MACEDONIA/GREECE NAME ISSUE: HOPING FOR A MIRACLE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000179 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA/GREECE NAME ISSUE: HOPING FOR A MIRACLE, SHOWING SOME FLEXIBILITY REF: SKOPJE 173 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY ¶1. (C) In separate meetings March 6, Macedonia's name negotiator Ambassador Dimitrov and UN mediator Ambassador Nimetz briefed the Charge on the latest round of high level discussions earlier the same day. Still disappointed over the latest Nimetz proposal, Macedonian leaders are not yet prepared to start making concessions, but signaled that they may accept a permanent replacement for the temporary name "FYROM." Dimitrov hoped for a new Nimetz proposal that moved closer to Macedonia's position, or to find a way to get past the Bucharest summit with a NATO invite. If that outcome materialized, Macedonia would be more receptive to a compromise. Dimitrov recommended the U.S. convey to the Macedonian leadership that the USG does not have a "magic formula" for an eleventh-hour resolution, absent steps toward a compromise between Macedonia and Greece. End summary. SOME FLEXIBILITY IN GOM'S OFFICIAL POSITION ¶2. (C) UN mediator Ambassador Nimetz briefed the Charge March 6 on his talks with the top Macedonian leadership earlier the same day. Nimetz said the GOM's official position remained the dual-name approach (i.e. use "Democratic Macedonia" or "Independent Macedonia" with Athens, and use the constitutional name for all others and in international organizations). The Macedonian leaders signaled, however, that if/if there was an agreement on a specific name, excluding any geographic adjective or the modifier "New," Macedonia could use the new name "wherever FYROM currently is used." In a subsequent meeting, Ambassador Dimitrov confirmed Nimetz's readout and indicated that PM Gruevski remained the stumbling block to putting a more flexible proposal forward. DOMESTIC POLITICS IMPEDING FLEXIBILITY ¶3. (C) According to Dimitrov, the latest Nimetz proposal, which the Macedonians see as heavily biased in Greece's favor, shocked even the "rational elements" of the GOM leadership. A new proposal, which was "at least somewhat acceptable" to the Macedonian side, could reinvigorate the process, Dimitrov said. He was worried, however, that domestic political rivalries between the ruling VMRO and opposition SDSM were impeding GOM flexibility. �00A;HOW TO AVOID A DEAD END?.. ¶4. (C) Clearly frustrated, Dimitrov assessed that "we are gradually heading towards a dead end," and neither the U.S., nor any other NATO ally, was giving Macedonia supportive signals about the viability of the negotiations process. He outlined a number of options Macedonia might pursue to try to resolve the issue: 1.) Stick to its current dual-name position; 2.) Accept a provisional name to replace FYROM for 7 years, pending a final agreement (see paragraph 5); 3.) Ask for a "conditional invitation" that would allow the two sides to resolve the issue before ratification of Macedonia's membership; 4.) Take the matter to the International Court of Justice. Dimitrov said that the GOM team was "genuinely worried about the possibility of a Greek veto of Macedonia's NATO membership." The Charge suggested that Dimitrov put down on paper a draft position that Macedonia could potentially accept and circulate among all major political leaders. Once they concurred, Dimitrov could present the document to the Prime Minister as a united national position, which Gruevski could then decide whether to propose to Greece, knowing he was protected domestically. Dimitrov said he would consider doing that. NEW "TEMPORARY NAME" FOR 7 YEARS? ¶5. (C) Dimitrov suggested that a provisional NATO invitation to Macedonia, with a requirement for resolution of the name issue prior to full membership might be acceptable here, but he was skeptical that the Greeks would accept it. His approach echoed Nimetz's newly-floated idea of a "temporary name" to be used for 7 years, during which negotiations would continue in parallel with joint history and CBM commissions between the two countries. If no agreement was reached by the end of the period, the matter would be referred back to the UNSC. Dimitrov said that the idea was "acceptable in principle," but rejected the names that Nimetz had floated again ("Republic of Makedonija-Skopje" and "Northern Republic of Macedonia"). Nimetz said he planned to ask Athens whether it could accept a halfway solution in order to get past the Bucharest summit with a NATO invite for Skopje. The names he mentioned he would test again with the Greeks were "Independent Republic of Macedonia," "Democratic Republic of Macedonia" and "Republika Makedonija." HOPING FOR A U.S. DEUS EX MACHINA... ¶6. (C) Both Nimetz and Dimitrov felt the GOM's "strategy" now boiled down to waiting for "the Americans to help us resolve this." Convinced of the futility of such an approach, Dimitrov suggested that the most useful message the U.S. could convey to Macedonia at this time was that "the U.S. has no magic wand to make this problem disappear, and that we will have to reach an agreement with the Greeks." He suggested that a letter, or a phone call from "the highest levels in Washington" to the top leaders in Macedonia might provide the needed wake up call for the Macedonian leadership. COMMENT ¶7. (C) Our conversations yesterday showed that the Macedonians are down, but not yet out. Disappointed and convinced that the latest Nimetz proposal was unfairly slanted towards Greece, Macedonia's top leaders are concerned about the impact on Macedonia's future of a Greek veto. They are hesitant to start making compromises in the absence of any sense that Greece would reciprocate, and out of concern over increasing attacks by their domestic political rivals. A reliable voice of reason, Ambassador Dimitrov is pessimistic and feels that the only way the process could progress is for Nimetz to make an urgent new proposal that tilts at least a bit towards the Macedonian side. The Macedonians are hoping that NATO allies, out of concern for regional stability, will prevent Greece from vetoing. We will continue to encourage the Macedonians towards greater flexibility and away from simply hoping for a U.S.-delivered solution. NAVRATIL