Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHENYANG71
2008-05-30 06:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shenyang
Cable title:  

PRC-DPRK: BORDER-CROSSERS, RELIGIOUS TROUBLES,

Tags:  PREL PINR PGOV PREF PHUM KIRF KN KS CH 
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VZCZCXRO6668
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHSH #0071/01 1510656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300656Z MAY 08
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8419
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1795
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0118
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0084
RHHJJAA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI 0048
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0057
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/SACINCUNC SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0106
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0029
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0547
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHENYANG 000071 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, PRM, DRL/IRF

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV PREF PHUM KIRF KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK: BORDER-CROSSERS, RELIGIOUS TROUBLES,
PUST, TRADE AND UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT

REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 67

B. (B) SHENYANG 68

C. (C) SHENYANG 13

D. (D) 07 SHENYANG 216

E. (E) SHENYANG 37

Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL ROBERT DEWITT.
REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHENYANG 000071 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, PRM, DRL/IRF E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV PREF PHUM KIRF KN KS CH SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK: BORDER-CROSSERS, RELIGIOUS TROUBLES, PUST, TRADE AND UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 67 ¶B. (B) SHENYANG 68 ¶C. (C) SHENYANG 13 ¶D. (D) 07 SHENYANG 216 ¶E. (E) SHENYANG 37 Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL ROBERT DEWITT. REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The PRC appears to have tightened internal security in the PRC-DPRK borderlands in recent months, though border-crossers continue to trickle into China. Border residents report increased official scrutiny of some religious activities. Yanji officials warned religious leaders that they will be "held responsible for what they say" if interviewed during the Olympics by visiting journalists. Continuing delays have again postponed the opening of Pyongyang's first private university until fall ¶2008. A brief spat, perhaps related to food-safety issues, caused DPRK authorities to temporarily disallow certain PRC food exports into Sinuiju earlier this year. Recently enacted PRC regulations encouraging the use of the renminbi, and Chinese banks, for border-trade settlement are having only a minimal impact on PRC-DPRK trade. Chinese contacts dispute interpretations that the measures represent a "loosening" of PRC enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Poloff traveled May 12-16 to Jilin Province and the northern end of the PRC-DPRK borderlands. Sites visited included Changchun, capital of Jilin Province; Yanji, seat of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture; Tumen, opposite the DPRK's Namyang; and Hunchun, near China's land gateway to Rajin-Sonbong (Rason). This is the third in a multi-part snapshot of the PRC-DPRK border in April/May ¶2008. Part I (ref A) focused on surging prices in North Korea and squeezed aid groups there; part II (ref B) examined DPRK food troubles and PRC/DPRK responses. THE BORDER TIGHTENS: ANECDOTAL OBSERVATIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) Empirical observation and discussions with contacts in Liaoning and Jilin provinces suggest that the PRC has started tightening internal security in the PRC-DPRK borderlands in recent months. Both WU Jianhua (STRICTLY PROTECT) and LU Chao (STRICTLY PROTECT),specialists on North Korea and PRC-DPRK border issues at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences (LASS)
, told Poloff in separate meetings April 28 that concerns about the Beijing Olympics have been the most important driver of the security ramp- up. Both, however, declined to elaborate on specifics. ¶4. (C) Internal security, and scrutiny of local Chinese and foreigners alike, appears to have increased considerably in Yanbian. Pastor Jin (STRICTLY PROTECT) of the Ping'an Church, on the outskirts of Yanji, noted May 14 that he started observing a growing security presence in the Yanji area beginning "in February or March." Manifestations, he said, included a far more visible presence of Public Security Bureau (PSB) officers and patrols in the city, as well as increased police scrutiny of his congregation. Northeast of Yanji in Tumen, a longtime Western resident of the border city reported May 14 that Tumen police noticeably increased their vigilance in the area during the same time period. Examples, he said, included sudden inspections by police of foreigners' homes, residency papers and in some cases workplaces, as well as increased scrutiny of the city's foreigner-only church (e.g., police questioning foreign visitors at length, expressing concern about church activities). Still farther east in Hunchun, near both the Sino-Russian