SHANGHAI MARKET PARTICIPANTS DISCUSS HOT MONEY: MARKET

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000264 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/SCHINDLER; SF FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NY FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELY/DAGES/DAWSON TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA - DOHNER, HAARSAGER, CUSHMAN, WINSHIP TREASURY FOR IMFP/SOBEL, MOGHTADER USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, MAC/OCEA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV CH SUBJECT: SHANGHAI MARKET PARTICIPANTS DISCUSS HOT MONEY: MARKET MEASURES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS, IMPACT ON RMB ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Shanghai market participants agree, hot money presents a serious challenge for Chinese monetary policy. With sterilization bills becoming increasingly costly to issue and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) increases hurting the profitability of an already constrained banking sector, there are few good options for controlling liquidity. Instead of tightening monetary policy, our interlocutors in Shanghai and nearby suggest the Central Government will continue to try to restrict hot money using administrative measures to control inflows through the current and capital accounts. Our interlocutors expressed confidence that capital and financial account controls would be effective, though they were less confident regarding current account controls. Some felt newly adopted measures combining the monitoring capabilities of three government agencies would be sufficient, though others expressed skepticism. Our interlocutors also opined that hot money would not affect RMB appreciation. They note structural changes in the macro-economy, such as the shift from export-oriented growth to growth driven by domestic consumption, necessitating a market-determined RMB exchange rate. End Summary. -------------- Introduction -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Congen Econoff from June 19 to July 11 met with Shanghai financial market participants and macroeconomic analysts to discuss issues relating to hot money. Meeting participants include Fudan University Professor Sun Lijian, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) Economist Xu Mingqi, PBOC Shanghai Head Office International Department Deputy Director-General Shi Liya, Hong Kong Trade and Development Council Regional Director for East China Brian Ng, Fortis Haitong Investment Management Analyst Zhu Mingjie, Taiwan Compatriot Investment Enterprises Association of Kunshan Deputy Chairman Huang Jiangzhong, and a general manager of a U.S. joint venture securities firm in Shanghai. -------------- Background -------------- ¶3. (U) Since China adopted its present exchange rate mechanism in July 2005, the RMB has appreciated 21.1% against the U.S. dollar (as of July 11, 2008). In the last 6 months, the RMB appreciated 13.4%, with an average appreciation of .05% per day. As of July 11, one year forwards imply an annual appreciation of 5.6%. The large expected appreciation of the RMB versus the dollar as well as a favorable interest rate spread with the U.S. has caused a large amount of speculative capital, commonly referred to as hot money, to flow into China. The exact amount of hot money coming into China is difficult to discern, though most analysts agree it has grown substantially since the beginning of 2008. For example, analyst Logan Wright at Stone and McCarthy estimates China's FX reserves grew by $393 billion USD in the first five months of 2008, of which he estimates up to $170 billion was hot money. -------------- -- Most hot money coming in through FDI, Current account and bank deposits -------------- -- ¶4. (SBU) According to a survey done by Deustche Bank analyst Ma Jun, appearing May 28 on China financial website Caijing, foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most popular means of increasing RMB exposure by firms outside of officially sanctioned foreign exchange markets. A Shanghai-based American management consultant and investor told Econoff in late May, foreign firms attempt to attain approval for investments larger then the specified projects require, using the onshore surplus funds derived thereby to make portfolio investments. Huang Jianzhong, the Taiwan business association leader in Kunshan (just west of Shanghai, across the border in Jiangsu Province) readily admitted in a June meeting that Taiwan companies frequently use this channel. Huang asserts that such investment transactions are entirely legal, so long as investments are approved by the appropriate mainland officials. SHANGHAI 00000264 002 OF 004 ¶5. (SBU) Huang in Kunshan and other interlocutors also note companies use the current account, that is under-invoicing imports or over-invoicing exports, as a means of acquiring and retaining RMB. Huang notes the ubiquity of this practice among firms engaged in trade. According to Deutsche Bank analyst Ma Jun's above-referenced survey, trade invoice manipulation and the FDI channel account for 73% of hot money transactions made by firms. Fudan University Economics Professor Sun Lijian notes that trade invoice manipulation is also a common means