NATIONAL SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE

UNCLAS STATE 101233 SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP PREL PARM SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: BACKGROUND INFORMATION, TALKING POINTS AND QS AND AS 1.(U) Summary and Action Request: On September 22, 2008 a paper entitled, "National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century" was signed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and given limited release to Congress. On September 23 it will be released publicly and will be available on the unclassified internet at www.defenselink.mil/news/nuclearweaponspolicy .pdf. The paper expands on a July 2007 statement, signed by Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Bodman, and addresses in greater detail the considerations behind U.S. requirements for nuclear weapons. The principal objective of the paper is to provide the logic and rationale for the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, and describe how operational nuclear forces, the stockpile of nuclear warheads, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure together enable the United States to manage risk in an uncertain world. The paper will inform public opinion, Congress, allies and others about U.S. nuclear weapons policies, programs, and capabilities. OBJECTIVES: -- (U) This cable provides Talking Points and Qs and As regarding the paper should Embassy personnel receive inquiries from host government officials, local media, or host-country opinion makers about the purpose and meaning of the paper. Copies of the paper will be distributed directly to relevant Defense Attaches in Washington-based embassies from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, South Korea, Japan and Australia, as well as China and Russia. -- (U) For NATO embassies, Embassies Seoul, Tokyo, Canberra, Beijing, Moscow, and Kyiv: Posts should deliver the Talking Points in para 2 and report Host Government's response, if any. Posts should draw on the Qs and As in para 3 as appropriate. In addition, Action Addressees are requested to advise Department and assess the impact of any local media coverage and comment, and reactions or inquiries from local elites or other interested groups. Slug replies to ISN/RA Terry Godby, ISN/SPO Brandy Buttrick, DOE/NNSA John Harvey, OSD/P David Stein, and NSC Brig Gen Jeffry Smith. --(U) All other posts: deliver the Talking Points in para 2 on an if asked basis only, drawing on the Qs and As in para 4 as appropriate, and report Host government response, if any. -- (U) Washington's intention is to respond quickly to negative or inaccurate commentary. Washington is also prepared to provide informational briefings to Washington-based embassies and follow-up with addressees as required. ¶2. (U) Begin talking points: --On September 22, 2008, the United States released a paper signed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman entitled, "National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century." --Copies of the paper will be distributed by the Department of Defense directly to relevant Defense Attaches in Washington-based embassies from NATO members, South Korea, Japan and Australia, as well as China and Russia. --The paper expands on a July 2007 statement, signed by Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Gates, and Secretary of Energy Bodman, and addresses in greater detail the considerations behind U.S. requirements for nuclear weapons. --The principal objective of the paper is to provide the logic and rationale for the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, and describe how operational nuclear forces, the stockpile of nuclear warheads, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure work together to enable the United States to protect U.S. and allied security in an uncertain world. --The paper will inform public opinion, Congress, allies and others about U.S. nuclear weapons policies, programs, and capabilities. --In the interest of transparency, the United States is providing your government with the following information about the current direction of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, programs, and capabilities. -- The United States has made significant reductions in its nuclear arsenal. --The United States has reduced its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 50 percent over the past 15 years, and plans to reduce them to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012 as called for by the Moscow Treaty. --This represents a cut of about 80 percent from the highest levels during the Cold War. The United States has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons by over 90 percent since 1991. --To maintain a credible deterrent at these lower levels, however, the United States requires nuclear forces that can adapt to changing needs, and a responsive research, development, and production infrastructure that can maintain existing capabilities and manufacture new or replacement components as needed. --Early in his first term, in recognition of the changed security environment, President Bush called for a fundamental reorientation of the United States' strategic force posture. --The President directed the Department of Defense to develop a portfolio of strategic capabilities?including missile defenses and advanced conventional strike assets?and to reduce the nuclear force to meet 21st Century requirements. --The Administration's strategy is an appropriate and responsive approach to the uncertainties and challenges we face in the decades ahead. --Even as they are reduced in numbers, nuclear weapons remain an essential and enduring element of this new strategic triad, and underpin in a fundamental way these new capabilities. --Nuclear forces continue to represent the ultimate deterrent capability that supports U.S. national security. Extended deterrence is key to U.S. alliances, both in NATO and in Asia and the Pacific, assuring allies and friends of the credibility of U.S. security commitments. -- U.S. nuclear weapons deter potential adversaries from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies and friends. In the absence of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, some non-nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear capability. --Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure is of vital importance to U.S. and allied interests. The United States must also have the means to respond to dramatic adverse developments that can reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. --The United States must also retain sufficient force structure to enable the deployment of additional warheads, if needed, for the most stressing, plausible challenges ahead. --Until a truly responsive nuclear infrastructure is operational, the United States