ROKG'S CALM RESPONSE TO DPRK RHETORIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000636 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017 TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL SUBJECT: ROKG'S CALM RESPONSE TO DPRK RHETORIC REF: A. SEOUL 616 ¶B. SEOUL 623 Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak told the Ambassador on March 31 that recent DPRK rhetoric was an effort to test the new government's dedication to denuclearization, but that the ROKG would "respond calmly" without backing down. Assistant Minister of Unification Park Chang-bong pointed to the DPRK's recognition of its economic dependence on the ROK as a mitigating factor, but he noted the underlying issue of denuclearization as a structural problem in the South-North relationship. Both Kwon and Park expected the rhetorical battle to subside, since neither side wanted it to escalate further. END SUMMARY. -------------- ROKG STATEMENTS -- DPRK RESPONSES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After a month of "wait-and-see" silence following President Lee Myung-bak's February 25 inauguration, the DPRK expelled 11 ROKG officials from the Kaesong Industrial Complex on March 27 (ref A) and test-fired short-range missiles on March 28 (ref B). More disturbing was the accompanying rhetoric: -- On March 28, while not acknowledging the missile firings, the DPRK Naval Command issued a statement carried by KCNA on March 28 that rejected March 26 comments by ROKG General Kim Tae-young, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the National Assembly, that "the NLL (Northern Limit Line) is a line that we have to defend." The KCNA statement referred to the NLL as a "ghost line" and accused ROK warships of violating "North Korean territorial waters," warning of an armed clash if such actions were repeated. The ROK JCS in turn dismissed the DPRK accusation, saying that, "South Korean Naval ships have never violated the NLL." -- On March 29, the North Korea's chief military negotiator with the ROKG, Major General Kim Young-chul, sent a letter to his ROKG counterpart. The letter criticized JCS Chairman Kim for remarks that Kim also made on March 26 at the National Assembly that if the DPRK were found to be preparing a nuclear attack on the South, that the ROKG would undertake "strikes in advance" on relevant facilities. The letter made three points: that the DPRK would respond "more powerfully" to any ROKG sign of a preemptive strike; that the ROKG should retract and apologize for Kim's statement; and that, if no apology were forthcoming, the DPRK would take stern measures by preventing ROKG officials and military personnel from crossing the Military Demarcation Line. ¶3. (SBU) North Korea intensified this rhetoric on March 29 after a senior official at the ROK Ministry of Defense (MND) remarked that JCS Chairman Kim,s remark was "not something we have to apologize for," adding that the ROKG would make a decision within two or three days on whether to send a written response to the DPRK. Immediately, the DPRK, through a KCNA editorial, reiterated Saturday,s demands, adding a warning that it would retaliate if South Korea showed any sign of initiating a preemptive strike against the North, "burning everything to ashes." The ROKG again tried to calm the situation with a public comment on March 31 that it was taking a long view toward North Korea. -------------- SENIOR MOFAT AND MOU OFFICIALS CALM -------------- ¶4. (C) In a March 31 meeting with the Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak likened North Korean authorities to new first grade students who had to make the change from being coddled by the previous ROK administrations. There would now be a learning process, since the DPRK had to adjust to the new environment. The recent DPRK statements were meant to "intimidate us and test our will," but the ROKG would not be swayed from its emphasis on the need for denuclearization, even though the DPRK hoped that ROKG concern for economic progress in the North would trump that concern. ¶5. (C) Commenting on the changed international environment, Kwon said that the DPRK had "no escape route," because China was now active in the Six-Party Talks process, and Japan, like the U.S. and ROK, remained firm. Hence, Kwon reasoned, the bottom line was that the DPRK would not "isolate itself" for long by maintaining its defiant, provocative stance. He did not see a likelihood of the DPRK's provocative rhetoric affecting the April 9 National Assembly elections. ¶6. (C) The ROKG did not want to provoke the DPRK, but the DPRK needed to know that the situation had changed, Kwon said. The DPRK's rhetoric and actions caused some South Koreans to be nervous, but even in the face of such provocations, the ROK maintained "peace in our minds." The DPRK knew that it needed food and fertilizer assistance, but it could be holding back from asking the ROKG for assistance out of hope that either the USG or China (which Kwon said was proposing 150,000 metric tons of maize assistance) would move first. Kwon said that the ROKG had previously conveyed to the DPRK (nfi) that if the DPRK were to request humanitarian assistance, the ROKG would be willing to talk. ¶7. (C) Kwon noted that ROKG-DPRK Energy and Economy Cooperation Working Group talks had proceeded without a problem in Panmunjom on March 27-28, despite the rhetoric and actions seen elsewhere, because the DPRK soberly recognized that it needed ROKG energy assistance. (Note: MOFAT Nuclear Negotiation Division Director Kim Gunn also told us on March 31 that the March 27-28 talks proceeded professionally without incident. End Note.) ¶8. (C) Separately, Assistant Minister of Unification Park Chan-bong told Pol M/C on March 31 that he, too, saw the North's harsh rhetoric as having limited duration, because the North recognized the fundamental fact of its dependence on South Korean economic assistance. That was why the North Koreans had carefully expelled only South Korean officials from the KIC, but did nothing to ROK private companies and workers there. ¶9. (C) Unlike Kwon, Park suggested that ROK officials should react more carefully. JCS Chairman Kim's remarks about an advance strike were "too frank," and bound to provoke a reaction from the DPRK. Kim could have answered the questions in National Assembly a lot more tactfully. ¶10. (C) Looking ahead, Park saw the situation improving soon since neither the ROK nor DPRK were interested in escalating the tensions. However, Park argued, there remained a structural problem, which was that the Lee administration had said clearly that as long as the DPRK made no progress in denuclearization, the ROK could not re-engage in South-North dialogue. On the issue of South-North meetings, Kwon told the Ambassador that no high-level meetings were currently planned, and that the DPRK would have to request such meetings for the ROKG to act. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Leaving aside Vice Foreign Minister Kwon's excess zeal, nobody in the ROKG wants an escalation in tensions with North Korea. Our guess is that the remarks by JCS General Kim and MOU Minister Kim that triggered the sharp reaction from Pyongyang were mostly accidental. They did not mean to veer off into the unknown. Simply put, they are not used to answering "what if" questions on North Korea. Still, our contacts are clearly right in pointing out the structural impediment in the North-South dialogue: the lack of progress in denuclearization. It was, therefore, a matter of time before the Lee administration's "reciprocity" policy was tested. This time, the test involved words only. We don't expect either side to further aggravate the situation now. However, it is probably only a matter to time before the ROKG is confronted more seriously over this structural issue in the relationship, particularly if the deadlock over the nuclear declaration continues. VERSHBOW