She said the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) is adamantly against a UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia and is pushing for the formation of a multinational force. A/S Frazer told Meles all African countries on the Security Council should push hard for a UN peacekeeping force that re-hats AMISOM. She also warned that urgency was needed since Ethiopia is considering withdrawing its forces and the next Administration will require time to get up to speed on Somalia and other issues, which could mean a significant delay. ¶4. (C) Meles noted his concern over the internal cohesion of the TFG. He stressed the importance of getting the TFG to work together so that Ethiopian forces could move out of Mogadishu. He said Ethiopia could operate from its side of the border but undertake operations in southern and central Somalia as necessary to disrupt operations of al-Shabab and others destabilizing forces in the region. He noted TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf was becoming more obstinate suggesting Yusuf was acting under the impression the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) and others were "stuck with him". Meles warned the GOE would move out of Somalia if Yusuf was to push them too far. The GOE is making necessary preparations for such a move, "just in case." He added the GOE was already in discussions with the Government of Uganda (GOU) about a possible withdrawal because the GOU had asked to be given the opportunity to move out first, if a withdrawal was to go ahead. ¶5. (C) Meles told A/S Frazer a "decisive" Summit of Somalia,s Parliament, TFG leadership, and regional leaders is scheduled for early October (NOTE: In a later meeting, Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Watengula told A/S Frazer the Summit would be held October 6-8. END NOTE). The Summit's goal is to address the issues that are leading to destabilization within the TFG. A/S Frazer told Meles the USG would coordinate closely with the GOE and other regional partners to ensure this Summit is a success. Additionally, Meles said the GOE may need to begin discussions to develop a "plan B" in case there is a need to move people out of Mogadishu in the near future. -------------- SUDAN -------------- ¶6. (C) Meles told A/S Frazer the Government of Sudan is focused on the deferral of the indictment against President Bashir. He also noted the GOS is not moving aggressively to address the underlying problems in Darfur. The GOS is trying to "buy time" with the recent Qatari regional initiative. In their role as mediators, the Qataris are "behaving as a bad copy of Norway" because they are too close to the "bad guys". He expressed frustration that everyone is "playing for time" and that no progress is being made to address the underlying issues in Darfur. ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer told Meles the USG would veto Article 16 indictment deferral motion without tangible changes on the ground in Darfur. She pointed to three areas where the GOS needed to move forward: 1) removing barriers to the deployment of UNAMID so that the Rwandans, Ethiopians, Thais and Nepalese are deployed before the end of the year, 2) actively engaging in the peace process, including providing real compensation and development packages to the rebel groups, and 3) allowing greater humanitarian access and support by ending the killing of civilians and allowing humanitarian workers to travel to the region. The USG must see a "real commitment" to the political process, with tangible change on the ground in Darfur. A/S Frazer added that time was running short since a warrant of arrest for Bashir is expected soon. ¶8. (C) Meles noted additional concern that if the International Criminal Court (ICC) issues its arrest warrant, the Arab League and African Union (AU) were unlikely to abide by it. Such a move would play into the GOS,s hands since it would drive a wedge between the Arab League, the AU and the ICC. A/S Frazer added she thought it is unlikely that Bashir would ever be arrested since she believes he enjoys immunities as Head of State, although others who had been indicted could still be arrested. Meles noted Bashir and the other indictees were sticking closely together and had an incentive to maintain their status quo: to profit from Sudan,s oil wealth and ensure their personal security. Without strategies to address these concerns it remains likely Bashir and others will cling to power and attempt to delay significant action on Darfur. The situation could lead to an "implosion" in Darfur and strategies to address this deadlock should be found. RICE