BULGARIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO AFTER A MAJORITY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000088 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV SUBJECT: BULGARIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO AFTER A MAJORITY OF EU STATES REF: SECSTATE 13716 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: FM Kalfin told us Bulgaria would announce its intention to recognize Kosovo following the GAERC meeting Feb. 18 (assuming a CDI before then),but would extend official recognition only after a solid majority of EU states had done so. Official recognition was a government decision that could be taken quickly without consulting parliament or the President. He said Bulgaria could not take the lead in extending recognition, citing vulnerability to Serbian economic retaliation and lack of enthusiasm at home for recognition, but asserted there would be "no ambiguous signals" to Belgrade. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In response to reftel demarche, FM Kalfin told Ambassador Beyrle on February 11 that he expected a common EU position to be agreed upon at the upcoming GAERC meeting on February 18, which would open the way for member states to declare their intentions to recognize Kosovo,s independence (which Kalfin said they expected to come just before the GAERC). Kalfin said as early as the press conference following the GAERC, he would make a public statement saying he had recommended to the government that it recognize Kosovo,s independence. Actual recognition, he said, would come after a majority of EU states recognize (later he amended that to "twenty-plus"). He said Bulgaria could move quickly, as recognition was a government decision with no need to consult parliament or the President. ¶3. (C) Kalfin said Bulgaria would not be among the first to recognize; there were negatives his government had to take into consideration. He acknowledged that Serb reaction would not be as strong as during the sanctions on Yugoslavia in 1999 and that Bulgaria's position was stronger now -- but Bulgaria was still the "most vulnerable" of the EU states. Serbia would have two reactions, official and unofficial. The official reaction would be "very sharp but not extreme" (e.g. no embargoes or broken relations),but the unofficial reaction could be damaging. Transport links went through Serbia, and rerouting through Romania was not economical. There were Bulgarian minorities in Serbia and Bulgarians transiting who would be vulnerable to a Serb "anti-Bulgarian campaign" and experience harassment at the border and with the Serb bureaucracy. Noting the stand of its two EU neighbors, Greece and Romania, Kalfin said it would be a "strange position" for Bulgaria to be the first among them to recognize Kosovo. Ambassador Beyrle said it would not be a strange position, but a strong position for Bulgaria to take the lead and be the first. Kalfin said Greece and Romania would not define Bulgaria's position, but their attitudes would be taken into account. ¶4. (C) Kalfin said he had consulted with the appropriate parliamentary committees on the government's position. Parliamentarians were "not enthusiastic" about recognition but understood the realities of the situation and the importance of resolving Kosovo to regional stability. He asked that they confine discussion of the issue to committees and not raise it in plenary. A danger was that the first reaction of Parliamentarians and the public alike would be that recognition is a "choice between Serbia and Kosovo," with the sentiment being toward Serbia as a neighbor and trading partner. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Beyrle asked what would be gained by delaying recognition. Kalfin replied it would make a difference, primarily in the domestic reaction, since recognition was not popular. A few days would help, assuming a European critical mass developed quickly. Kalfin said in the follow up Bulgaria would try to engage Serbia to the extent that it could, including at the SCC meeting on February 27-28 in Sofia. Kalfin repeated that the post-independence period would be very difficult and that he hoped the U.S. would understand and appreciate Bulgaria's position. The Ambassador said there was no doubt of the U.S. commitment to support its friends through this crisis and continue its assistance to Kosovo. Beyrle