for foreign companies to avoid mainland regulations meant to slow or prevent profit repatriation. ¶6. (SBU) The most common means for individuals to increase exposure to RMB appreciation is offshore transfers to RMB accounts. Huang and HKTDC's Ng observe many Taiwan and Hong Kong individuals use this tool to increase RMB exposure. China permits only one bank account per person and limits transfers to $50,000 USD per year, with holders of Hong Kong bank accounts allowed to transfer up to 10,000 RMB per day, these interlocutors explain. The JV manager points out several Hong Kong banks with presences in the mainland now offer their customers services in which daily transfers into the mainland are automated. Our interlocutors note popular press accounts of people from Taiwan and Hong Kong using the unused quotas of friends and relatives to make even larger transfers. Ng suspects that growing concern over inflation may lead the government to eventually lower these quotas. ¶7. (SBU) Huang and Ng say both Taiwan and Hong Kong firms as well as individuals also use underground banks to convert currency. Ng suspects this channel is used more often than the RMB account quotas. Fudan Professor Sun asserts Taiwan firms are heavily involved in China's underground financial market. He observes many have been in China for nearly two decades and have had more time to build up liquidity than firms which have entered more recently, such as those who did not venture into China until after China's December 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization. With exports losing competitiveness and declining due to an appreciating currency, higher fuel and raw material prices and increasing labor costs, (issues worriedly mentioned by Huang, the Taiwan business association leader, and HKTDC's Ng),these longer-established firm are using their accumulated liquidity to provide loans to other firms, providing an alternative source of income for China's cooling export sector. Ng and Huang note many small and medium exporting firms are also increasingly aiming their production and sales at China's domestic market, again seeking payments in RMB and foregoing immediate repatriation of profits. -------------- - Most hot money sitting in bank accounts, though substantial amounts may be entering through underground capital markets -------------- - ¶8. (SBU) As previously noted, hot money is difficult to track, with analysts not even sure how much hot money is actually entering China. Determining where hot money is being invested is even more difficult. Our interlocutors cite real estate as a destination, though they add with softening markets and ever higher hurdles placed on foreign investment, it is unlikely much more is going there now. The most popular destination now, they suggest, is normal liquid bank accounts. Ng notes that with modest interest rates and expected appreciation of over 6% annually, investors can earn a near risk-free 10% annual return on their investments. PBOC Shanghai's Shi and the American JV manager similarly suggest that most inbound hot money is probably sitting in onshore bank accounts. ¶9. (SBU) Fudan's Sun also suggests another popular destination for hot money is the informal banking sector, which has gained new life in the current tight credit environment. A recent published survey by Professor Li Jianjun at Beijing's Central University of Finance and Economics estimates that 28% of all bank loans in China come from the underground banking sector. Our Shanghai interlocutors note that most underground banking sector loans probably go to small and medium enterprises, which SHANGHAI 00000264 003 OF 004 are not able to obtain loans from the larger state owned commercial banks in the present credit environment. -------------- - Left with few options, government is confident administrative measures will work -------------- - ¶10. (SBU) China's "managed float" exchange rate regime forces it to sterilize foreign currency inflows to prevent expansion of the money supply. With the high volume of inflows lately, sterilization has become increasingly difficult. PBOC Shanghai's Shi admits the PBOC's main tool, sterilization bills, are becoming increasingly costly to issue, with financial markets already saturated with bills from previous sterilizations. Fortis Haitong's Zhu and Fudan's Sun note that increasing the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) is a much easier means of sterilization. Zhu notes this is one of the few effective means the PBOC has to contract liquidity, and expects more RRR increases to come. Sun is quick to point out, however, that current high or future higher RRRs could pose a serious risk for the banking sector if faced with a sudden demand for liquidity. He thus warns that the government must be careful when using RRR as a tool for managing the money supply. While PBOC Shanghai's Shi did not express the same level of concern as Sun over the RRR, she did suggest the PBOC would use a combination of tools to address over liquidity, possibly including raising interest rates. ¶11. (SBU) Our interlocutors offered different opinions regarding their expectation of government policies for dealing with inflation from over liquidity. SASS economist Xu believes that the