BULGARIA: MFA ON NATO EXPANSION, KOSOVO, RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000681

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: MFA ON NATO EXPANSION, KOSOVO, RUSSIA
AND BLACK SEA

REF: SOFIA 640

Classified By: DCM Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. MFA Security Policy Director Petio Petev
stressed Bulgaria's support for MAP for Georgia and Ukraine
and eventual NATO membership for all of the Western Balkans.
While pessimistic on resolving differences between NATO and
Russia, he was upbeat on Bulgaria's ability to contribute
proactively to stability in the region. Bulgaria is
promoting regional integration through its engagement with
the Western Balkans and its participation in KFOR, EULEX and
OSCE missions in Kosovo. Bulgaria has also agreed to train
Kosovar diplomats (in addition to the Afghani diplomats its
currently trains.) Bulgaria has completed a new interagency
plan on Black Sea Security and will share it with us shortly.
Petev expressed concern over Russia's actions in Georgia and
its intransigence on CFE. Russia would prefer to see CFE
shelved in lieu of a new arrangement that would force NATO to
negotiate a new framework with Russia, one that Moscow would
try to de-link from Georgia and Moldova. Bulgarian leaders
are uncertain how NATO should proceed in engagement with
Russia, but they did not support a Russian proposal for a
meeting of NATO MFA Security Policy Directors, as an
alternative to a meeting of Ambassadors. End Summary.

NATO EXPANSION EAST AND WEST WILL IMPROVE REGIONAL SECURITY


2. (C) In an October 24 meeting with EUR/CE Director
Pierangelo and a follow-on session with Poloff, Petev noted
the Bulgarian Parliament's ratification of the NATO accession
treaties for Croatia and Albania, but he regretted that
Macedonia was not among this group. The expansion of NATO
and trans-Atlantic values to the west and east (Western
Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia) is essential to unifying and
securing the region. He expressed hope that Georgia and
Ukraine would be offered MAP status at the next opportunity
and that Montenegro and Bosnia would be close behind.
Serbia, he said, should not be neglected. Bulgaria has urged
Serbia to continue engagement with NATO through Partnership
for Peace, and found the Serbians very receptive. Bulgaria
and Serbia will soon sign an agreement on the exchange of
classified information.

BULGARIA DOING ALL IT CAN TO SUPPORT KOSOVO


3. (C) The situation in Kosovo following independence has
gone &smoother than we could have hoped,8 Petev said, a
testament to the intense dialogue among NATO and EU partners
leading up to the event. But the danger of instability
remains, he added. Bulgaria is prepared to do all it can to
support the successful political and economic development of
Kosovo. While the Bulgarian mission in Pristina is currently
led by a Charge d,Affairs, this will be upgraded to an
Ambassador &within a few months.8 Bulgaria maintains 42
soldiers attached to a military engineering contingent at
Camp Prizrin, as well as representation in the EULEX and OSCE
missions. Beginning in 2009, Bulgaria will begin training
Kosovar diplomats and is considering other forms of economic
or political training and assistance.

RUSSIA MUTE ON US-BG JOINT TRAINING, ANGLING TO SHELVE CFE


4. (C) Asked about Russian reactions to the recently
concluded largest-ever U.S.-Bulgaria Land Forces training
exercises, Petev described a recent meeting he had in Moscow
where his interlocutors complained at length about the
missile defense installations in the Czech Republic and
Poland, but did not mention the U.S. &bases8 in Romania and
Bulgaria once, even when discussing CFE. He mentioned his
surprise at this, since in the past, Russian objections to
the facilities and their &violations8 to the CFE had been
consistent and strenuous. Petev's opinion is that the lack
of a Russian response to our highly publicized joint
exercises was the result of two factors. First, the Russians
never truly felt threatened by the joint facilities, but
instead saw them as a chip to be played in the larger CFE
game with NATO and the U.S. He believed the complaints about
the bases would be trotted out again in future multilateral
fora, but the Russians did not appear to view the facilities
as an obstacle to bilateral relations. Second, he believed
that the Russians were picking their battles and had made a

calculated decision to refrain from commenting on regional
security issues too strenuously in the wake of the Georgia
conflict.


5. (C) Petev expressed Bulgaria's concern over the impasse
on CFE and was pessimistic that any negotiated solution could
be reached in the near future. His view was that the
Russians had no interest in saving the CFE and would rather
force NATO to sit down with them to create new ground rules.
Russia's strategy would be to use the OSCE Summit in Astana
in 2010 to launch a new security dialog, hoping to gradually
reach normalized relations with NATO and the EU and
eventually a de facto acceptance of the situation in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Petev said Bulgaria would follow the U.S.
and NATO lead on CFE, but the Bulgarians were anxious to know
how long NATO intended to continue to share CFE information
with the Russians in the light of its non-compliance.

BULGARIA TO UNVEIL NEW BLACK SEA SECURITY STRATEGY


6. (C) After 18 months of consultations, Bulgaria is poised
to release a new interagency Black Sea Security Strategy.
The Council of Ministers approved this classified plan on
October 9, but Petev said the MFA is anxious to share it with
the embassy as soon as it is releasable (a process that could
take three weeks to three months.) The new plan is
&Navy-centric8, he said, and conforms to long-standing
Embassy Sofia recommendations to focus efforts on improving
cooperation among the Black Sea states that are also NATO
members before trying to reach out to all littoral states.
While he could not share details, Petev stressed that the new
plan would be &more than talk8 and a &real contribution to
Black Sea security.8


7. (C) Comment: Traditionally Bulgaria has tended to go
with the flow on NATO and EU policy in the region and rarely
moved proactively or independently. We have steadily
encouraged Bulgaria to take a more active role in regional
security policy, particularly since it will soon no longer be
among the newest NATO members. In small ways, the Bulgarians
are now doing this. While resources remain an obstacle,
Bulgaria is committed to integrating the Western Balkans into
the EU and NATO, and is taking a serious look at what it can
contribute to security in the Black Sea region. Its
development of a new Black Sea strategy is remarkable since
the Bulgarians rarely produce unsolicited proposals on
international security issues. Timely high-level
discussions, especially a visit to Sofia, will support these
new Bulgarian initiatives and ensure their efforts align
fully with ours.
McEldowney