and PRC-DPRK borders, a Western resident May 16 spoke of similar security developments. ¶5. (C) Anecdotally, Poloff in Tumen on May 14 and May 16 found the most visible security presence--including several teams of foot-patrols, as well as PSB vehicles trolling the streets--he had observed over eighteen months of visits to the city. Back in Yanji, the city's usually-lax internet SHENYANG 00000071 002 OF 004 cafes began strictly enforcing new regulations requiring that they swipe the machine-readable identification cards that all users must now present in order to access computers at internet cafes. Staff at several establishments told Poloff the regulations took effect the week of May 12, but they were unclear on the reasons why. NORTH KOREAN BORDER-CROSSERS: ANECODTAL REPORTS -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Border contacts reported that North Korean border- crossers continue to trickle into Yanbian. In Yanji, for instance, Father Lian--an ethnic Korean detained by Chinese police in 2001 for assisting North Koreans--reported that "only three or four" border-crossers each month arrived at his church this year. Pastor Jin of the Ping'an Church, an ethnic Korean who himself for many years sheltered North Korean border-crossers, reported even fewer arrivals. He received one border-crosser to date this year--in March; he fed and offered the North Korea money, but advised him to exit Yanji with haste explaining that it was unsafe. Elsewhere on the outskirts of Yanji, a Western administrator involved in the Yanbian University of Science and Technology's quiet aid to border-crossers reported May 15 that arrivals continued, but declined to comment on specific numbers. Farther afield in Tumen, a longtime Western resident of the city told Poloff May 14 that compared to recent years, he heard of "fewer" vanloads of North Koreans being repatriated via Tumen Land Port. Back in Shenyang, the Japanese Consulate still shelters eight North Korean border-crossers. Diplomats there told Poloff May 19 that four recently received PRC exit permission; the remainder awaits word from Beijing. ¶7. (C) LASS' Lu Chao--a longtime post contact and IVLP grantee who researches North Korean border-crosser issues for the Liaoning provincial government--claimed April 28 that earlier in the month in Jilin Province, he interviewed a North Korean border-crosser from northestern North Hamgyong Province. The North Korean, who frequently crossed the border to trade scrap metal for Chinese food, reported little difficulty in crossing the border, noting that both the Chinese and North Korean border controls were no stricter than before, related Lu. The North Korean told Lu that his home province did not face difficulties like those now encountered by South Hwanghae and other provinces hit by floods last year. The border-crosser detected no substantial change in fellow border-crossers, at least from his hometown--never specified--and environs, as a result of food-supply difficulties, added Lu. YOU "WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE" FOR WHAT YOU SAY -------------- -- ¶8. (C) Concerns about the Olympics, in addition to recent events in Tibet, have heightened the "sensitivity" of religious issues in Yanji, according to several religious leaders in Yanbian's government seat. Local Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) officials in March called a special meeting--in conjunction with a pre-scheduled fire inspection--of all religious leaders to discuss Olympics- related issues, recalled the Ping'an Church's Pastor Jin. RAB officials bluntly instructed their audience to put forward a "positive" image of China during the Olympic period, warning that any interviewees would be "held responsible for what they said" when/if interviewed by visiting foreign journalists, related Pastor Jin. Father Lian Changyuan (STRICLTY PROTECT) of Yanji's official Catholic Church confirmed this meeting and the content of RAB officials' warnings on the Olympics, adding that he had been required to attend "two or three" such Olympics- related meetings since February. Lian claimed May 15 that he openly challenged RAB officials at the meetings--arguing that China ought to embrace more openness. He said he received no meaningful response from RAB officials, but did not experience any subsequent problems either. YANJI HOUSE-CHURCH LEADER'S TROUBLES -------------- ¶9. (C) Religious contacts shed some light on a May 8 SHENYANG 00000071 003 OF 004 report, by the Texas-based China Aid Association, that PSB officers in Yanbian on May 4 assaulted HAO Yuji, a house- church "pastor" in Yanji. The Catholic Church's Father Lian told Poloff he "heard through friends" that police confronted Hao and demanded she dissolve her congregation. He could not confirm specifically whether Hao was beaten, as claimed by the China Aid Association and Hao herself. (Hao on May 23, by way of a Chinese-language article on Boxun.com--a website run by overseas Chinese--claimed Yanji police beat her while they detained her on May 4. Hao claimed she was released later that same day, and that police subsequently outlawed her congregation and ordered her to cease proselytizing.) According to Father Lian, Hao is said to have drawn police attention in part because of her involvement with a South Korea congregation with politically sensitive (i.e., irredentist) views vis-Q-vis northeast China. It was this political angle, as well as foreigners allegedly