government will use price controls in the near term to lower the CPI, removing some of the inflationary pressure from over liquidity. He suggests China's central planning legacy makes Chinese officials more comfortable with price controls then other measures. Fudan's Professor Sun however, believes the government will utilize quantitative restrictions as a means of controlling over liquidity. He notes that the Central Government has stepped up monitoring of current and capital accounts, integrating the networks of SAFE, the Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs. By valuing the goods in customs transactions and comparing those values to payment amounts, PBOC could effectively control hot money entering or leaving through the current account, and help hedge against the possibility of capital flight were a financial crisis to occur. Shanghai PBOC's Shi echoed this point, though she admitted implementation at the local level would be difficult. Ng was less confident that such an approach would prove to be effective. He notes trade in services continues to increase. Services transactions are much more difficult to value then goods transactions, lacking a tangible good for SAFE to value. Services trade could thus become a prominent loophole for avoiding SAFE controls on hot money. -------------- Hot - and sticky? -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The American JV manager suggests the government may have more flexibility in managing hot money than many expect. He believes that since most hot money is probably coming from Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas Chinese elsewhere (a point echoed by our other interlocutors),hot money is less likely to rapidly flow out of China as it did in SE Asia during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as these people will still require liquidity to support business operations in China. This, in his words, makes the hot money inflows into China "sticky." Though stickiness may lower the risk of capital flight, it will not help contain liquidity growth which poses risks for persistently high inflation. -------------- - Interlocutors suggest hot money will not slow RMB appreciation -------------- - ¶13. (SBU) Fudan's Professor Sun does not believe the hot money SHANGHAI 00000264 004 OF 004 issue will have any significant effect on the RMB exchange rate. Instead he expects administrative measures will be sufficient to control hot money, while other tools can be used to combat over liquidity. Shi and Zhu similarly argued that over liquidity and capital flight could be targeted using policies other than RMB appreciation. HKTDC's Ng agrees, noting that in order for Shanghai to attain its goal of becoming an international financial center, China must first have a freely floating exchange rate. SASS's Xu, however, believes the current level of hot money inflows is unsustainable, necessitating a slowdown of the RMB's appreciation until inflation comes down. ¶14. (SBU) Despite acknowledging risks of gradual RMB appreciation, our interlocutors were skeptical of a one-off appreciation, even though such an action might immediately stem inflows. Xu notes the damage a one-off appreciation would inflict on many exporters, who keep many urban workers employed. Sun echoes this point, adding most export firms are not financially hedged against appreciation. Sun notes that onshore RMB forwards exist, but they remain prohibitively expensive for most firms and relatively underdeveloped. He adds that because many firms have known only a fixed exchange rate for so long, they do not know how or realize the need to hedge against appreciation. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (SBU) These Shanghai market participants and analysts expect the PBOC will continue to follow a gradual RMB appreciation policy, despite concerns over hot money and over liquidity. PBOC Shanghai's Shi and Fudan Professor Sun framed this as part of a broader structural change national policy makers are trying to promote, namely the transition from export-driven growth to growth driven by domestic consumption, hence the importance of continuing RMB appreciation despite other monetary challenges. RMB appreciation, ignoring the hot money aspect, is also consistent with PBOC's effort to fight inflation, they averred. In sum, these interlocutors expect that for now, the PBOC is likely to continue to rely on RRR hikes and sterilization to remove liquidity, even though the cost of sterilization continues to rise. ¶16. (SBU) Administrative measures also figure prominently in these interlocutors' expectations about government policy, particularly as a means of controlling inflows. Professor Sun was the most confident administrative measures would be an effective method of controlling liquidity growth. Other analysts, however, have expressed strong skepticism that with such large volumes of trade, China will be able to control the current account, and as Ng notes, services will likely remain a large loophole. Though administrative measures would likely slow liquidity growth to a degree, they come with the externality of further empowering an unregulated and inefficient underground capital market, which may ultimately render such measures ineffective. JARRETT