Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SHANGHAI396
2008-09-17 05:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI SEEKING NEW PERKS FOR FINANCIAL SECTOR

Tags:  CH ECON EFIN PGOV 
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RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0396/01 2610548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170548Z SEP 08
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7156
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2114
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1400
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1371
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1554
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1394
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0167
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1207
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0362
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7742
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000396 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/SCHINDLER
SAN FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK
NEW YORK FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/DAWSON
STATE PASS CTFC FOR OIA/GORLICK
CEA FOR BLOCK
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, AND OCEA/MCQUEEN
TREASURY FOR AMB. HOLMER, WRIGHT, AND TSMITH
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP/CUSHMAN
TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER
NSC FOR LOI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CH ECON EFIN PGOV
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SEEKING NEW PERKS FOR FINANCIAL SECTOR

REF: 07 SHANGHAI 211

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000396 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/SCHINDLER SAN FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK NEW YORK FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/DAWSON STATE PASS CTFC FOR OIA/GORLICK CEA FOR BLOCK USDOC FOR ITA/MAC DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, AND OCEA/MCQUEEN TREASURY FOR AMB. HOLMER, WRIGHT, AND TSMITH TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP/CUSHMAN TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER NSC FOR LOI E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CH ECON EFIN PGOV SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SEEKING NEW PERKS FOR FINANCIAL SECTOR REF: 07 SHANGHAI 211 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Slowing coastal economic growth and the slumping stock market are driving top Shanghai officials to lobby the central authorities for a package of financial sector reforms. A key part of the plan is for increased authorities to be granted to local branches of financial regulators, or even to allow markets to self regulate. Chinese central leaders, for their part, may be more open to reforms in light of macroeconomic concerns. Approval could be announced by the end of September, but is more likely to take longer. End summary. Shanghai Proposal at the State Council ¶2. (SBU) Shanghai by the end of September may be granted authority to carry out a package of reforms to promote the local financial services sector, Shanghai Financial Services Office Director-General Fang Xinghai told visiting Embassy FinAtt, Federal Reserve Board and San Francisco Federal Reserve professional staff members, and Congen Econoff on September 5. DG Fang said the package could include income tax rebates for Shanghai-based financial services firms and professionals, devolution of regulatory authority for approval of new products and other financial service innovations to the Shanghai branches of national financial regulators, and opening of new markets for bond and interest rate futures as well as exchange-traded funds for foreign market indices. (Note: This past summer, Shanghai's Pudong District, home to much of the financial services industry in Shanghai, announced tax breaks and subsidized apartments for qualified finance professionals. End note.) The Central Government would establish a working group under Vice Premier Wang Qishan to implement the reforms, according to Fang. ¶3. (SBU) Shanghai Vice Mayor Tu Guangshao in a meeting September 6 said his biggest priority is devolving more authority on the operation of financial markets from the regulators to the exchanges. (Comment: Tu seemed to have in mind a model closer to U.S.-style
self-regulatory organizations. End comment.) ¶4. (SBU) Other interlocutors suggested that there may be other elements to the Shanghai proposal package. High-level executives in foreign-invested financial firms in Shanghai separately said that the reform package could include a higher foreign equity cap in securities joint ventures -- although still a minority share in the range of 30%-35%. However, an idea to allow Shanghai firms to set up offshore banking, publicly mentioned by Pudong officials in August, has been discarded, said one investment banker. The Premier Has Signed Off, Or Has He? ¶5. (SBU) Premier Wen Jiabao has basically approved the package following heavy lobbying by Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng, said Fang. A foreign investment banker and Chinese press articles suggest that Wen's interest in Shanghai's financial reform package was piqued during his July 4-6 visit to the region, when he connected the dots on how slowing coastal growth due in part to financial sector inefficiencies would leave him open to criticism over his economic policies. Vice Mayor Tu is less optimistic than Fang that the package would be passed quickly, although he judged that much of Shanghai's wish list would be approved. Wang Qishan Needs a Little Push ¶6. (SBU) Both Wen and Vice Premier Wang are now more ready to experiment with financial opening to stimulate services sector growth, said our interlocutors. In particular, DG Fang said that U.S. requests to open China's financial sector should be raised by the President directly with President Hu Jintao, in stark contrast to his past warnings that U.S. officials should not appear to criticize Beijing's financial policies (see SHANGHAI 00000396 002 OF 002 reftel). Our interlocutors said that Vice Premier Wang has not yet moved on further financial opening, but he wants to. Is Shanghai China's Financial Center? ¶7. (SBU) This latest twist in Shanghai's ambitions to be definitively crowned as China's national financial center comes four years after President Hu first called for Shanghai to have this status, adding his imprimatur to that of former President Jiang Zemin and senior leader Deng Xiaoping. Following Hu's July 2004 statement, Shanghai in November 2006 announced its eleventh Five-Year Plan which include the goal of building an international financial center with ambitious growth targets. To date, Shanghai can claim a stock market, the inter-bank lending market, a bond market, a commodity and gold futures exchange, and the bulk of the foreign-invested financial firms present in China. The Shanghai Head Office of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) was established in August 2005, with responsibilities including the central bank's open-market monetary operations. Just prior to this past May's inaugural Lujiazui Financial Forum, attended by global financial leaders, China's credit reference center (operated by the PBOC) was moved from Beijing to Shanghai. ¶8. (SBU) However, Shanghai also faces several domestic competitors for financial sector growth, said many of our early September interlocutors. One foreign investment banker whose firm recently established its headquarters in Beijing went as far to say "the wind is not blowing Shanghai's way." Fang himself admitted other cities are lobbying Beijing for local financial sector incentives: Chongqing is proposing tax rebates for private equity, venture capital, and trust funds, for instance. But Fang expressed confidence that Shanghai would be able to match any incentives Chongqing might win. Interlocutors pointed to financial services in which other localities were attempting to gain market share: Beijing for investment and commercial banking, Tianjin for private equity and renminbi trading, and Chongqing for regional finance. Hong Kong, with its low taxes, is seen as the gold standard. Comment ¶9. (SBU) Most people we spoke with September 4-7 expect some financial sector reforms to be enacted, though views differed on their timing and breadth. Optimists felt that Premier Wen would come under increasing pressure to take bold actions to spur growth and moribund financial markets. China remains stuck in a repeating pattern of financial booms and busts and has yet to develop robust capital markets that can finance growth. Chinese retail investors, having been burned, are placing savings back in banks. Chinese securities firms, whose income depends heavily on brokerage commissions and high turnover, will face financial pressures and may be more accepting of capital injections from foreign investors. ¶10. (SBU) Nonetheless, DG Fang is probably exaggerating Beijing's support for the proposed Shanghai reforms. His description of impending incentives and his appeal for intervention by high-level U.S. officials probably is intended to help tip the decisionmaking process at the Central Government level as well as in any firm considering where to base its China headquarters.. ¶11. (U) Beijing Financial Attache David Loevinger has cleared on this cable. CAMP

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