MACEDONIA'S PRESIDENT ON LATEST NAME PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000140 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S PRESIDENT ON LATEST NAME PROPOSAL REF: SKOPJE 64 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) President Crvenkovski briefed the Ambassador February 19 on the state leadership's reaction to the latest Nimetz proposal, which had been provided to the Greek and Macedonian sides the night before. In a dispassionate, moderate analysis, Crvenkovski said the proposal was unexpected and contained elements and formulations the GOM side could not accept. It listed "New Macedonia" as a possible name (despite PM Gruevski having identified that option as a redline for the Macedonian side). Of far greater concern, however, were changes to the overall approach -- including that the name for international organizations be used in official Macedonian documents and that the UN would encourage nations to use the international organization name in bilateral relations. Seeing the proposal as heavily weighted against Macedonia, Crvenkovski nevertheless assured the Ambassador he would discuss with the Prime Minister ways to keep the process moving forward. End summary. REQUIRES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) President Crvenkovski met with the Ambassador February 19 to brief her on UN Special Envoy Nimetz's latest proposal on the name issue, which had been provided to the Greek and Macedonian sides on February 18. Analyzing the framework of the new proposal, Crvenkovski said the stipulation that the international name (IN) be used beyond international organizations, to include in multilateral treaties, on passports, etc., was impossible to accept. That requirement was a major departure from earlier Nimetz formulations, he added, since it not only required others/others to refer to Macedonia by the IN, but would compel Macedonians to do so as well. Furthermore, the proposal would require Macedonia to amend its constitution (there is even a specific paragraph on this) to allow Macedonia to refer to itself by the IN on passports and when signing multilateral treaties, while Macedonian citizens would continue to refer to themselves by their constitutional name. That requirement also was a non-starter. ¶3. (C) COMMENT: The proposal to issue passports using the IN surprised and angered the Macedonians. The concept of issuing official documents with anything other than the constitutional name essentially negates the provision that the constitutional name remains unchanged. We are unfamiliar with any precedent of a nation issuing national documents (e.g. passports, driver's licenses) under a name other than its own. It is not entirely clear whether a constitutional amendment or just a regular law would be required, but in any case we would not expect any serious consideration of changing the name used in passports. END COMMENT BILATERAL USAGE PRINCIPLE UNDERMINED -------------- ¶4. (C) Crvenkovski also objected to the suggestion that the IN would be considered for use in other official international usage and for bilateral usage, a position he said had never been contemplated in earlier proposals. He drew a distinction between (acceptably) leaving it open and (unstated) to every sovereign nation to decide by what name to recognize and refer to Macedonia, and the (unacceptable) formulation in the proposal that would have the UN encourage use of the international name for bilateral recognition. NAME OPTIONS UNACCEPTABLE -------------- ¶5. (C) The President noted the five name proposals in the text (Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Macedonia, Independent Republic of Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia, and Republic of Upper Macedonia) included two (New and Upper) that were completely unacceptable to the GOM. He suspected Nimetz would ask both SKOPJE 00000140 002 OF 003 sides to each delete two names, and expected the fifth name remaining to be Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, which Skopje likewise could not accept. He noted the linkage between that suggestion and Bulgaria's earlier rejection of the existence of the Macedonian language and Sofia's 1999 references to "the Macedonian language, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia." The Ambassador noted that the five names were only suggested options, and that others could be put on the table as part of a revised package proposed by either side. HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF THIS "BAD PROPOSAL"? -------------- ¶6. (C) Overall, Crvenkovski said, he had been willing to consider a "good proposal" from Nimetz, along the lines of Nimetz's 2005 proposal and in keeping with the framework Nimetz proposed a few months ago, but this was a "bad proposal," the "worst Nimetz had ever tabled." He had been planning how to get the political leadership together to unite behind an acceptable name and finish things, while now he could not even be sure he could convince the PM not to reject the entire proposal. According to him, Gruevski believed it would be easier to justify to the public rejecting the deeply flawed (from Skopje,s perspective) package now, and then hoping for another Nimetz proposal in a week or two. ¶7. (C) The President said that, instead of rejecting the proposal, he would propose to Gruevski that the GOM take the following steps: - Highlight what was acceptable in the proposal, and what was not, including the GOM,s acceptance of the modifiers "Independent" or "Democratic" for the IN if they were used only in international organizations, and provided the constitutional name remained in use for bilateral relations; - Agree that Nimetz could address international use only/only in further discussions, but not bilateral use. That would include deleting provisions on the use of the IN for Macedonian passports ("he cannot tell us how to refer to ourselves.") ¶8. (C) Crvenkovski cautioned it was possible Gruevski would reject the proposed way forward, but if he did so, the GOM would need to know what next steps they would have to take. If Nimetz invited both the Greek and Macedonian negotiators to New York to hear their positions, and then produced a compromise solution out of both sides' proposals, would the GOM be bound to accept it? DON'T SAY NO, KEEP TALKING! -------------- ¶9. (C) Emphasizing that she was not talking on instructions from Washington, the Ambassador stressed the Greeks likewise were not likely to find the proposal acceptable. Both sides would need to compromise. It was important for Skopje not to say NO or walk away from the process. The proposal contained a "menu" of options for which the GOM could offer a counterproposal, as long as it kept the process alive. She did not believe the proposal was a "take it or leave it" offer. The Macedonian could side could say YES, even if conditionally, with comments on what was acceptable in the package. As the process continued, there would be an increased international desire to see it succeed, which would help build momentum toward compromise. WHAT IF THE WORST HAPPENS? -------------- ¶10. (C) Clearly frustrated, Crvenkovski asked what we thought would happen if Greece blocked Macedonia's NATO invitation. What would happen to Macedonian troop deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq? To inter-ethnic relations and Framework Agreement implementation? To the country's EU perspective? A "bad atmosphere" would prevail domestically, which would affect the region. The Ambassador said we understood well the consequences of a veto. That was what was driving our efforts to keep the Nimetz process going, with a resolution SKOPJE 00000140 003 OF 003 of the name issue either before the Summit or agreement in sight. We did not believe that a Macedonian "Plan B" to "change the name at the UN" had much chance of succeeding, given the need for the UNSC to agree to such a move. And even if successful, it would not remove the roadblock of Greece refusal to permit Macedonia to enter NATO and the EU. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The latest proposal came as a shock to the GOM as it differs substantially and negatively (from Skopje,s viewpoint) from past proposals, including the framework recently proposed by Nimetz. The introduction of elements that appear in practical terms to negate the paragraph saying the constitutional name remains unchanged, and the contrast between the nature of the proposal, and the hope that had started to build that with a "good" proposal Macedonia might be able to accept something, all combine to make prospects very difficult. ¶12. (C) It was clear that even the President, who is far more experienced and professional than the Prime Minister, felt that there was a grave risk in negotiating from a position of weakness, e.g., from the new Nimetz draft, since their proposed revisions would be based on a far less evenhanded proposal than many in the past. The Ambassador countered that there is only benefit from negotiating. She underscored that it was important to give Nimetz space to continue discussions and offer some positive ideas. Crvenkovski is well disposed, and we are actively supportive of getting to yes or at least not announcing no. But the proposal has dashed hopes and given PM Gruevski a lot of ammunition and incentive to act swiftly and negatively. MILOVANOVIC