MACEDONIA: RUMORED PLANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL

S E C R E T SKOPJE 000438 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR P (U/S BURNS) AND EUR A/S FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: RUMORED PLANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND CONCENTRATION OF POLITICAL POWER MAY THREATEN OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT REF: SKOPJE 436 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (U) This is a request for policy guidance (see paragraph 5). ¶2. (S/NF) According to a wide range of credible sources, PM Gruevski's VMRO-led coalition plans to amend the constitution to allow for indirect election, by parliament, of the President (head of state). VMRO's new coalition partner, eAlbanian DUI, has indicated to us that it would support such an amendment. Such an action would end direct popular election for the office of the President, one of the few checks and balances on government in this young democracy. This has been a long-standing goal of Gruevski's, and with his new 82-seat governing majority (reftel),he now has the means to achieve it through a constitutional amendment. ¶3. (S/NF) Limiting the President's independence through indirect elections would clear the way for a system in which the party in government could act without the possibility of dissenting views from the President, undermining democracy in Macedonia. It would give the ruling party control over appointment of the Chief of Defense Staff in the Ministry of Defense (MOD),weakening the civilian-military separation of power in the MOD. It also would give the ruling party additional influence over the appointment of Macedonia's ambassadors, further concentrating power in the government. ¶4. (S/NF) The change from a direct to indirect election of the President would be retrogressive and harmful to democratic development in Macedonia. Although the constitutional powers of the President are limited, the traditional independence of that office has had an important tempering effect on government policies and attitudes. In recent months, the most notable example of this moderating influence relates to the name dispute. President Crvenkovski's more flexible position related to the name negotiations, coupled with his statesmanship on the issue, was critical in persuading the government to accept the pre-Bucharest Nimetz proposal, and helped moderate public opinion on the issue. Removing a directly elected President and further limiting his/her independence would clear the way for a mono-party system that could act without regard to minority political views. ¶5. (S/NF) POLICY GUIDANCE REQUEST: We request the Department instruct us to use the considerable influence the USG enjoys here to persuade PM Gruevski and his coalition partners to refrain from pursuing any action to amend the constitution to allow for parliamentary election of the president, and to ask other influential domestic and international actors to discourage it as well. We would convey that message privately. Milovanovic