MOI REFORM UPDATE: INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR GOB

UNCLAS SOFIA 000345 SENSITIVE SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY - (CAPTION ADDED) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KCRCM BU SUBJECT: MOI REFORM UPDATE: INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS REF: A. SOFIA 00303 ¶B. SOFIA 00301 ¶C. SOFIA 00293 ¶D. SOFIA 00248 ¶E. SOFIA 00229 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. In response to Prime Minister Stanishev's request for expert advice to reform the Ministry of Interior, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) Senior Law Enforcement Advisor in Belgrade Gary Bennett consulted with lead Bulgarian officials May 21-23 in Sofia. The Bulgarian political leadership stressed the need to begin reforms immediately (within two weeks) to regain the public's trust, following the ouster of the former Interior Minister amidst a series of scandals. Operational staff disagreed about the nature of the problems (e.g., politically motivated vs. incompetence) and feared radical change, which might hinder the Ministry's operation. At the Embassy's request, Bennett outlined high-level recommendations to address the most pressing priorities the officials raised: organized crime, corruption, special investigative techniques and internal control. Bennett also stressed the need to undertake long-term reforms to improve both the internal culture within the Ministry and its external image. End Summary. METHODOLOGY ¶2. (U) Bennett arrived in Sofia May 20 for internal consultations within the Embassy. The purpose of the visit was to provide strategic level perspective on the challenges facing the Interior Ministry. Over the next two-days, Bennett met with senior Bulgarian officials, including: - Dr. Vassil Kirov, Head of Financial Intelligence Directorate, State Agency for National Security (DANS) - Mincho Spassov, Chairman, Parliament Committee on Domestic Security and Public Order - Mihail Mikov, Minister of Interior - Petko Sertov, Head of State Agency for National Security (DANS) - Petar Vladmirov, Head of the General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOP) - Sonya Yankulova, Deputy Interior Minister - Pavlin Dimitrov, Secretary General, Ministry of Interior POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ¶3. (SBU) The Bulgarian political leadership stressed the need to implement reforms immediately (within two weeks) in order to regain the public's trust, following a series of crippling scandals, which ultimately led to ouster of the former Interior Minister. The pending European Commission report, which is expected to be sharply critical of Bulgaria's progress in addressing rule of law, only adds to the pressure. ¶4. (SBU) Confident in Interior Minister Mikov's character, senior Bulgarian leadership in the Parliament and DANS expressed willingness to help him build a ministry that he is comfortable managing. Mikov wants the reformed ministry's new structure to align with its main functions, including security, criminal investigations, border police, and fire emergency services. The placement of the specialized intelligence units (DOI, which is in charge of physical surveillance and DOTI, which executes wiretapping requests) remains unresolved, with the Interior Ministry favoring maintaining the structures under its jurisdiction and parliamentarians leaning towards establishing a separate agency directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. Mikov said that physically removing the units from the Interior Ministry would be almost impossible for technical and logistical reasons. Regardless of the structure, use of specialized investigative techniques, or rather overuse of such, has been highlighted as an acute problem for the system where more than 90 percent of the data collected is not used in court. To discipline law enforcement, Parliamentarians are considering, as an interim measure, placing a limit on the number of wiretapping requests per annum. ¶5. (SBU) Other reform priorities for senior leadership include discipline, establishing and enforcing ethical standards, and hiring and retaining good employees. Mikov intends to strengthen the role of the Ministry's internal inspectorate by promoting it to a directorate under his supervision. Anti-corruption efforts are also high on the Parliamentarians' agenda which, in addition to top-down house cleaning in the ministry, suggest what they view as exotic measures like introducing a pocket-money limit for police officers. Acknowledging the lack of incentive for hard work, politicians recommend raising the police investigators' salaries, which may be two-three times below those offered by DANS. Streamlining cooperation between DANS and MOI, and clearly delineating their investigative authority is another area for improvement. While Mikov enjoys a strong personal relationship with DANS Head Sertov, the exact relationship between DANS and MOI still needs to be formalized in a statutorily mandated instruction. OFFICIALS OPERATIONAL STAFF ¶6. (U) Operational staff feared that radical reform could undermine the ministry's operations and hinder the resolution of specific problems. They perceived that the current crisis in the ministry involving some political figures had discredited the entire organization and professional staff. Other specific concerns included the expedited mechanisms for disciplining and transferring staff that compromise the MOI's investigative work, as well as communication and distribution of case information. The handling of special investigative data by the requesters, who actually leaked information setting off the recent MOI scandals, is also a problem. ¶7. (U) The operational level would also like to see police without legal training (detectives) to have more investigative powers for lower level crimes. This would multiply the investigative workforce and allow those investigators with legal training to concentrate on more complex cases. The politicians oppose the idea of giving more investigative power to detectives and prefer attracting more lawyers and paying