NORTH KOREAN BORDER-CROSSERS: MORE PRC THINKING;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREF PGOV PINR GTIP KN KS CH
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN BORDER-CROSSERS: MORE PRC THINKING;
YANBIAN/SHENYANG SITREP

REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 7

B. (B) 07 SHENYANG 196

C. (C) 07 SHENYANG 229

SHENYANG 00000012 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN.
REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The small group of specialists researching
North Korean border-crossers for the PRC government largely
endorses Chinese policy on the issue, even if small
differences exist. One researcher said a PRC "transit
corridor" permitting North Koreans to quietly traverse
Chinese territory for a third country would undermine PRC-
DPRK and PRC-ROK relations. Contacts in frigid borderland
Jilin anecdotally report fewer new arrivals in early 2008
compared to the same period in 2007, while in Shenyang, a
former Korean prisoner of war and nine others living in the
ROK Consulate await PRC permission to depart for Seoul.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Poloff traveled January 7-11 to Changchun, capital
of Jilin Province, as well as to several points in the
Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, including Yanji,
Tumen and Nanping. This is the second in a two-part update
on the PRC-DPRK border in late 2007 and early 2008; the
first report (ref A) focused on politico-economic issues.

PRC RESEARCHER ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS, "TRANSIT CORRIDOR"
-------------- --------------

3. (C) The handful of specialists sanctioned to research
North Korean border-crossers on behalf of the PRC
government largely endorses Chinese policy on the issue,
according to one of the cohort's foremost researchers.
Asked about the state of the internal debate on policy
recommendations and potential alternatives, the Jilin
Academy of Social Sciences' ZHOU Weiping (STRICTLY PROTECT;
see refs B and C for background and recent discussions)
during an unofficial meeting in Changchun on January 10
explained to Poloff that she and her colleagues generally
agree with the political necessity of continuing China's
policy of repatriation except in some humanitarian cases,
even if many acknowledge the policy's human costs. Some
researchers may quibble on the margins of the apparently
less-than-dynamic policy debate, but differences are
generally contained within a narrow spectrum, she noted
without elaborating on fault lines.


4. (C) Queried about the possibility of Beijing quietly
opening a "transit corridor" that would permit North Korean
border-crossers to traverse PRC territory for a third
country (e.g., from the PRC-DPRK border to the PRC-
Mongolian border),Zhou replied that such a measure would
be of limited utility because it would simultaneously
undermine relations with both the DPRK and the ROK. The
PRC would lose valuable political leverage with the DPRK--
something Beijing does not want--and the probable surge in
third-country asylum-seeking would overwhelm Seoul's
capacity to process and absorb new North Koreans, thereby
straining PRC-ROK relations. She noted that during the
high tide of publicized intrusions by North Koreans into
Beijing's diplomatic compounds (i.e., 2002-2003),some PRC
government scholars discussed the merits of a de facto
loosening that would squeeze the ROK with a flood of new
arrivals. Zhou did not say how much traction the idea ever
gained in policy circles.


5. (C) Government specialists on North Korean border-
crosser issues and decisionmakers alike remain in favor of
repatriation. Zhou argued that mitigating some of the
humanitarian downside is the fact that some
officials/police along the border do not actively seek to
arrest/repatriate--indeed, they benignly neglect--North
Koreans illegally in the PRC. So too does the assistance
offered to border-crossers by many borderland Chinese,
often because of historical kinship ties. She added that
over one-half of Yanbian's ethnic Koreans have family
connections in either North or South Korea.

SHENYANG 00000012 002 OF 002




6. (C) Questioned about the views of provincial
policymakers, Zhou replied that in her experience,
provincial leaders do not generally question current policy
toward North Korean border-crossers, in part because they
have no decision-making authority on the issue, even at the
local level. Authority remains the province of Beijing and
the People's Liberation Army/People's Armed Police. Zhou
claimed central leaders remain interested in the issue and,
like provincial leaders, receive reports from the Liaoning
and Jilin social-science academies, along with those from
other national institutions.


7. (C) (NOTE: Zhou's comments generally track with remarks
we heard from other northeastern Chinese government
specialists engaged in research border-crossing, including
LU Chao (STRICTLY PROTECT) and WU Jianhua (STRICTLY
PROTECT),both North Korea experts at the Liaoning Academy
of Social Sciences. END NOTE.)

BORDER-CROSSERS IN YANBIAN AND SHENYANG
--------------

8. (C) YANBIAN. A frigid winter has fallen upon the PRC-
DPRK border region, though many sections of the Tumen River
have yet to completely freeze over, especially in wider
stretches of the river. Anecdotally contacts reported
relatively few new North Korean arrivals. Father Jin
(STRICTLY PROTECT) of the Ping'an Church in Yanji, which
for years has offered succor to border-crossers, told
Poloff on January 9 that for the first time in many
winters, December 2007 and early January 2008 saw not a
single North Korean come to his church for help. He knew
of no arrivals among his neighbors or worshipers. Yanbian
University DPRK expert GAO Jingzhu (STRICTLY PROTECT) on
January 8 claimed only small numbers of arrivals, but
forecasted an uptick once the Tumen River freezes
completely in the weeks to come. Farther north in Tumen,
Vice Mayor Yan Zhihong (STRICTLY PROTECT) acknowledged
small numbers of arrivals within his city limits this
winter, and told Poloff on January 8 of a recent visit to
the city's holding facility dedicated to North Korean
border-crossers, situated in front of a detention center
for domestic criminals on the outskirts of town. Yan noted
that security officials at the facility segregate the North
Koreans into groups/cells based on time spent in China--
under one year, 3 years, 5 years, and so on. He suggested
that segregation is practiced to prevent North Koreans
detainees from swapping information that might in the
future help them elude PRC authorities while in China.


9. (C) SHENYANG. Farther south in Liaoning Province, ten
North Koreans live in the ROK's Shenyang consulate.
Residents include at least one former prisoner of war (POW)
and several of his family members, according to Consul KIM
Jong Han (STRICTLY PROTECT),who recently attended a North
Korean asylum-seeker-workshop in Bangkok convened by the
ROKG for its Asia-based diplomats handling the North Korean
refugee account at their respective posts. Kim told Poloff
on January 7 that PRC processing of his Consulate's North
Korean residents was taking longer than expected--usually
near, or in excess of, one year. Relatively "expedited"
processing for special cases like POWs, however, remains
three-to-four months, he noted. A short walk away, seven
North Koreans remain in the Japanese Consulate. Japanese
officials in December had once been hopeful several of
their more pressing cases would receive PRC exit permission
on humanitarian grounds before the end of 2007.
WICKMAN