PRC-DPRK BORDER DEFENSE, BORDER-CROSSERS, NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHENYANG 000116 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV PREF ASEC KTIP SNAR KN CH SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK BORDER DEFENSE, BORDER-CROSSERS, NORTH KOREAN DRUGS, TRAFFICKING REF: 07 SHENYANG 196 Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The PRC has made some progress in PRC-DPRK border security in recent years, but advances ought not be overestimated, say northeast China experts. Although new investment, infrastructural improvements and modern technologies have enhanced defense capacity, the border remains porous and patrols insufficient. Experts dismiss the role of "civil militias" in border defense. Jurisdictional issues complicate dealing with, and repatriating, North Korean border-crossers; some scholars have internally advocated jurisdictional adjustments. North Korean narcotics trafficked into China have hit borderland Jilin Province hard. Officials there have protested to the DPRK but characterize Pyongyang as "looking the other way" at drug cultivation within its borders. Jilin's studies of a Chinese drug-control initiative along the PRC-Vietnam border suggest that model is unviable for the PRC-DPRK border because of Pyongyang's uncooperative attitude. Results are unclear from an ongoing anti-drug campaign in the Jilin borderlands also linked to countering cross-border human smuggling. Recent media reports have described PRC arrests for the apparent smuggling and--in one case--trafficking of North Koreans. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Poloff recently met in Shenyang, Changchun and Yanbian with northeastern Chinese experts on PRC-DPRK border issues. Topics discussed during these unofficial meetings include border defense, North Korean border- crossers, and the trafficking of North Korean narcotics into northeast China. BORDER DEFENSE: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, FUNDING, MODALITIES -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Experts pointed to limited improvements in securing the PRC-DPRK border in recent years but cautioned against overestimating progress. WU Jianhua (PROTECT),a government specialist on North Korea and PRC-DPRK border issues at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences (LASS), is among the more cynical. Wu argued July 16 that despite some progress in PRC-DPRK border-defense efforts, improvements have been minor, sometimes cosmetic and often "exaggerated" by the "South Korean media and others." Patrols, for instance, are insufficient, with too many still conducted on foot, he said. Use of new technologies by PRC border forces is limited, despite the installation of cameras and detection devices in certain areas. Cosmetic improvements, such as adding a token local police station ("paichusuo"),are often disingenuously publicized by the PRC as progress in making border residents safer, Wu also claimed. ¶4. (C) Wu did cite one major advance in PRC border security: the development of infrastructure along the border, particularly in the rougher terrain of borderland Jilin Province. He noted, for instance, that security forces--he did not specify either the People's Liberation Army (PLA) or People's Armed Police (PAP)--have funded new road construction in border areas. This has allowed an increase in vehicular patrols, particularly in more remote areas that have challenging terrains. New funding has also made available more patrol vehicles, as well as modern electronics and surveillance gear. Ultimately, however, Wu argued that much more remains to be done. LU Chao (PROTECT),another expert on North Korea and border issues also at based at LASS, shared a similar assessment June 26. He stressed that the length and porosity of the border makes meaningful deterrence of criminal elements or border- crossers difficult. ¶5. (C) Although these experts agreed that PRC investment in border security has increased, they declined to offer supporting data. Recent PRC press reports, however, shed some partial light on the issue. Jilin Province's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, for instance, invested RMB 10 million (USD 1.5 million) "in the past year alone to SHENYANG 00000116 002 OF 004 support border-defense construction," according to a March 28 article in the Qianjin Bao, published by the Shenyang Military Region. The Jilin Daily reported June 24 that Jilin Province recently invested over RMB five million (USD 735,000) in 38 border villages--comprising four thousand families--to install alarms and remote sensors to alert against intruders. The province invested an additional RMB 10 million (USD 1.45 million) to create eleven "special duty" units, according to the same report, which did not contain details of past funding levels or missions for these units. Also unclear is to what extent Olympics- related considerations may have influenced these expenditures. ¶6. (SBU) Northeastern Chinese press reporting also offers some detail, however limited, on how funds are being allocated. A March 28 profile of the Yanbian Military Subdistrict in Qianjin Bao pointed to efforts to boost intelligence gathering, improve command-and-control capabilities and enhance border forces' integration with other security