MACEDONIA: SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE NAME AND NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR A/S FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE NAME AND NATO

REF: A. STATE 08781


B. SKOPJE 87

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During separate meetings with President Crvenkovski
and PM Gruevski today, I pressed for greater flexibility in
approaching the Nimetz talks on the name dispute with Greece
and urged that Macedonia propose some options to Nimetz
before the next round of bilateral talks in Athens on
February 19. Both indicated a solution might be achievable
through the Nimetz process, although Crvenkovski raised a
number of pertinent questions regarding the modalities of
such a solution and Gruevski said any solution would have to
be approved in a referendum. Neither leader pressed back
with the traditional "dual name" position, and both were
clearly interested in receiving and analyzing the Nimetz
proposal before taking further decisions. We're far from
being out of the woods yet, but both leaders are showing
signs that they may be willing to demonstrate greater
flexibility in reaching a compromise, as long as Athens
reciprocates fully and a NATO invitation is the clear outcome
of their efforts. End summary.

NEGOTIATE, NOW, IN GOOD FAITH
--------------


2. (C) I met separately with President Crvenkovski and PM
Gruevski February 6 to deliver ref A points on NATO aspirant
progress, and to press further for resolution of the name
issue before the NATO Bucharest summit (septels follow). I
told both leaders that a NATO invitation was theirs to lose
(assuming continued reform progress),and that the obstacle
-- fair or not -- was the name dispute with Greece. I urged
them to find a name for use in international institutions,
and with Greece and possibly any other country that had not
already recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name. I
also urged them to devise some options or formulas for a name
that they could pass to UN Negotiator Nimetz before the next
bilateral meeting in Athens on February 19. I pointed out
that neither their traditional "dual name" position, nor
Greece's stance, was leading anywhere and time was short.

A BASIS FOR COMPROMISE
--------------


3. (C) Crvenkovski acknowledged that even if Greece allowed
Macedonia to enter NATO as FYROM (per the 1995 Interim
Agreement),the unresolved issue would continue to loom over
Macedonia's future Euro-Atlantic prospects and the country
would never be able to secure a "complete victory" in which
its constitutional name would be recognized for both
bilateral and international use. He volunteered that it
would be difficult to turn to the UNSC for resolution, since
just one member on the Council could block any motion to
recognize the constitutional name. Consequently, if
Macedonia were to receive "a good proposal" through the
Nimetz process a solution might be achievable.


4. (C) Assuming a "good proposal" could be found, Crvenkovski
said, it would be important to work out details regarding
three key issues: a.) the formulation of the proposal (e.g.,
if Macedonia accepted, but Greece did not, would the country
still receive a NATO invitation?); b.) the packaging (e.g.,
if a compound name were accepted, how broadly would it apply
in the UN -- to the description of the Macedonian
language/nationality?); and c.) the technical details
regarding steps after a proposal was accepted -- what would
be required/permitted in terms of ratification by both sides?
I said it was too early to discuss answers to those
questions, but agreed to convey them in detail (septel) to
Washington for review.

ANALYZE THE NIMETZ PROPOSAL, LET THE CITIZENS DECIDE
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Gruevski was convinced the Greeks intended to veto,
but thought that prolonging a resolution of the name issue
until after an invitation, but before ratification, "might be

SKOPJE 00000095 002 OF 002


the only way out." He said he would wait for the Nimetz
proposal and analyze it before responding. If the name for
international use was acceptable to both sides, he would hope
to resolve the issue to pave the way to NATO and --
eventually -- EU membership. Any change in the name, though,
even if only for international use, would require the
approval of the citizens of Macedonia through a referendum.
He said he would have to remain neutral on such a referendum,
but added that he was "not pessimistic" about the likely
outcome. I pushed back, pointing out that he could reframe
the context of public discussions on the choice at hand,
moving away from the question of "the name or NATO?" to
"FYROM or a differentiated name and/and NATO membership?"
Gruevski said he remained committed to working on the issue.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) Details of both conversations follow septels. I found
it positive that neither leader drew a "dual name" line in
the sand, or rejected outright the suggestion that the Nimetz
process could produce a viable solution that preserves
Macedonia's dignity while allowing Greece to permit an
invitation to go forward. While I detect no sea-change that
suggests the GOM has abandoned the "dual name" approach, or
that would lead to a quick compromise, I sense that both
Crvenkovski and Gruevski finally are earnestly grappling with
the potential consequences of a Greek veto, and possible
constructive actions they could take, as they head into the
next round of bilateral talks with Nimetz in Athens. We will
continue to press for a constructive Macedonian proposal to
Nimetz, and for continued movement toward a more flexible
stance. We hope that Athens can in the meantime be persuaded
to prepare for a compromise that would give it much, albeit
not all, of what it says it wants from Skopje.
MILOVANOVIC