will need to retain an appropriate inventory of non-deployed warheads to manage geopolitical, technical and operational risks. --Both the U.K. and France have each made sober assessments of the risks and uncertainties in the new security environment, and each has reached similar conclusions regarding these facts and trends. Both have made decisions to maintain their nuclear forces and infrastructure well into this century to guard against the challenges ahead. --Currently, the U.S. is pursuing service life extensions for existing warheads. --Over time, however, confidence in the nuclear stockpile is expected to decrease as programs to replace aging components cause warheads to deviate further from baseline designs which were originally validated during the period of underground nuclear testing. The long- term goal is to rely more on a revived infrastructure, and less on the non-deployed stockpile to respond to unforeseen events. --The desired size of a responsive nuclear infrastructure would depend on a number of key variables, but until a truly responsive nuclear infrastructure is operational, the United States will need to retain an appropriate inventory of non-deployed warheads to manage geopolitical, technical and operational risks. ¶3. Questions and Answers (if asked) ¶Q. Why is the Administration issuing such a paper in the last days of its tenure? A: Congress has called for a comprehensive statement on U.S. nuclear strategy and policy. This paper describes the relationship among strategic nuclear force structure, the stockpile of nuclear warheads, and the nuclear warhead research and production infrastructure. Many of the policy issues and strategic capabilities discussed in this paper represent continuity with decisions made by prior administrations. For example, the Clinton Administration developed the "lead and hedge" strategy as a way to reduce the size of the deployed strategic nuclear force, while also ensuring that the United States would be able to respond to future challenges that could be more stressing than estimated at that time. The current Administration seeks to build on that approach by relying, over time, more heavily on a responsive nuclear weapons design and manufacturing infrastructure to manage risk, and less on an inventory of non-deployed warheads. We believe the logic presented here provides a sound basis on which future administrations can consider further adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure. ¶Q. Is it true that the United States does not have the capability to produce new nuclear weapons? ¶A. At present, the United States is capable of refurbishing existing weapons through life extension programs; we do not have the capability to produce "new" nuclear weapons. ¶Q. Is the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence still necessary in the post Cold War world? ¶A. Nuclear forces continue to be a key element in U.S. alliances with other countries, for example, NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. U.S. nuclear forces act as a counterbalance to the military capabilities of hostile states that endanger international order. The role that U.S. nuclear forces continue to play in the deterrence of attack against allies remains an essential instrument of U.S. nonproliferation policy by significantly reducing the incentives of a number of allied countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. ¶Q. Isn't it hypocritical for the United States to tell North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear weapons programs when it is developing and preparing to deploy new nuclear warheads? ¶A. No. As a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, the United States is not prohibited from modernizing its nuclear stockpile. North Korea and Iran are undermining the global nonproliferation regime with nuclear programs that have violated the NPT and their safeguards agreements as well as Chapter VII UN Security Council resolutions. U.S. nuclear guarantees to allies support U.S. nonproliferation policy by significantly reducing the incentives of a number of allied countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. ¶Q. Is this announcement related to the recent missile defense announcement on establishing a missile defense system in Europe? ¶A. No, these announcements are unrelated. The proposed fielding of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe would provide the capability to defend much of Europe and the U.S. against ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. U.S. nuclear forces are intended to deter WMD attacks. Missile defenses reinforce deterrence and provide a means of self-defense if deterrence should fail. Q: Do you really see a potential need to replace the entire U.S. stockpile with new weapons? A: The Directors of the U.S. national laboratories have testified before Congress that reliance on a life- extension or refurbishment strategy for maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons presents increased risks to long-term stockpile reliability and is unsustainable in the long term. Q: Why does the U.S. need to invest in a "responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure"? A: The United States has not designed a new nuclear warhead since the 1980s and has not built a new warhead since the early 1990s. As a result, the nuclear weapons infrastructure has atrophied and existing U.S. nuclear weapons ? most of which were designed 20 to 30 years ago ? are being maintained well beyond the service life for which they were designed. Critical personnel, with experience in the design and testing of nuclear weapons, are also aging and retiring, and in the absence of a viable nuclear infrastructure, their expertise cannot be replaced. ¶Q. What is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)? ¶A. The RRW program is intended to evaluate warhead options to replace legacy systems developed during the Cold War that are nearing the end of their service lives. An RRW will have the same military capabilities as the warhead it replaces. RRW will ensure greater safety and security, long-term high confidence in warhead reliability, and be easier to manufacture and maintain. ¶Q. Why can't the U.S. add safety features to legacy systems and be done with it? ¶A. The designs of legacy systems will not permit the inclusion of all of the desirable additional safety features during refurbishment or reduce the amount of hazardous material. ¶Q. What is the future U.S. stockpile requirement? ¶A. Many questions regarding the future nuclear stockpile and nuclear force cannot be answered with precision today. The answers will depend on knowledge gained by further work on programs such as RRW, by efforts to modernize the nuclear warhead infrastructure, and by closely watching emerging trends around the world. RICE NNNN End Cable Text