MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000098 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME AND NATO REF: A. STATE 8781 ¶B. SKOPJE 95 Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador underscored to President Crvenkovski during a meeting February 6 that finding a compromise solution on the Macedonia-Greece name dispute is the best way to ensure Macedonia receives a NATO invitation at the Bucharest Summit in April. Crvenkovski acknowledged that Macedonia does not have good long-term prospects for resolving the name, and agreed a "good proposal" by UN Negotiator Nimetz might be the way to resolve the name dilemma and secure a NATO invitation. He posed a number of questions, however, regarding the modalities of such a compromise solution. That he did so, and also discussed the inter-party consensus that would be absolutely critical for acceptance of such a solution, is mildly encouraging. Continued work with both Skopje and Athens to compromise on the name issue along the lines of the Nimetz framework in the runup to Bucharest, combined with as much honest assurance as we can provide to Macedonia that its acceptance of such a compromise would pave the way to a NATO invitation, offers the best hope for a way forward. End summary. CONTINUE REFORM PROGRESS, ACCELERATE NAME RESOLUTION EFFORTS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador delivered ref A points on sustaining NATO aspirant progress to President Crvenkovski on February ¶6. She told Crvenkovski that Macedonia needed to continue efforts to implement the May 29 agreement, including submitting a draft language law to Parliament and beginning implementation of a social package for victims of the 2001 conflict. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. wants Macedonia in NATO, agrees the name issue is not a membership criterion, and would continue to insist that both Macedonia and Greece adhere to the 1995 Interim Agreement. Athens, however, did not accept that position. Greece would exercise a veto on an invitation for Macedonia if a name resolution was not agreed before the NATO Summit in Bucharest this April. The best hope for avoiding a veto, she added, was to reach a compromise before Bucharest in which Macedonia would keep its constitutional name, including for bilateral use, but would agree to a differentiated name for international usage. That would pave the way for Macedonia's membership in NATO and future accession to the EU. It also would rid the country of the detested FYROM acronym currently used in the UN and other international organizations. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador urged that the GOM present proposals for a name for international usage to Nimetz before the next bilateral meeting in Athens on February 19. She pledged that, if the government took that politically challenging step, we would work with both coalition and opposition parties to help build a consensus for the compromise. In the end, NATO membership was Macedonia's to lose. Fair or not, the name issue was the last remaining major obstacle to an invitation at Bucharest. A VETO LOOMS, REALITY SETS IN -------------- ¶5. (C) Crvenkovski asked whether Athens was serious about a veto. He said Greece knew that the U.S. wanted all three Adriatic Charter members in NATO and that Athens therefore refused to budge from its hardline position, confident that Washington would direct the pressure on Skopje for a resolution. He questioned whether Athens would, at the 11th hour, refrain from a veto. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador reiterated our view that Athens was serious about a veto. She pointed out that what we were proposing as a way forward was far from the Greek position and would require us also to lean heavily on Athens. Crvenkovski agreed that the GOG had little room for maneuver on the issue, given its razor-thin parliamentary majority. SKOPJE 00000098 002 OF 003 He also acknowledged that, over the long-term, even if Greece allowed Macedonia to enter NATO as FYROM, the name issue would remain unresolved. Athens would be able to pressure Skopje by using its veto elsewhere (e.g., regarding EU accession). And Skopje would be unable to prevail in its attempts to get international organizations to accept its constitutional name. Trying to get the UNSC to approve a change in its name also would be futile, since a single UNSC member would be able to block such a move. "We can never hope for a complete victory," he said, suggesting that a "good proposal" under the current Nimetz process might be the best way out. QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to the practical aspects of reaching an agreement, Crvenkovski unloaded a battery of practical and politically important questions he said had to do with the "formulation, packaging, and technology" of a possible agreement. Where would Nimetz make his proposal for a resolution? In Athens? If so, that would put Skopje in an awkward position. If both sides refused the proposal, what then? What if Skopje accepted, but Athens rejected? Would Macedonia still receive a NATO invitation? It would be devastating for the government, he said, if Macedonia was seen to have compromised without any payoff in the end. ¶8. (C) Continuing, Crvenkovski asked whether a proposal would be made public before the invitation at Bucharest, or at the same time as a NATO invitation was extended? What if the leaders on both sides agreed to a compromise solution, but the Greek parliament would not ratify it or the Greek government fell? Again, Macedonia would have compromised and paid a heavy domestic political price, for no payoff. On a more detailed level, he asked how would a new name (e.g., Independent Republic of Macedonia) be transcribed at the UN? What would the "short name" be? How would it be abbreviated? Macedonia could not change the description of its language (Macedonian) or nationality (Macedonian),he said. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said it was too early to address the President's specific questions, but acknowledged that they were important and promised to report them to Washington. She noted that, regardless of the Greek response to a proposal, a clear YES from Skopje would show flexibility and seriousness about reaching a compromise. That would give us more leverage to use with the Greek side in pressing for compromise that would open the door to Bucharest. It was important for the USG to know that the GOM would be ready to accept a Nimetz proposal. In the meantime, it was important that the GOM propose some options to Nimetz. ¶10. (C) Crvenkovski said that, even if the leadership accepted a compromise name, there would be a strong inter-party as well as public opinion battle to win acceptance of it. Would the compromise be acceptable to Athens as a "final" resolution of the matter? Political leaders here would not want to face the possibility of agreeing to a compromise, only to find Athens still blocking NATO accession. Given a "good proposal" and good answers to the key tricky detailed questions he had posed, Crvenkovski felt, however, that the major ethnic Albanian parties could be brought around, as could the major ethnic Macedonian opposition party (SDSM). The key to a complete political consensus would be PM Gruevski's governing VMRO party. FINISH REFORMS BEFORE BUCHAREST -------------- ¶11. (C) Crvenkovski agreed with the Ambassador regarding the need for continued implementation of the May 29 agreement, and added that it would be important to resolve both the language law and social package issues before the Bucharest Summit. If not, he said, Gruevski would pocket a NATO invitation and later ignore both issues, which would raise inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) As noted in ref B, we are cautiously optimistic that SKOPJE 00000098 003 OF 003 the GOM is beginning to think seriously about options for resolving the name issue, beyond their traditional "dual name" formula. That Crvenkovski is already thinking about the tricky detailed modalities of a possible solution, and the internal political challenges of building a consensus for it, is mildly encouraging. To have any chance of a NATO invitation for Macedonia and a resolution of the name issue, we believe we will have to work with Nimetz to facilitate good answers to Crvenkovski's detailed questions and couple carefully calibrated continued pressure on Skopje with strong consistent pressure on Athens to be flexible. The leadership here is also likely to insist that, if it does agree to a differentiated name for international use, it can only survive politically in doing so if it receives a NATO invitation this April. ¶13. (C) In thinking through how Macedonia's leaders can shield themselves from the risks of an unrequited compromise, we assess that they may need to condition in some way their final acceptance of a differentiated name for international organization use on completion of the NATO ratification process. MILOVANOVIC