SHANGHAI ACADEMICS SEE MEASURED PROGRESS ON NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000218 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2033 TAGS: PREL ECON KN CH SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMICS SEE MEASURED PROGRESS ON NORTH KOREA REF: BEIJING 1727 CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section Chief, U.S. Consulate , Shanghai . REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Shanghai academics concur that the Six-Party Talks are resulting in real, sustained progress, although, in moving forward, the pace of progress may not fully meet U.S. expectations. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) seeks friendlier bilateral relations with the United States, Pyongyang has probably not yet made the strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons. In the short term, China will likely maintain a more passive role in the Six-Party process, but stands ready to actively reengage following movement on Second Phase actions. Xi Jinping's planned June 17-19 visit to Pyongyang is meant to establish personal rapport with Kim Jong-il and members of the regime. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Poloffs conducted separate meetings June 12-13 with Shanghai academics on North Korea and the ongoing Six-Party Talks. Experts included: Ren Xiao, Center for American Studies, Fudan University; Liu Ming, Director of the Center for Korean Peninsular Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS); and Xue Chen, Department of American Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). SIX-PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶3. (C) The academics agreed that the Six-Party Talks are resulting in real, sustained progress. Ren Xiao pointed to Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill's meetings with North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-Gwan (KKG) in Geneva March 13-14 and Singapore on April 8, and to the recent release of records detailing the Yongbyon plutonium program, as indications that dialogue was moving in a positive direction. Liu Ming was similarly reassured that the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) seem to be exploring a range of potential actions aimed at conciliating all parties. It is his understanding, Liu stated, that A/S Hill and KKG, at their Singapore meeting, had even discussed the possible return of two or three Japanese Red Army terrorists who escaped to North Korea in 1970. Ren observed that symbolism plays an important role in creating positive atmospherics for dialogue and encouraging concrete Six-Party successes. Washington should pursue and replicate, whenever possible, such opportunities for outreach to the DPRK as the New York Philharmonic's March visit to Pyongyang. The physical destruction of the Yongbyon cooling tower, if achieved, would be a similarly powerful symbolic event. ¶4. (C) Despite these positive developments, the pace of short-term, Six-Party progress may not fully meet U.S. expectations. Liu sees no alternative to a protracted timeline, as Pyongyang is reluctant to fulfill its Second Phase obligations before Washington delivers on its own. The apparent willingness of the United States to allow the DPRK more time to submit information on its uranium enrichment and proliferation activities is therefore a smart move, Liu stated. Ren, meanwhile, believes the DPRK is anxious to be removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) sanctions. Pyongyang's primary hope for the Six-Party Talks is that dialogue with the United States will yield friendlier bilateral relations and, more generally, a less threatening international climate. Accordingly, a complete nuclear declaration is still achievable, Ren asserted, though it may fall outside Washington's desired timeframe. ¶5. (C) The academics tended toward the view that Pyongyang has not yet fully committed to giving up its nuclear weapons. Even Ren, who believes the DPRK has indeed made that strategic decision, acknowledged that the nuclear weapons are Pyongyang's only real bargaining chip, and that its probable strategy is to "kick the can down the road." Liu remarked that -- while no one can comment with certainty on Pyongyang's opaque decision-making structure -- the North Korean military is known to view the possibility of rapprochement with Washington warily, is insulated from outside thinking on the matter, and might be SHANGHAI 00000218 002 OF 003 primarily responsible for DPRK foot-dragging in the Six-Party Talks. Alternatively, Xue Chen argued that North Korean reluctance stems more from the regime's belief that the U.S. Congress would not ratify any agreement made by the present U.S. administration. Xue also thought Washington's friendly relations with India, which the DPRK hopes could be a model for its own future arrangement with the United States, might be distracting Pyongyang from pursuing denuclearization. ¶6. (C) These experts agreed that, in the short term, China will take a more passive approach to the Six-Party Talks. China will continue to push the DPRK to fulfill its Second Phase commitments, but Beijing's occupation with the Olympics and Sichuan earthquake relief assistance makes more active involvement unlikely. Still, Liu asserted, China would quickly reengage with the process once the DPRK and the United States are ready to move forward. China would convoke formal Six-Party meetings as early as July, for instance, if there is sufficient progress on energy assistance, verification, and abductees -- admittedly, Liu remarked, a rather tall order. EAST