MINISTER OF UNIFICATION: ROKG STEADFAST ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000976 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017 TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL SUBJECT: MINISTER OF UNIFICATION: ROKG STEADFAST ON PRINCIPLES; FLEXIBLE ON DIALOGUE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a May 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of Unification (MOU) Kim Ha-joong described ROKG policy as "steadfast" on its principle that significant economic assistance to the DPRK would require progress on denuclearization, but also "flexible" in terms of seeking dialogue and offering humanitarian assistance now, if the North agrees to talk. He described North Korea's spate of hostile rhetoric as an effort to challenge the ROKG's resolve, but said that the DPRK would eventually see that this effort was unsuccessful and seek dialogue. He stressed the importance of close coordination with the USG. END SUMMARY. -------------- DPRK'S HOSTILE RHETORIC -------------- ¶2. (C) At the outset of their May 9 meeting, the Ambassador asked the new Minister of Unification, veteran diplomat Kim Ha-joong, to outline the ROKG's North Korea policy and in particular its interpretation of the North's recent hostile rhetoric. Kim replied that as Minister of Unification, he wanted to have constructive consultations with the North, but the North's continuing "derogatory" remarks, directed personally at President Lee Myung-bak and himself, prevented that. But he added that the North's current posture was nothing new: such attacks were par for the course when new ROK administrations took office. For example, dialogue was suspended for one year after the (more accommodating) Kim Dae-Jung Administration took office. The Lee Administration would ride out the rhetoric, having decided to "refrain from a direct response." The Ambassador mentioned that President Bush and other USG officials supported this calm stance. ¶3. (C) Asked what he thought the North was seeking to accomplish through its rhetoric, Kim said he viewed the DPRK government as disappointed that the Lee Administration had a markedly different attitude toward the North than the two previous administrations. The North sought to change this attitude through its rhetoric, falsely expecting the ROK public to put pressure on the Lee Administration to change its firm position. In response to a question, he said that USG efforts to quietly tell the DPRK that its "insulting" approach was not productive would be helpful. -------------- ROKG WILLING TO ENGAGE -------------- ¶4. (C) Kim said that the ROKG would not retreat from its principle that economic assistance to the North required progress on denuclearization. At the same time, the ROKG was signaling that it wanted dialogue with the North and that some humanitarian assistance could be provided now. Kim described the ROKG as willing to "continue to engage on all but economic assistance," meaning that exchanges and non-economic cooperation could go forward if the North agreed, even before progress on denuclearization. ¶5. (C) He added that President Lee's "Denuclearization, Openness, USD 3000" proposal for offering substantial economic assistance to the North could proceed in a flexible fashion, depending on progress on denuclearization. This approach contrasted with DPRK authorities' impression that the ROKG wanted to "forcefully" implement the plan. However, Kim said, the ROKG would not publicly state that the economic cooperation plan was flexible, but would instead save that point for the bargaining table. Kim agreed with the Ambassador's comment that the prospect of increasing per capita income to USD 3000 would appeal to ordinary North Koreans, which was why the regime was worried about it. The Ambassador also noted that some repackaging of the plan might be in order, in view of the North's neuralgia about the terms "reform" and "openness." ¶6. (C) Kim said that the Lee Administration's position was that engagement with North Korea should be on the basis of abiding by all past agreements, not just the most recent ones (June 2000 and October 2007) that the DPRK was fond of invoking. He agreed when the Ambassador noted that this comment implied inclusion of the 1992 "Basic Agreement" and the 1992 "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the ROKG planned to clarify its position on the June 2000 and October 2007 agreement (the former resulted in development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the latter called for substantial further economic cooperation),since recent DPRK statements had accused the Lee Myung-bak Administration of "renouncing" these accords. Kim equivocated, saying that the ROKG had not yet stated that it would abide by or not abide by those agreements, implying that this would be an area of discussion should the two sides sit down together. Kim said that the ROK's message would be that the sides needed to abide by all their commitments under all past agreements (including the 2000 and 2007 agreements),noting that the DPRK had not fulfilled many of its previous obligations. -------------- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶8. (C) Kim expressed interest in reports that the USG was getting close to providing 500,000 metric tons of food assistance to the DPRK. He requested close consultations with the USG on this issue, noting that a group of ROK professors whom he had met recently assessed that the DPRK was deliberately aiming to expand ties with the U.S. while cutting back ties to the ROK. Kim said that he had reassured the professors that President Bush did not have a naive view of North Korea and would maintain close consultations with the ROKG to prevent such a situation. The Ambassador agreed on the importance of such consultations, and said we would not let the North Koreans drive a wedge between us. He added that a USG food-aid team had just completed a visit to Pyongyang, but that its results had to be assessed in Washington. -------------- DPRK SITUATION "AGGRAVATED" -------------- ¶9. (C) Kim turned to North Korea's overall situation, which he assessed as "aggravated" compared to that of the past. The DPRK was used to friendly relations with and substantial aid from China, but now relations with China were "less friendly" (NOTE: Kim served as ROK Ambassador to China, 2002-2008). Similarly, the DPRK was used to Korean "Chosen Soren" residents in Japan providing "large amounts of money," but now the aid and regular ship contact had been cut off. The ROKG understood this situation and was hence "not threatened by North Korea." He later added that DPRK leaders lacked any kind of strategic attitude about Northeast Asia so they were unlikely to respond to proposals to launch a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. ¶10. (C) Commenting dismissively about Kim Jong-il, Kim Ha-joong said that he did not believe that the North Korean leader kept close tabs on the ROK via the internet, and that he did not really understand the situation in the South. Kim Ha-joong said that he had also told Chinese officials that taking KJI to Shenzen and other economically developing areas had no meaning, because KJI had no real interest in economic advancement in the North. It would take a change of leadership or collapse of the regime to bring about change in the DPRK, Kim Ha-joong added. That being said, everything in the DPRK was decided by one man. If KJI woke up one morning and decided it was necessary to reestablish dialogue with the South, Pyongyang's policy would change instantly. In the meantime, the Lee Myung-bak Administration was ready to wait. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) During this conversation with the Ambassador, Minister Kim Ha-joong expressed interest in resuming dialogue with the North, but he was not wringing his hands about the current situation. He appeared prepared to wait for the North to come around in terms of agreeing to talk, but expected little substantive change in the fundamentals of the South-North relationship. Kim, and his Ministry, now co-located with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are keeping a very low profile. VERSHBOW