partners. It also highlighted increased manpower and the growing use of new surveillance and communications technologies to stem North Korean border- crossings. On the latter, for instance, the article mentioned adding "duty posts" during the "high season for border-crossings." Some 800 North Koreans were stopped from crossing into the Yanbian Subdistrict in 2007, according to the report. ¶7. (SBU) Press reports have hailed the role of civil militias ("minbing") at the grassroots in bringing "stability" to the PRC-DPRK border. These militias, sometimes referred to as "village-protection teams," are typically comprised of border residents organized to defend against intruders. A January 2008 Qianjin Bao article profiled their impact in Yanbian's Helong City, describing their role in patrolling the border and integration with conventional border-defense forces. The report also noted their contribution to the transformation of the city, which it claimed only "several years earlier" had been a "disaster area" where "illegal border-crossers and criminal activities" were "rampant" (changjue). ¶8. (C) Experts like Wu Jianhua offered a negative appraisal of the militias' role in border defense, dismissing them as ineffectual, although some, such as Professor ZHOU Weiping (PROTECT) of the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, a leading specialist on the DPRK and border issues, offered more nuance. Zhou explained in Changchun on July 23 that the militias are typically organized by reservists at the local level, some of whom may receive a token subsidy from the People's Armed Forces Department (Wuzhuang Bu). Training and organization tends to be poor, she said, limiting their utility. ¶9. (C) More useful at the grassroots level, Zhou claimed, has been the "lianfang system" (ref A). A bottom-up initiative that started in Yanbian in the 2004-2005 period, "lianfang" involves an alarm system linking households in a given border locality with their local police station. Upon entry of an intruder, residents can sound the alarm, tipping off villagers and local police. Zhou explained that the system is found in localities close to the border, within the first line of defense ("diyi xian"). Interviews she conducted along the border in Yanbian indicated that residents--mainly concerned about possibly violent thieves from across the border--consider the initiative a success, one reason she says that its use has spread. Zhou acknowledged, however, that the lianfang system's benefits are mostly psychological; residents perceive themselves to be safer from intruders than in the past. (Note: It remains unclear whether the practice has spread to border villages beyond Yanbian, particularly south in Liaoning Province, near Dandong. End note.) HANDLING DPRK BORDER-CROSSERS: JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Although one apparent focus of border-security efforts remains deterring and apprehending North Korean border-crossers, LASS researcher Wu Jianhua asserted that SHENYANG 00000116 003 OF 004 certain jurisdictional issues complicate the efforts. Wu claimed that the PLA has the authority to detain crossers, but no power to handle ("chuli quan") their cases further. That power falls to the PAP Border Defense Corps, whose authority supersedes that of local Public Security Bureau (PSB) officials at the local "paichusuo" level, he said. When a PLA patrol captures a border-crosser, detainees must be remanded to Border Defense, claimed Wu. Border Defense then notifies the Foreign Affairs Office and Public Security counterparts, who in turn contact the North Korean side to arrange for repatriation. Detainees, meanwhile, are "investigated" pending repatriation; the process typically takes under fifteen days, claimed Wu. The process is an administrative "hassle," which is why repatriation tends to take place in groups, he said. ¶11. (C) Wu reported that he and other scholars have argued internally that the PLA should also be accorded the "power to handle" cases in order to streamline an inefficient arrangement. He added that organizational tensions become more complicated on water--particularly near Dandong, which abuts the Yalu River and Yellow Sea--because additional actors are involved. NORTH KOREAN NARCOTICS AND PRC BORDER SECURITY -------------- - ¶12. (C) North Korean narcotics trafficked into northeast China pose another challenge for PRC border security. A Yanbian official having decades of North Korea experience, both on cross-border political and economic issues, described Jilin Province as the province hardest hit by North Korean drugs. Without specifying a timeframe, he told Poloff in Yanji July 21 that the DPRK has displaced Russia, which for years had proven the larger source for narcotics entering Jilin, especially Yanbian. Liaoning Province has fared better than Jilin: the more mountainous North Korean terrain across the border from Yanbian/Jilin is better suited for growing certain drug crops, noted the official. Narcotic trafficking is commonly transnational, involving North Koreans, ethnic Koreans and Han Chinese, as well as third-country nationals (e.g., South Korea, Japan, Russia). He claimed that Yanbian officials believe most drug-trafficking networks operating along the border are involved purely in drugs (as opposed to more elaborate