BULGARIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO AFTER A MAJORITY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000088

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: BULGARIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO AFTER A MAJORITY OF
EU STATES

REF: SECSTATE 13716

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: FM Kalfin told us Bulgaria would announce
its intention to recognize Kosovo
following the GAERC meeting Feb. 18 (assuming a CDI before
then),but would extend official recognition only after a
solid majority of EU states had done so. Official
recognition was a government decision that could be taken
quickly without consulting parliament or the President. He
said Bulgaria could not take the lead in extending
recognition, citing vulnerability to Serbian economic
retaliation and lack of enthusiasm at home for recognition,
but asserted there would be "no ambiguous signals" to
Belgrade. End Summary.


2. (C) In response to reftel demarche, FM Kalfin told
Ambassador Beyrle on February 11 that he expected a common EU
position to be agreed upon at the upcoming GAERC meeting on
February 18, which would open the way for member states to
declare their intentions to recognize Kosovo,s independence
(which Kalfin said they expected to come just before the
GAERC). Kalfin said as early as the press conference
following the GAERC, he would make a public statement saying
he had recommended to the government that it recognize
Kosovo,s independence. Actual recognition, he said, would
come after a majority of EU states recognize (later he
amended that to "twenty-plus"). He said Bulgaria could move
quickly, as recognition was a government decision with no
need to consult parliament or the President.

3. (C) Kalfin said Bulgaria would not be among the first to
recognize; there were negatives his
government had to take into consideration. He acknowledged
that Serb reaction would not be as strong as during the
sanctions on Yugoslavia in 1999 and that Bulgaria's position
was stronger now -- but Bulgaria was still the "most
vulnerable" of the EU states. Serbia would have two
reactions, official and unofficial. The official reaction
would be "very sharp but not extreme" (e.g. no embargoes or
broken relations),but the unofficial reaction could be
damaging. Transport links went through
Serbia, and rerouting through Romania was not economical.
There were Bulgarian minorities in Serbia and Bulgarians
transiting who would be vulnerable to a Serb "anti-Bulgarian
campaign" and experience harassment at the border and with
the Serb bureaucracy. Noting the stand of its two EU
neighbors, Greece and Romania, Kalfin said it would be a
"strange position" for Bulgaria to be the first
among them to recognize Kosovo. Ambassador Beyrle said it
would not be a strange position, but a strong position for
Bulgaria to take the lead and be the first. Kalfin said
Greece and Romania would not define Bulgaria's position, but
their attitudes would be taken into account.


4. (C) Kalfin said he had consulted with the appropriate
parliamentary committees on the government's position.
Parliamentarians were "not enthusiastic" about recognition
but understood the realities of the situation and the
importance of resolving Kosovo to regional stability. He
asked that they confine discussion of the issue to committees
and not raise it in plenary. A danger was that the first
reaction of Parliamentarians and the public alike would be
that recognition is a "choice between Serbia and Kosovo,"
with the sentiment being toward Serbia as a neighbor and
trading partner.


5. (C) Ambassador Beyrle asked what would be gained by
delaying recognition. Kalfin replied it would make a
difference, primarily in the domestic reaction, since
recognition was not popular. A few days would help, assuming
a European critical mass developed quickly. Kalfin said in
the follow up Bulgaria would try to engage Serbia to the
extent that it could, including at the SCC meeting on
February 27-28 in Sofia. Kalfin repeated that the
post-independence period would be very difficult and that he
hoped the U.S. would understand and appreciate Bulgaria's
position. The Ambassador said there was no doubt of the U.S.
commitment to support its friends through this crisis and
continue its assistance to Kosovo.
Beyrle