SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DAS JONES TO SOFIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000723

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/FO/DAS STUART JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV BU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DAS JONES TO SOFIA,
NOVEMBER 18-19

REF: SOFIA 681

Classified By: ambassador nancy mceldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Your visit to Sofia comes at a high point
in our bilateral cooperation and a tough time internally for
the Bulgarian government. Bulgaria has been a solid partner
on key security issues, with deployments in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, and joint military exercises
under Joint Task Force-East. It plays a positive diplomatic
role on Kosovo, Macedonia and Georgia, though moving
cautiously not to upset the Russians. Internally, PM
Stanishev's government is under increasing pressure over
corruption scandals and the misuse of EU funds, in addition
to tensions among coalition members and within Stanishev's
own Socialist party. The election season is underway and
populist Sofia Mayor Borissov's GERB party is favored to win
in June 2009; Stanishev's Socialists are fighting hard to
come in a strong second. The government is looking to
burnish its international and Euroatlantic credentials and
has begun taking a more active role in regional security
policy, most recently, its plan to announce a new Black Sea
Security Strategy. This visit is an opportunity to encourage
the Bulgarians to stay their constructive course in regional
diplomacy, encourage them to be more proactive, and reassure
them of the continuity of USG policy toward Bulgaria and the
Balkans with the new administration. END SUMMARY.

Solid Partner
--------------


2. (C) Bulgaria prides itself on being a reliable partner.
It has done well by us, supporting our security and
diplomatic objectives with deployments in Iraq and
Afghanistan despite public disapproval (polls show over 70
percent of Bulgarians oppose deployments). Last summer we
conducted joint military exercises under JTF-E (over 900
Americans and 100 Bulgarians) and started construction of
permanent training facilities at Bulgarian bases. The
government looks to us for advice and leadership as it
undertakes military modernization, especially obtaining
multi-role fighters for its aging and Russia-dependent air
force. Bulgaria plays a low-key but stabilizing role in the
Balkan and Black Sea regions. It supports Macedonia's NATO
membership while steering clear of the name issue with
Greece, favors MAP for Ukraine and Georgia (and has large
arms deals with Georgia, now on hold),and supports missile
defense, emphasizing the need for NATO systems that would
cover Bulgaria as well. Bulgaria was in the second wave
recognizing Kosovo and joined the ISG in May. It quietly but
consistently encourages Belgrade to temper emotions on Kosovo
and keep focused on integration with Europe.

Russia Factor
--------------


3. (C) Though a reliable NATO and EU member, Bulgaria is
also careful to keep on good terms with Russia and will not
go too far in criticizing Russia's aggressive actions, as in
Georgia. Unlike other former east bloc countries, Bulgaria
never suffered a Soviet invasion or military occupation and
Bulgarians regard the Russians as friends (70 percent
approval rating v. 50 for the U.S.). More importantly,
Bulgaria depends on Russia for over 70 percent of its energy.
Lukoil's refinery on the Black Sea coast produces seven
percent of Bulgaria's GDP and 23 percent of national tax
revenues. Many Bulgarian officials resent Russia's
high-handed tactics but knuckle under the pressure. Russia
plays on historical and cultural ties, Bulgaria's hopes to
become a regional energy transit hub, and woos with
high-level meetings (eight meetings with Putin since
President Parvanov took office). It also exerts influence
through connections gray economy connections with business
and politicians. Most major parties have some Russian
connection. Energy observers suspect recent government
energy contracts favorable to the Russians were part of a
deal benefiting Russia-linked oligarchs and politicians.

Internal Stresses
--------------


4. (C) With elections scheduled for June, Socialist PM
Stanishev's ruling coalition is limping through its last
year, hoping to be the first Socialist-led government to
complete its term in office. Suffering from growing domestic
and international criticism over corruption in general and
misuse of EU funds in particular, the government is trying
hard to convince the EU and its own skeptical public that it

SOFIA 00000723 002 OF 002


is seriously tackling corruption. Tensions within the
Socialist party, including between PM Stanishev and his
former mentor President Parvanov, and with its two coalition
partners hamper the government's maneuverability. Sofia
Mayor Borissov's populist GERB party is favored to dominate
the June elections and the Socialist strategy is to try to
come in a strong second to gain a place in the next
government. The financial crisis has not hit Bulgaria's
financial system as hard as others, but will impact the real
economy with reduced FDI, access to credit and lower growth.

Valuing Our Advice
--------------


5. (C) Though internal politics are increasingly taking the
government's attention, on foreign and security policy our
cooperation and advice remain valued as Bulgaria looks to
bolster its international and transatlantic image. Our
contacts have told us Bulgaria is planning to release a new
interagency Black Sea Security Strategy (reftel),and former
ambassador to Washington Elena Poptodorova has been appointed
special envoy for Black Sea issues. The plan reportedly
conforms to our recommendations to work on improving
coordination among NATO members before reaching out to all
littoral states. We have steadily encouraged Bulgaria to be
more assertive on regional security issues and it has been
moving now on a number of these, including Kosovo, Georgia
and now Black Sea security. This visit will be an
opportunity to engage the Bulgarians on their view of the
priorities in the Balkan and Black Sea regions, express
appreciation and encouragement for the positive role they
have played, and help keep their vision in line with our
regional objectives. They will also want to be assured that
there will be no major changes in U.S. policy toward Bulgaria
with the change in administration.
McEldowney