ventures involving human smuggling). ¶13. (C) He went on to say that Jilin officials have protested to their North Korean counterparts over the years, demanding that the DPRK take action to stem the problem. The North Korean reply: the problem stems from individual farmers beyond the state's control, recalled the official. Our source claimed drug cultivation and production in North Korea at present is not state-directed. But he characterized North Korea as "looking the other way"; while the North Korean may not itself be directing production of the narcotics entering China, it is aware of the activity taking place and chooses not to clamp down. He added that North Korean officials themselves have, on occasion, been involved in trafficking narcotics into China. He recalled one case "several years ago" in which at least one PRC-based North Korean diplomat was found to have collaborated with ethnic Korean Chinese to smuggle drugs into China. The PRC sentenced the ethnic Koreans to death, while diplomatic immunity permitted the North Korean diplomat(s) to return home. ¶14. (C) Queried on Jilin Province's efforts to address the trafficking of North Korean drugs into China, the official explained that the strategy continues to center on intelligence and interdiction. Asked whether Jilin officials have explored alternative strategies, the official replied that they have studied the "successful" crop-substitution and law-enforcement efforts in recent years along the PRC-Vietnam border. There, he explained, the Chinese side has paid Vietnamese farmers to plant alternative crops, provided farming inputs and guaranteed to purchase set amounts from farmers in a bid to deter a reversion to cultivation. (Funding for the program has come from provincial coffers, with contributions from Beijing, he said.) Our contact, who was once himself SHENYANG 00000116 004 OF 004 dispatched to the Vietnam border to study the program, said the officials there adjudged these programs to be effective. Such success notwithstanding, he said Jilin officials assess that a similar program is not viable along the PRC-DPRK border because, unlike the Vietnamese, the North Korean side has not displayed a willingness to address the problem. "CATCH SNAKEHEADS, BLOCK SOURCES": DRUGS, HUMAN SMUGGLING -------------- -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Local and national PRC press reports for the past few months have referred to the "serious drug situation" in borderland Jilin Province. In the lead-up to the Olympics, moreover, the Jilin Border Defense Corps linked its "Spring Thunder" anti-drug campaign with an initiative to combat what a June 17 Xinhua report described as "organized human smuggling" in the border region involving individuals from "outside the border." One campaign slogan urged border- defense forces to "catch snakeheads, block sources, unearth channels and smash shelters." A stping of progress reports on seizures in local media have made clear, at times less obliquely than usual, that North Korea remains the source country for trafficked narcotics. (Note: "Spring Thunder" is an annual campaign, but the Olympics endowed it with increased intensity this year, said our Yanji-based contact on July 21. End note.) ¶16. (C) Results of the campaign are unclear. Since 2005, the Jilin Border Defense Corps has cracked 96 "major" drug and alien-smuggling cases, arresting over 800 suspects and seizing roughly 30 kilograms of methamphetamines, according to "incomplete statistics" cited in a June 24 Jilin Daily report. In the first six months of this year, the Jilin Border Defense Corps netted 15 alien smugglers and 54 smuggled individuals; police also seized over 10 kilograms of methamphetamines and 62 suspects, according to a June 17 Xinhua report. Our Yanbian-based contact assessed that these are a small fraction of North Korean drugs being trafficked across the PRC-DPRK border. ¶17. (SBU) Media reports in past months have described PRC arrests for the apparent smuggling and--in one case-- trafficking of North Koreans. In Shenyang in early June, for instance, the Jilin Border Defense Corps and Liaoning police together arrested one person attempting to "smuggle" 19 individuals out of China via southern Yunnan Province. Another two individuals, along with an additional organizer, were caught in Changchun, capital of Jilin Province, according to the June 5 Xinhua article that disclosed the two related cases. The article did not offer the nationalities of the smuggled individuals, but the reported route out of China and the involvement of the Jilin Border Defense Corps in the case strongly suggests that the 21 were North Koreans attempting to transit China. ¶18. (SBU) By contrast, human trafficking appears to have been at play in an early April case, according to an April 27 online report by the Yanji PSB. Yanji police, according to the report, busted a "criminal" ring of at least six individuals allegedly involved in "selling" (fanmai) and "trafficking" (guaimai) two "foreign women from outside China's territory." The outside-China's-territory formulation is a common euphemism used to indicate North Korean nationality. Also notable in the report is the use of both "fanmai" and "guaimai" to distinguish human trafficking from voluntary human smuggling (i.e., "toudu"). SWICKMAN