BULGARIA: EU MONITORING MISSION: LOW MARKS BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000365

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR LAURA LOCKMAN, VALDA VIKMANIS-KELLER
USEU FOR LORELEI SNYDER
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018
TAGS: ECON PGOV BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: EU MONITORING MISSION: LOW MARKS BUT
NO PREDICTIONS ON POLITICAL DECISION

REF: A. SOFIA 0254

B. SOFIA 0122

C. SOFIA 0168

D. SOFIA 0229

Classified By: CDA Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The European Commission Monitoring Team
sent to Sofia to prepare a comprehensive report on Bulgarian
reform efforts told us June 3 Brussels is growing more and
more frustrated with Bulgaria's lackluster efforts on
judicial reform, organized crime and corruption. In a
private meeting, team members told us the report would
reflect the team's findings of "little progress" but the EU
political level had yet to decide whether to impose harsh
sanctions or take a softer approach. We also exchanged
information on judicial reforms, reorganization and reform of
the Interior Ministry, and on Bulgaria's corruption fight.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The team was in Sofia June 2-4 to follow-up their
April visit (REFTEL A) and begin preparing a comprehensive
report on Bulgaria's efforts to combat organized crime and
corruption to be released in mid-to-late July. The EU team
included three EU officials and three independent experts
from Germany, France, and the Netherlands. They met with
Prime Minister Stanishev, Interior Minister Mihail Mikov,
Justice Minister Miglena Tacheva, the Financial Intelligence
Directorate (FID) of DANS, the National Audit Office, the
Committee to Identify Criminal Assets, NGOS, and members of
parliament. They also met with DANS, Sofia City prosecution
and Sofia Military prosecution to examine cases for judicial
effectiveness and the precise powers of DANS. The team did
not meet with Magdalena Plugchieva, the new Deputy Minister
for handling EU funds, who was not in Sofia.


3. (C) Team Leader Norbert Sagstetter and the team agreed
that the Bulgarians shared information more openly than
during the April mission, but that they projected a
"schizophrenic" desire to show they were "doing something" in
the face of few concrete results. The Bulgarians are in a
"panic mode" -- only responding to the EU's threat to
withhold EU funds -- and provided contradictory responses on
a range of issues, including draft MOI legislation.
According to the team, the Bulgarian approach to MOI reform
appears to be simply firing people but not taking a deeper
look at the roots of problems. Interior Minister Mikov seems
to want to reform the MOI, but some draft MOI reform
legislative proposals contradict each other and do not jibe
with Ministry of Justice proposals. (NB: The draft
legislation is not yet complete so we are not surprised that
there are many wrinkles to iron out and that there are
inter-ministerial differences.)


4. (C) The team was concerned about DANS' powers and who
has oversight over DANS. Legal expert Magdalena Jagiello
said the proposals for the Parliamentary Committee to oversee
DANS were worrisome because they lacked a "clear strategy" of
checks and balances and did not spell out how DANS relates to
other law enforcement agencies. (NB: The Bulgarians know
that they need supplemental legislation; the MOI package is
supposed to account for that in part.)


5. (C) Despite the team's disillusionment with the
government's lack of progress, they were impressed by PM
Stanishev's expressed interest in building a "bridge to the
next mandate," establishing stable institutions that do not
change with changes in personalities and governments.
According to the team, Stanishev hired PR firm Barston
Marstellar to manage what he perceives as an "international
press conspiracy" against Bulgaria. EC spokesman Mark Gray
told us the firm hired the American-based NGO American Center
for Democracy (ACD) to visit Bulgaria to provide a positive
spin on Bulgaria's anti-organized crime and anti-corruption
efforts, and to put out the message that harsh sanctions
would be counterproductive. He lamented the fact that
Bulgarian journalists in Brussels did not report EC released
information about Bulgaria accurately and in fact "actively
lied." The team confirmed that its report on Bulgaria's
performance would be plainly critical. The decision as to
whether the report would be accompanied by invoking the
safeguard clause, cuts in funding, or a softer approach had

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yet to be made at the political level.


6. (C) COMMENT: The team was clearly discouraged by
Bulgaria's weak reform and anti-corruption efforts, and
talked in terms of "generational change" coming before any
significant improvement. Team members did not have a read on
what political level decision would be taken in response to
Bulgaria's failure, nor were they inclined to speculate.
Separately, our contacts confirm deep concern within the
government about the report and a fear of doing anything on
any issue now that might upset Brussels. In our conversation
with key government officials, they worry less about the
impact on the cabinet or coalition, though they concede there
could be aftershocks, but on the impact on the public. They
worry that a very negative report could sap rather than spur
public enthusiasm for reform and lead to a defensive crouch
and anti-EU sentiment. END COMMENT.

Karagiannis