ASIAN MULTILATERALISM -------------- ¶7. (C) The academics viewed a potential Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM) favorably though premature. Ren argued that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has lost momentum, is too large to achieve consensus on anything, and is now merely an opportunity for heads of state to meet. Meanwhile, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),and related ARF groupings (e.g. +1, +2) are useful fora for discussion and cooperation on regional economic and security issues, but their work is mostly tangential to Northeast Asia. A NEAPSM would clearly fill this niche, Ren opined, although certain issues, such as Taiwan, still would be off limits. ¶8. (C) Liu remarked that in the past, China had more reservations about a NEAPSM, due to U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The possibility that those members might "gang up on" Beijing in a multilateral forum, or raise sensitive issues such as Taiwan, was a significant concern. However, Liu acknowledged, China is now coming around to the view that a NEAPSM could prove useful for dialogue, confidence-building measures (CBMs),and coordinating economic assistance for and liberalization of North Korea. Of course, realization will first require success in the Six-Party Talks -- specifically, on DPRK denuclearization, energy assistance, and Japanese abductees. Since this will be a long process, Liu said, the time is not really ripe to discuss a NEAPSM in much detail. NORTH KOREA'S ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY -------------- ¶9. (C) The academics differed on whether the DPRK was prepared to open up economically, and on the significance of reported food shortages. Ren was sanguine on the prospects for North Korean economic liberalization, stressing that Pyongyang faces a dilemma: opening too quickly may jeopardize regime stability, but some degree of opening is vital to North Korea's future. North Koreans realize the old system of controlled distribution does not work; consequently, the role of the market has expanded, with more people seeking foodstuffs and other goods through private transactions. The Pyongyang regime has tried to encourage this shift, Ren claimed, but it does not know how to do so effectively. The Kumgang Mountain project has generated some revenue, but the Sonbong SEZ has been a failure, Ren noted. Pyongyang also lost several million USD intended for investment, after innocently entrusting the sum to a corrupt Chinese businessman later detained by Chinese authorities. Despite these letdowns, the DPRK eventually will open "because it has no other choice," Ren asserted. ¶10. (C) Xue was far less optimistic, arguing that Pyongyang need only continue its brutal policy of providing adequate food and equipment to members of the regime, military, and their families -- approximately one in four North Koreans -- to maintain political stability. On the other hand, Xue agreed that the rise in food prices and shortage in food production have combined to put the DPRK in a difficult situation. Prices in 2008 are three times those of 2005, while the World Food Programme estimates that North Korea's demand for food is SHANGHAI 00000218 003 OF 003 approximately 5.5 million tons. Jilin University, meanwhile, has calculated that Pyongyang can only produce between 3.2 and 3.8 million tons. Since the United States has pledged 500,000 tons of food aid toward making up the shortfall, this might buy Washington some goodwill in the Six-Party Talks, Xue said. ¶11. (C) Liu opined that the food shortage in North Korea is not as urgent as is frequently portrayed. North Korea has a history of famines, its people are resilient and by now accustomed to adapting to shortages. For example, there is a great deal of illicit trading on and food raids into Chinese territory by North Korean citizens, Liu contended. The North Korean military has also been involved in some of these raids, though it is not clear they have the backing of the regime. The DPRK is a proud nation, and China will not offer advice unless asked, because, Liu said, Pyongyang will resist being told what it ought to do. ¶12. (C) Poloffs inquired about DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun's reported visit to Shanghai in late April (reftel). Xue confirmed that Pak indeed had visited, touring Bao Steel, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the Oriental Pearl Tower. However, Pak's visit was most likely a courtesy call of little significance. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has routinely visited Shanghai on his past tours of China, so the city has become an obligatory stop for any North Korean official. Liu seconded this view, noting that no one in the Shanghai academic community had been alerted to Pak's visit, that Pak was not very influential in Pyongyang, and was probably in Shanghai "just for tourism." XI JINPING'S AGENDA -------------- ¶13. (C) Asked about Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's planned June 17-19 visit to Pyongyang, Liu believed the event is intended to establish personal rapport with Kim Jong-il and members of the regime. Liu observed that, as presumptive successor to President Hu Jintao, it is necessary for Xi to make his first trip abroad to a fellow Communist state. Ren remarked that Xi might urge North Korea to allow greater Chinese investment, stressing that economic assistance is "not a one-way street." Given the small volume of bilateral trade between China and the DPRK, the meeting would otherwise be short on substance. JARRETT