Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SINGAPORE35
2008-01-10 09:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Tags:  ECON ETRD EFIN ETTC PREL PGOV SN 
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VZCZCXRO8506
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #0035/01 0100914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100914Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4709
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4186
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5835
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 000035 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR DEPUTY NSA DANIEL PRICE FROM AMBASSADOR HERBOLD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON ETRD EFIN ETTC PREL PGOV SN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
DANIEL PRICE

REF: SINGAPORE 23

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 000035 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR DEPUTY NSA DANIEL PRICE FROM AMBASSADOR HERBOLD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EFIN ETTC PREL PGOV SN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DANIEL PRICE REF: SINGAPORE 23 ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Singapore looks forward to your January 14-15 visit. While we are not allies, the United States enjoys a close relationship with Singapore, based on similar strategic views and substantial trade and investment ties. Singapore is a keen observer of regional developments, but for political and demographic reasons does not play a leadership role. Your meetings with key Singapore government officials, regional financial analysts, and U.S. business representatives offers an excellent opportunity to: -- discuss economic developments in Southeast Asia and beyond; -- encourage continued support for our efforts in the WTO and APEC; and -- seek Singapore's views on regional developments and ASEAN. Partners, not Allies -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Our excellent relationship with Singapore is founded on a convergence of views on key strategic issues and substantial trade and investment ties. As a tiny, wealthy, predominantly ethnic-Chinese state surrounded by much larger, poorer, Malay/Muslim neighbors, Singapore has an acute sense of vulnerability. It is also grappling with the economic and strategic impact of China's and India's resurgence. Consequently, Singapore views a strong U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the region as essential to its own and the region's peace and prosperity. No matter how broad or deep our engagement with Southeast Asia, however, Singapore's leaders always encourage us to do more. The GOS worries that perceptions of flagging U.S. attention to the region could embolden terrorists and others who might see opportunities, if they think we are not watching. Singapore's leaders are equally concerned about the "Arabization" of Southeast Asia's traditionally tolerant approach to Islam and the potential spread of Middle East-inspired radicalism here. ¶3. (SBU) Singapore is a valuable logistics hub for U.S. forces, supports Coalition efforts in Iraq, and contributes to a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. However, Singapore worries about being seen in its Muslim-majority neighborhood as "too close" to the United States. Thus, Singapore does not wish to be a treaty ally. Our military leases its facilities here; there are "places, not base
s" on the island. Economic Success and the FTA -------------- ¶4. (SBU) With Singapore,s commitment to free trade, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),and sound economic management, the country has enjoyed four decades of high growth, giving it a per capita GDP of approximately USD 30,000. Our bilateral economic ties are flourishing. The 2004 U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has been a tremendous success; U.S. exports have grown by more than 50 percent and in 2006, we enjoyed a USD 6.9 billion trade surplus with Singapore. FTA implementation has proceeded smoothly. However, during the third annual review of the FTA in May 2007, we noted a number of areas where Singapore needed to make further progress, such as on telecommunications (especially providing reasonable access to "last mile" leased lines),intellectual property rights, environmental cooperation, and market access. Some 1,500 U.S. companies operate here, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Singapore exceeds USD 60 billion, second only to Japan in Asia. Singapore is a strong supporter of our efforts to conclude the Doha Round, works closely with us within APEC, and is eager for us to join its "P4" Free Trade Agreement with Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand. The Hub -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Singapore's role as the leading shipping and transportation hub in the region has long been the foundation of its economy. By attracting FDI, Singapore has also become a major regional hub for financial services and a manufacturing center in information technology, pharmaceuticals, and oil refining. Singapore has enjoyed 6-8 percent growth per year since 2004, fueled by booming exports to China, the United States, and India. To further diversify the economy, Singapore has aggressively moved into private SINGAPORE 00000035 002 OF 002 wealth management and biomedical research, and the GOS has licensed two multi-billion dollar casinos, set to open in ¶2009. Domestic Scene -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The People's Action Party (PAP) has held power since 1959 and won another landslide victory at the polls in May ¶2006. While the PAP's hardball treatment of the opposition, gerrymandering, and tight media controls contributed to the magnitude of victory, there is no doubt the PAP enjoys broad public support based on its record of delivering security, prosperity, excellent services, and clean government. Burma -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Singapore is clearly fed up with the incompetence, brutality and insularity of the Burmese regime, but unconvinced that stepping up international pressure on the junta can actually bring about positive change in Burma. It has maintained a strong rhetorical stance -- Singapore was a key driver of ASEAN's tough September 27 Chairman's statement on Burma and founding father Lee Kuan Yew has been scathing in public remarks about the regime -- but does not support expelling Burma from ASEAN or imposing sanctions, which it believes would only further isolate the regime. While Singapore wants to see meaningful change, it also worries that a rapid transition that sidelined the military altogether could be highly destabilizing in light of Burma's ethnic divisions and lack of alternative national institutions. ASEAN -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Burma issue overshadowed the Singapore-hosted ASEAN-related summits in November, which were to highlight ASEAN,s institutional development, celebrate its 40th anniversary and develop further the East Asia Summit (EAS). Singapore sought to have UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari brief the EAS on the situation in Burma, but the plan collapsed when Burma rejected it (reftel). This brought back into play sharp underlying divisions between ASEAN's more developed members and its "newer" members (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma). ¶9. (SBU) On the positive side, ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic Blueprint, which aim to strengthen ASEAN institutions and establish a "single economic entity" by 2015, respectively. These are important steps in ASEAN,s efforts to transform itself from a loose grouping of highly diverse countries into a more cohesive and effective organization. (Singapore was the first member to ratify the Charter on January 7.) Singapore sees this transformation as a strategic imperative in order for the small countries of Southeast Asia to maintain political and economic leverage relative to the region's growing powers. A more integrated ASEAN (collectively our fifth largest trading partner and fourth largest export market in 2006) would also benefit U.S. strategic and economic interests in Asia. Regional Pacesetter, but Not a Leader -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Singapore, with its strategic vision and efficient and effective government, wants to come in first and be seen as a leader in fields ranging from e-government to globalization to economic (but not political) freedom. This does not translate, however, into a capacity to be a regional leader, particularly in the political arena. Singapore's small size (in terms of territory and population),wealth, demographics, and unique political culture often lead to testy relations with its neighbors. Even when it wants to, Singapore is not always well-suited to play a leadership role or carry water for the United States in Southeast Asia. Normally, it prefers to work within ASEAN's slower, consensus-based style to deal with regional issues. However, Singapore's leaders are keen observers of regional developments and able to share useful insights with USG counterparts. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm HERBOLD

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