FORMER PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG-SAM STAYS RELEVANT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000862 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG-SAM STAYS RELEVANT, COMMENTS ON GNP MAELSTROM, CURRENT EVENTS Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Over lunch on April 25, former President (1993-98) Kim Young-sam told the Ambassador that Lee Myung-bak needed to do better in handling domestic political issues and find a way to accept former Grand National Party (GNP) lawmakers recently elected as independents or under the Pro-Park Alliance (PPA) banner. Kim said compromise with political heavyweight Park Geun-hye was essential for Lee so he could pass desired reforms in the National Assembly. Kim expressed pessimism that North Korea could be trusted or that the Six Party process would produce any significant results. He wistfully opined that if he had not blocked then-President Clinton's idea to strike Yongbyon, the Peninsula would now be nuclear-free. The octogenarian was pleasant and energetic throughout the two-hour lunch and was loath to leave, content to talk politics and offer his views on all topics. END SUMMARY. -------------- Domestic Politics: Park-Lee Conflict -------------- ¶2. (C) Former President Kim said he was upset by the way the GNP handled the nomination process for the April 9 National Assembly elections. He explained that excluding many well-respected lawmakers like Kim Moo-sung, who were later elected as independents, was a mistake. Politics was about winning elections. Kim believed that President Lee Myung-bak had controlled the entire process behind the scenes despite public statements to the contrary; Blue House Chief of Staff Ryu Woo-ik told Kim during a recent meeting that President Lee was personally involved in the entire selection process. Independents and Pro-Park Alliance members should be allowed back into the GNP, but the GNP party leadership is fighting this. Kim said Lee's recent statements that he had no influence over the GNP were laughable. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked if President Lee's supporters believed that the bare majority of 153 (out of 299) lawmakers that the GNP had won in the April 9 election was better than a bigger majority with more pro-Park members. President Kim said that 153 had no meaning as former President Roh Moo-hyun's Uri Party won a similar 152 seats in the 2004 elections but was unable to push through their party's platform; after a series of by-election and local election losses, the party dissolved just two years after this victory. To have power to institute Lee Myung-bak's far-ranging reforms, the ruling GNP should have at least 170 seats. With that many seats, the party would control all of the standing committees. Kim recounted that when he was leading an opposition party of just 50 lawmakers, he was able to block the ruling party that, at the time, had a slim majority of the seats. ¶4. (C) Kim said that despite rhetoric and hard feelings on President Lee's part, he was confident Lee would do the right thing vis-a-vis possible successor to the Blue House Park Geun-hye and would eventually allow her supporters back into the party. Kim said Park would never leave the GNP. Since she currently had a lot of political power and more lawmakers loyal to her than to President Lee in the upcoming 18th National Assembly, she was a political force to be reckoned with. Lee needs to compromise and work with Park but he is not ready since the heated conflict during the presidential primary had left serious scars. Kim said he told Lee by phone he should work with Park and said he would tell him again in person. ¶5. (C) Kim guffawed at the thought of Lee Hoi-chang's Liberty Forward Party (LFP) joining the GNP -- this was "impossible" because of the ill will the two Lees have for each other. If the pro-Park independents and Pro-Park Alliance (PPA) members are not soon allowed back into the GNP, they will likely combine forces and create a negotiating bloc (20 seats needed) and become the third largest party in the National Assembly behind the GNP and the UDP. This was not the ideal solution for either the GNP or Park, but it could prove inevitable. In an April 25 press conference, Park announced she would not run for the GNP leadership; Kim said this announcement was intended to make it easier for the GNP to allow Park supporters back into the party. While Kim said he thought Park and Lee would come to an understanding and the former GNP lawmakers would eventually return, there were so many hard feelings from last year's bitter primary that Lee had told Kim he would never meet Park Geun-hye. -------------- North Korea -------------- ¶6. (C) The current tension between North and South Korea is similar to that experienced at the start of all previous administrations, Kim said. In 1993, the DPRK said Seoul would go up in "a sea of fire," similar to the recent rhetoric from Pyongyang insulting President Lee. This did not signal a worsening of relations, Kim insisted, but was an attempt by the North Koreans to test Lee Myung-bak. So far, Lee had done well to ignore the rhetoric. Kim said that while it might be cruel, calls for aid to North Korea should also be ignored until the North made some progress toward denuclearization. Kim said former DPRK leader Kim Il-sung agreed to a summit just before his death in 1994, and, if they had met, Kim believed Kim Il-sung would have made many concessions. The Ambassador asked if the current tension on the Peninsula would eventually lead to uncertainty or concern among the Korean people. Kim said that Koreans were used to North Korean bluster and would just think, "here they go again," and continue on with their lives. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador explained that the U.S. had attempted to give 500,000 tons of food aid to the DPRK in late 2007 but the DPRK refused it because they would not allow enough monitors to ensure that the food was distributed properly. The North Koreans also objected to Korean-speakers or Korean-Americans as monitors. President Kim said that "communism equaled secrecy" so it was no surprise the DPRK was so averse to allowing people in to monitor the aid. Kim said that the more aid we gave to North Korea, the more they would request. -------------- Six Party Talks -------------- ¶8. (C) Kim said repeatedly that Kim Jong-il was not genuinely interested in denuclearization and was using the U.S. and the Six Party Talks (6PT) to his advantage. Kim Jong-il would attempt to drag out the process and continue to use the negotiating process to pocket economic assistance. He added that he felt the U.S. expected too much of the 6PT process. The Ambassador said that President Bush, while recognizing the possibility Kim Jong-il may be stalling, thought that there was some chance North Korea would denuclearize. Also, at the recent summit, President Lee declared that it would be difficult but not impossible to make North Korea denuclearize. It was false, however, for anyone to think that President Bush would compromise and settle for anything less than a fully denuclearized North Korea, the Ambassador explained. Similarly, we were not lowering the bar on the declaration of the North's nuclear programs and activities, and we had stressed that verification is very important. If the North denuclearized and this could be verified, only then could progress on normalization and other fronts be considered. Kim repeated that North Korea could never be trusted. -------------- 1994 -------------- ¶9. (C) Kim said that former President Clinton and Defense Secretary Perry wanted to attack North Korea in 1994, and SIPDIS would have done so had he not intervened. Looking back, he said we all would be better off if he had allowed the U.S. to strike the Yongbyon nuclear facility. -------------- Afghanistan and Beyond -------------- ¶10. (C) Kim said that the ROK should take a larger role supporting international efforts in Afghanistan and in the world, not because the U.S. asked the ROK to do so, but because Korea was strong enough to do so. The Ambassador said that press articles claiming the U.S. wanted to maintain our troop levels in Korea at 28,500 simply to get more money from the ROK were ridiculous; this was a mutual decision based on what was best for security on the Korean Peninsula. Kim advised the Ambassador not to take too much stock in articles that criticized the U.S. and the alliance -- all agreements are criticized widely in Korean press, so this recent agreement should not expect different treatment. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Former President Kim is still lucent and plugged-in politically and, at 81 years of age, shows no signs of slowing down. Without the Nobel Peace Prize and global acclaim of his long-time rival -- and presidential successor -- Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam still tries to stay politically relevant. Kim backed Lee Myung-bak early on in the campaign and lent considerable support in Kim's home region in the southeast. He did not, however, see many returns on his investment, as his former aides and his son did not receive nominations for the April 9 National Assembly elections. This has led him openly to express dissatisfaction with Lee Myung-bak and the GNP. Still, Kim holds sway with President Lee and many of his advisors. His winsome personality and strong southern accent are also helpful with the new conservative administration. VERSHBOW