proselytizing to Hao's Chinese congregants, that upset police, claimed Father Lian. The Ping'an Church's Pastor Jin, by contrast, knew of Hao but had not heard of the May 4 incident. He reflected generally that "these sorts of incidents still occasionally happen," although religious freedom in Yanbian had, on balance, improved in recent years (see, for instance, ref C). PYONGYANG'S PRIVATE UNIVERSITY: DELAYED AGAIN -------------- ¶10. (C) The official opening of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST) has been pushed back yet again, until fall 2008, due to continuing delays. PUST's Yanji-based Amcit project manager told Poloff March 14 that a formal response from the Department of Commerce on export permissions for computers, laboratory equipment and other technology destined for PUST's classrooms is still pending. Campus construction is now "nearly complete," though the North Korean Ministry of Education has yet to give PUST final approval for opening. The Yanbian University of Science and Technology, from which the PUST project is being coordinated (see ref D and previous for background), already assembled enough international teachers--American, South Korean and others--to staff the program's first year, but has yet to submit the list to North Korean officials for approval. PRC-DPRK TRADE DUST-UP IN DANDONG/SINUIJU? -------------- ¶11. (C) A brief spat, supposedly related to food-safety issues, temporarily halted certain PRC food exports to the DPRK via Dandong earlier this year, according to Shenyang- based Korea specialists and business contacts involved in cross-border trade. Exact details remain sketchy, but most versions of the story hold that North Korea in February suddenly imposed new regulations obligating certain PRC food exports products (e.g., instant noodles) to carry certifications indicating that they met unspecified "international food-safety standards," contacts said. LASS' Lu Chao claimed Chinese shipments sat for a number of days in Dandong until the North Korean side finally relented. Lu explained to Poloff that he learned of the incident from a Dandong shipper-friend whose North Korean partners eventually phoned several days later and informed him that shipments could be accepted-provided they contained any sort of certification sticker. Lu's shipper- friend quickly commissioned fake certification stickers in Dandong and shipped the products over to Sinuiju, along with payments for North Korean customs officials to facilitate the shipment, said Lu. ¶12. (C) LIU Chensheng (STRICTLY PROTECT),a trade official- turned-businessman who facilitates PRC investment in North Korea via the Liaoning Civilian Entrepreneur Association's Korean Liaison Office, confirmed the dispute April 29. He claimed the row originated when poor-quality Chinese cookies exported to the DPRK caused serious illness in consumers, causing the DPRK to stop exports in protest. Liu ascribed the blame to unscrupulous "southern Chinese firms." Lu Chao, by contrast, remained unclear on the SHENYANG 00000071 004 OF 004 reason, but speculated corrupt North Koreans seeking easy money may have been a reason. IMPACT OF NEW TRADE-SETTLEMENT REGULATIONS -------------- ¶13. (C) PRC regulations enacted earlier this year encouraging the use of the renminbi (RMB) and Chinese banks for border-trade settlement (ref E) are having a minimal impact on PRC-DPRK trade, contacts say. Officials in Yanji and Tumen generally cited increased convenience--and decreased transaction costs--for Chinese traders as the primary impact of the changes. LIU Chensheng, the trade PRC-DPRK facilitator based in Shenyang, sounded a less sunny note. All of his Chinese investment ventures in North Korea are financed in cash, regardless of size; despite the changes, large contracts remain denominated in U.S. dollars, though some smaller projects are now being denominated in RMB because of the Chinese currency's appreciation, Liu said. Asked for his reaction to official claims that the new regulations will "standardize" PRC-DPRK trade, Liu argued that because of its often-informal nature, border trade simply "cannot be controlled or standardized." The regulations, he argued, will have little impact on the ground. ¶14. (C) Foreign and Chinese contacts alike took issue with Japanese press reports interpreting the new trade- settlement regulations as a "loosening" of the PRC's enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718. Japanese diplomats in Shenyang reporting on border issues, for instance, assessed May 19 that the regulations are largely aimed at stimulating more border trade and do not necessarily indicate a slackening of UNSCR 1718 enforcement. ZHANG Yushan (STRICLTY PROTECT),a specialist on the DPRK economy at the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences (JASS) in Changchun, argued May 12 that the measures had no bearing on the PRC's enforcement of UNSCR 1718. Rather, the measures--sought by both sides, he said--are meant to legalize use of the RMB for trade-settlement purposes. Ultimately, the hope is that they will offer traders more convenience; "standardize" PRC-DPRK trade; and, to a very limited extent, help reduce Beijing's trade deficit with Pyongyang, said Zhang. Queried about the timing of these measures, both he and his colleague, the respected Korea expert CHEN Longshan (STRICTLY PROTECT),cautioned against reading anything into this. DEWITT

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