STRATEGY FOR EXPANDING BULGARIAN ENGAGEMENT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000684

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: STRATEGY FOR EXPANDING BULGARIAN ENGAGEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: DCM Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Bulgaria has 470 soldiers in Afghanistan
(up from 80 in 2006),most of whom are in Kandahar. The
Bulgarians will add their first Operational Mentor and
Liaison Team (OMLT),in cooperation with the Tennessee
National Guard, to Kandahar in February 2009. Withdrawal of
152 troops from Iraq in December will allow Bulgaria to
redirect additional assets to Afghanistan. Bulgaria has
capacity for more OMLTs and a Role Two Military Medical
Facility, as advocated by Embassy Sofia and NATO. With clear
and concerted U.S. and NATO engagement, Bulgaria would likely
agree to further new contributions or additional manpower to
medical, military police or engineering units. We should
approach the Bulgarians formally before the end of the year
to avoid the political slowdown that will develop as next
year's general election nears. End Summary.


CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS: FOCUSED IN RC-SOUTH


2. (C) In 2007, the Bulgarians deployed an additional 340
troops to Afghanistan to supplement the 80 already in place.
The bulk of these forces guard the perimeter of Kandahar
Airfield, while the remainder are embedded in international
contingents in Kabul and Herat Provinces. A Bulgarian
mechanized company and staff officers are embedded with the
Italians in Eastern Kabul; a mechanized platoon is embedded
with the Germans in Kabul; a five-person medical team is
embedded with French hospital in Kabul; ten military doctors
serve in two teams embedded in the Spnish Hospital in Herat;
and two Bulgarian offices are serving with the Hungarian
Provincial Recostruction Team in Pol-e Khomri. Past support
inludes the provision of 70 personnel for Air Traffic
Control at Kabul International Airport and donatons of light
weapons, ammunition and ancillary euipmen to the Afghan
National Army.


3. (C) In June 2008, Bulgaria approved the deployment of 0
additional troops to Kandahar Airfield to assum the Entry
Control Point 4 mission, bringing it o its current total of

470. Starting in 2008, Blgaria signed an agreement to train
a dozen Afghni diplomats per year in Sofia. In February
200, Bulgaria will send seven soldiers to participate n its
first OMLT, along with six soldiers from the Tennessee
National Guard (Bulgaria's state partner),who will be in
command. The OMLT will utilize HMMWVs provided under the
Coalition Solidarity Fund. After six months, it will be
replaced by a second OMLT (with the same composition,) but
under Bulgarian command. Future OMLTs will be entirely
Bulgarian staffed. The Bulgarians have also offered to
provide two MI-17 transport helicopters with crews to ISAF if
NATO members pay for the extensive refurbishments necessary;
(we understand the UK has tentatively agreed.)

BULGARIAN FORCES: EFFECTIVE IN THE FIELD, THOUGH NOT FULLY
UTILIZED


4. (C) American and allied commanders have praised the
skill and professionalism of Bulgarian soldiers in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia. Bulgarian soldiers are
capable, and in many instances, may be under-utilized (e.g.,
Special Forces personnel assigned to perimeter security
missions, etc.) Bulgaria remains below NATO targets for
deployable troops as a percentage of the whole as it is
currently downsizing and professionalizing its Armed Forces.
Despite this, it still retains a sizable pool of deployable
forces, many with prior experience in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kosovo, Bosnia or peacekeeping missions in Africa. As a
rule, Bulgarian soldiers are eager to participate in overseas
operations and the General Staff always has more volunteers
than slots to fill.


5. (C) While Bulgaria possesses capable forces, its
soldiers have very little experience leading operations and
its political leadership remains leery of sending troops into
combat situations. (Bulgaria maintained combat troops in
Iraq for almost three years sustaining 13 military KIAs,
before switching to a perimeter security mission at Ashraf
Refugee Camp.) Two Bulgarian soldiers were wounded in a
rocket attack on Kandahar Airfield in early October 2008.
This does not appear to have shaken the Bulgarian
government's resolve to remain in Afghanistan in the
slightest, but it will likely reinforce their preference to
keep its troops "behind the wire." The government does not

impose caveats on its forces in Afghanistan, but it does
adopt the caveats of any ally with whom its forces are
embedded. This applies to its Kabul-based infantry
contingents which mirror the limitations of the commanding
Italian and German units.


RECOMMENDATIONS


6. (C) The President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and
Defense Minister have all strongly supported NATO operations
in Afghanistan. We can turn this political support into
practical, on-ground contributions by defining the most
valuable specific contributions they can make. The more NATO
the optic and operation, the easier for the government to
make the strategic case to the public.

- Following two rotations of OMLTs partnered with
Tennessee National Guard, Bulgaria should commit to fielding
two Bulgarian-only OMLTs simultaneously starting in 2010.

- Bulgaria should provide a Role 2 Military Medical team
in 2009 as recommended in the CJSOR.

- Although the 152 Bulgarian troops returning from Iraq
in December 2008 cannot be directly reassigned overseas, the
United States or NATO should propose a new Bulgarian mission
in Afghanistan for roughly the same number of troops.

- U.S. and NATO should consider proposals for additional
Bulgarian civilian-military contributions to Afghanistan,
such as engineering or medical teams.

- Pending the outcome of the MI-17 refurbishment plan,
Bulgaria should be approached to consider additional
contributions of transport helicopters and crews.



7. (C) Comment: For a country of its size and GDP,
Bulgaria's contributions to Afghanistan have been
exceptional, but we believe Bulgaria can do still more. The
Bulgarian military, both upper-level and the rank-and-file,
are willing to be forward-leaning on new deployments that the
U.S. or NATO suggests, but will not propose new ideas on
their own. The Bulgarian political leadership wants to be
seen as reliable partners in international security, but will
need time to socialize new deployment proposals among all
government coalition partners. With elections on the horizon
next year, we must move quickly to lay down a road map for
more ambitious contributions for 2009.
McEldowney