higher salaries. SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS ¶8. (SBU) Acknowledging that many of the ministry's problems could only be addressed in the long-term, Bulgarian officials expressed a political imperative to take immediate action. In response, Bennett provided the following short-term recommendations: Organized Crime/Corruption - Thoroughly vet the existing investigative/management cadres within GDBOP and high levels within the Ministry of Interior (e.g. financial disclosure; telephone records; unexplained wealth; case performance); make additional personnel changes where deemed appropriate - Assign all the regional Directorate-level representatives of GDBOP as direct-reports to the agency director - Clearly define, differentiate, and publish (policy and media) the investigative mandates of GDBOP and DANS (e.g. define the "high profile" and "national security" priority for DANS; how will cases be assigned and what will be the filtering template?) - Create a standing coordinating working group--- with high-level GOB leadership--- to bring together all enforcement, criminal intelligence and prosecutorial entities working on organized crime and corruption - Using the model created at the working group level, create vetted/secure operational task forces with the mission to dismantle the top organized crime organizations in Bulgaria and to successfully bring to justice those responsible for the unsolved murders - Institute a regular "Report to the People" on case achievements and challenges Special Investigative Techniques - Assess the use and overuse of "wire tapping"--- the original request, its use in the pre-investigative stages, the communication to and use by responsible investigative agencies, its relative value as evidence, its secure storage and ultimate purging. - In order to ensure more legal consistency to the requests for and the application of wiretapping: ¶1. Reduce the number of approving authorities (currently all 28 of the regional District Court Chairs; appellate level regions?); provide specialized training and oversight for these authorities ¶2. Create and implement a mandatory "check list" (from existing law) to be completed by the requesting agency, reviewed and approved by the agency chain of command and then by the approving authority; include in case file - Institutionally separate the technical process (collection of information) from the investigative process ("exploiters" of information collected) - Create or reinforce regular oversight report to parliament on basic statistics (e.g. number initiated and in-progress, % of use as evidence, amount destroyed) - Maintain detailed internal analysis for day-to-day management Internal Control - Consolidate all inspection/security assets and place directly under the Minister of Interior - Suggest re-naming for public visibility (e.g. Inspector General) - Staff already deployed at 28 Regional Directorates should have all necessary material resources (e.g. vehicles, secure office space, etc) so as to eliminate reliance on local chain of command LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS ¶9. (SBU) Beyond the need to urgently respond to calls for MOI reform, Bennett discussed evolutionary changes needed to address the OFFICIALS MOI's systemic problems. Organized Crime/Corruption - Following the vetting and satisfactory performance reviews, examine the need to gradually return to salary/scales parity between GDBOP and DANS (a morale, recruitment and retention issue) - Review and amend appropriate penal and procedural codes to facilitate stronger prosecutions based upon 1) conspiracies, 2) criminal enterprises (ala RICO) and 3) negotiated pleas for cooperating, lesser associates - To free up staff for a continuous and concerted assault on high-profile organized crime and corruption cases, consider the expansion of the investigative mandate to allow appropriately trained regular police officers (non-Academy graduates) to investigate minor crimes to conclusion - Institutionalize Practical Criminal Investigative and Enterprise Theory Investigative training for all organized crime and corruption personnel - Develop positive working relationships with Non-Governmental Organizations and investigative journalists that specialize in organized crime and corruption Special Investigative Techniques - Ensure that the entire range of special investigative techniques be strengthened through 1) legal/policy amendments and 2) training of operatives and unit management. In particular, this recommendation applies to the use of undercover agents and the development of informants. Internal Control - Consider the expansion of purpose to include professional inspections and auditing - Design and implement practices at the Directorate level that will engage the local chain of command in the issue of accountability - Develop a database that maintains disciplinary histories of employees (ideally as part of a larger human resources database including all noteworthy personnel actions) - Expand to become a part of a more comprehensive system of discipline including a circular "learning" model that evaluates individual & organizational performance for lessons to be learned; feed back into mission, training and policy development COMMENT ¶10. (SBU) The urgency to engage with the Bulgarian authorities as they began drafting legislation did not allow for a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of a whole range of cross-impacting reform issues. Further evaluation will be needed to identify discrete areas for potential engagement of U.S. law enforcement and assistance resources. The recommendations provide feasible practical solutions from experience for the Ministry's new political leadership, which, beyond its immediate goal to meet the concerns of the EU before the July report, appears sincere in its efforts to resurrect public confidence in police. We will continue to engage the Bulgarians on suggested structural and legislative changes, particularly with respect to use of specialized investigative techniques and authority to investigate organized crime. KARAGIANNIS 6 7