BULGARIA: EU MONITORING MISSION: LOW MARKS BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000365 SIPDIS EUR/NCE FOR LAURA LOCKMAN, VALDA VIKMANIS-KELLER USEU FOR LORELEI SNYDER DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018 TAGS: ECON PGOV BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA: EU MONITORING MISSION: LOW MARKS BUT NO PREDICTIONS ON POLITICAL DECISION REF: A. SOFIA 0254 ¶B. SOFIA 0122 ¶C. SOFIA 0168 ¶D. SOFIA 0229 Classified By: CDA Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The European Commission Monitoring Team sent to Sofia to prepare a comprehensive report on Bulgarian reform efforts told us June 3 Brussels is growing more and more frustrated with Bulgaria's lackluster efforts on judicial reform, organized crime and corruption. In a private meeting, team members told us the report would reflect the team's findings of "little progress" but the EU political level had yet to decide whether to impose harsh sanctions or take a softer approach. We also exchanged information on judicial reforms, reorganization and reform of the Interior Ministry, and on Bulgaria's corruption fight. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The team was in Sofia June 2-4 to follow-up their April visit (REFTEL A) and begin preparing a comprehensive report on Bulgaria's efforts to combat organized crime and corruption to be released in mid-to-late July. The EU team included three EU officials and three independent experts from Germany, France, and the Netherlands. They met with Prime Minister Stanishev, Interior Minister Mihail Mikov, Justice Minister Miglena Tacheva, the Financial Intelligence Directorate (FID) of DANS, the National Audit Office, the Committee to Identify Criminal Assets, NGOS, and members of parliament. They also met with DANS, Sofia City prosecution and Sofia Military prosecution to examine cases for judicial effectiveness and the precise powers of DANS. The team did not meet with Magdalena Plugchieva, the new Deputy Minister for handling EU funds, who was not in Sofia. ¶3. (C) Team Leader Norbert Sagstetter and the team agreed that the Bulgarians shared information more openly than during the April mission, but that they projected a "schizophrenic" desire to show they were "doing something" in the face of few concrete results. The Bulgarians are in a "panic mode" -- only responding to the EU's threat to withhold EU funds -- and provided contradictory responses on a range of issues, including draft MOI legislation. According to the team, the Bulgarian approach to MOI reform appears to be simply firing people but not taking a deeper look at the roots of problems. Interior Minister Mikov seems to want to reform the MOI, but some draft MOI reform legislative proposals contradict each other and do not jibe with Ministry of Justice proposals. (NB: The draft legislation is not yet complete so we are not surprised that there are many wrinkles to iron out and that there are inter-ministerial differences.) ¶4. (C) The team was concerned about DANS' powers and who has oversight over DANS. Legal expert Magdalena Jagiello said the proposals for the Parliamentary Committee to oversee DANS were worrisome because they lacked a "clear strategy" of checks and balances and did not spell out how DANS relates to other law enforcement agencies. (NB: The Bulgarians know that they need supplemental legislation; the MOI package is supposed to account for that in part.) ¶5. (C) Despite the team's disillusionment with the government's lack of progress, they were impressed by PM Stanishev's expressed interest in building a "bridge to the next mandate," establishing stable institutions that do not change with changes in personalities and governments. According to the team, Stanishev hired PR firm Barston Marstellar to manage what he perceives as an "international press conspiracy" against Bulgaria. EC spokesman Mark Gray told us the firm hired the American-based NGO American Center for Democracy (ACD) to visit Bulgaria to provide a positive spin on Bulgaria's anti-organized crime and anti-corruption efforts, and to put out the message that harsh sanctions would be counterproductive. He lamented the fact that Bulgarian journalists in Brussels did not report EC released information about Bulgaria accurately and in fact "actively lied." The team confirmed that its report on Bulgaria's performance would be plainly critical. The decision as to whether the report would be accompanied by invoking the safeguard clause, cuts in funding, or a softer approach had SOFIA 00000365 002 OF 002 yet to be made at the political level. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: The team was clearly discouraged by Bulgaria's weak reform and anti-corruption efforts, and talked in terms of "generational change" coming before any significant improvement. Team members did not have a read on what political level decision would be taken in response to Bulgaria's failure, nor were they inclined to speculate. Separately, our contacts confirm deep concern within the government about the report and a fear of doing anything on any issue now that might upset Brussels. In our conversation with key government officials, they worry less about the impact on the cabinet or coalition, though they concede there could be aftershocks, but on the impact on the public. They worry that a very negative report could sap rather than spur public enthusiasm for reform and lead to a defensive crouch and anti-EU sentiment. END COMMENT. Karagiannis