BULGARIA RECOGNIZES KOSOVO -- FINALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000171 SIPDIS SIPDIS PASS TO EUR/NCE AND EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA RECOGNIZES KOSOVO -- FINALLY REF: A. (A) SOFIA 00088 ¶B. (B) SOFIA 00065 ¶C. (C) SOFIA 00114 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: After maintaining a careful balancing act following Kosovo's declaration of independence, Bulgaria finally announced it would recognize the new state on March 19 along with Croatia and Hungary. The Council of Ministers gave formal approval on March 20. This puts Bulgaria at the tail end of the "second wave" of EU states to recognize Kosovo. The GoB believed putting some time between the declaration and recognition would help it sell the idea to a skeptical public and manage fallout with the Serbs. While there was little doubt that Bulgaria would eventually recognize Kosovo (with consistent pushing from us),this is another example of the GOB foregoing opportunities to show leadership in regional affairs for the safety of joining a consensus. END SUMMARY. ANNOUNCEMENT - SAFETY IN NUMBERS -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 19 the MFA issued a joint statement with Hungary and Croatia announcing their decisions to recognize Kosovo's independence. The statement stressed the role of the international community and EU, cooperation of the Kosovar authorities, maintaining good relations with Serbia and supporting SAA for Serbia. The MFA waited to send the formal proposal to recognize Kosovo to the Council of Ministers during its regular weekly meeting March 20 because the government did not want the decision to be viewed as a "special case," according to an MFA contact. Initial public reaction has been mixed but most appeared resigned to the idea that eventual recognition was inevitable. The center-right opposition used the occasion to criticize the government for waiting too long. WHY WAIT -------------- ¶3. (C) The GoB generally stuck to its plan to be in the "second wave" of EU states to recognize Kosovo. Senior officials told us they needed time for a skeptical public to "get used to the idea" of an independent Kosovo. They wanted to present a case to the public that recognition was in accord with the efforts of the EU and international community and that the Kosovar leadership was acting properly. They would wait some weeks to ensure that the Kosovars would incorporate the Ahtisaari plan into their laws and for a majority of EU states to extend recognition. ¶4. (C) GoB officials pointed out that Bulgarians were not enthusiastic about recognition. In addition to sympathy for the Serbs from Slav and Orthodox ties, they recalled the serious economic disruption during the 1999 Yugoslavia embargo and expected that Serb retaliation for recognition would lead to similar problems. Some also worried about Kosovo becoming a precedent for other minorities breaking away, especially in Macedonia. Our government interlocutors insisted Bulgaria was the "most vulnerable" country to Serb retaliation and recalled that the 1999 embargo led to the rise of Bulgarian organized crime. ¶5. (C) MFA officials also believed delaying recognition would help them manage the Serb reaction and ease eventual reestablishment of good relations. One MFA official said the Serbs asked that Bulgaria not be among the first to recognize, understanding that they would do so eventually. The GoB also wanted to avoid a Serb boycott of the Regional Cooperation Council meeting it was hosting on February 29, where it hoped to keep Serbia involved in regional cooperation. ¶6. (C) The government may have also wanted time to manage opposition within the ruling coalition. Hard-line Socialists voiced objections or urged a longer delay in recognition, as did as some members of coalition party NMSS, but did not change the government's course. The majority ethnic Turkish MRF supported recognition as did the center-right opposition. Only extreme nationalist Ataka condemned it. THE DECISION -------------- ¶7. (C) In early March MFA contacts told us all the internal paperwork was prepared for recognition; the only issue was to choose how and when to announce. The government wanted to SOFIA 00000171 002 OF 002 announce simultaneously with other countries and was negotiating with Hungary and Portugal. Making the announcement with other states would help with the public and the Serbs. In a March 7 meeting with FM Kalfin, Amb. Beyrle warned that dragging the process out was making the Government look indecisive. Washington was losing its ability to see the nuances of the Bulgarian timetable; press reports had already lumped them together with the Cypriots and Romanians in the "rejectionist" camp. A/S Fried,s subsequent phone conversation with Kalfin helped sharpen the sense of urgency for the GoB, adding the carrot of our support for their ISG membership once they recognized. BRACING FOR SERB REACTION -------------- ¶8. (C) Belgrade recalled its ambassador Danilo Vucetic following recognition, as expected. In a TV interview on March 21 Vucetic said Serbia would not take "retaliatory measures" but bilateral relations would be affected. MFA contacts who have been meeting with the Serbs told us on March 19 that they believe the Serbs are still working on a specific reaction to the neighboring states that recognized Kosovo, which they believe will not be so harsh. They were very worried about their embassy in Belgrade being targeted during demonstrations planned for March 24 and were taking security measures. They noted that Serb emotions were still running high, but eventually will have to calm down. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) To give them their due, the GoB shared their recognition plan with us in early February (ref A) and largely stuck to it: announce their intention to recognize at the Feb. 18 GAERC, stay out of the first wave, and tie their decision to Ahtisaari-compliant law-making in Pristina. The government, wanting to be a dutiful member of the EU and international community, understood it had to recognize Kosovo and that there might be some risk and pain involved. The recognition issue is another example of the GoB preferring to choose the safest course over an opportunity for leadership. Delaying recognition cost Bulgaria a "founding seat" on the ISG, but does not ultimately deny them a chance to have a stronger voice on Kosovo issues. We believe the Bulgarians can continue to play a key role as the only one of Serbia,s "eastern" neighbors to have recognized Kosovo, and strongly support their inclusion in the ISG as soon as practicable. END COMMENT. Beyrle