SCENESETTER: MARCH 26 MEETING WITH ROK FOREIGN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 000592 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MNUC KN KS OVIP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: MARCH 26 MEETING WITH ROK FOREIGN MINISTER YU MYUNG-HWAN Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Madam Secretary, the main reason for Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan's March 26-27 visit to Washington is to set the stage for a successful April 18-19 summit meeting at Camp David between President Lee Myung-bak and the President. Since your meeting with FM Yu on February 25, political interest in winning a legislative majority in the upcoming April 9 National Assembly elections has severely limited any new policy initiatives by President Lee and his Government. It has also not helped that President Lee and his political allies in the Grand National Party (GNP) have been heavily criticized for mismanaging Cabinet appointments and party nominations for the elections, the latter leading to an open rift with Park Geun-hye. All of this has damaged Yu's ability to engage fully on the issues of greatest concern to us. Nonetheless, we have already reaped some positive results from the new Korean Government. On March 24, the ROKG informed us that it would recognize Kosovo's independence by the end of this week, and that FM Yu had taken a much tougher line on North Korea in his meeting with the Chinese last week. We expect the political situation will improve after the April 9 elections, and that more progress will then be possible. We believe the new Administration recognizes how much is at stake for Lee's first visit. ¶2. (C) I recommend that you focus on the following issues with FM Yu to ensure that we have genuinely positive results when the President meets with Lee on April 19. -- KORUS FTA: Without quick resolution of the beef issue, we will lose the opportunity to ratify the FTA this year. -- SIX PARTY TALKS: South Korea needs to use all its leverage with North Korea and whatever influence it has with China to obtain a complete and correct declaration of the North's nuclear assets and programs. -- THE ALLIANCE: The Lee Administration has pledged to revive the Alliance but has not said how. You should urge Yu to start spelling out specifics, and warn that deep defense budget cuts could create problems on Capitol Hill. -- VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: Many Koreans expect to achieve VWP status by the end of 2008 -- so much so that some are holding off applying for visas. Yu will want to make significant progress on accession to the VWP to justify his Government's expressed commitment to improve ties with the U.S. End Summary -------------- BEEF AND FTA -- KEEPING THE PROCESS ON TRACK -------------- ¶3. (C) Since your visit a month ago, we have continued to press President Lee and his team to reopen the beef market quickly. Senior ROKG policymakers understand that if Lee's visit is to generate the momentum necessary to obtain Congressional ratification of the KORUS FTA this year, Korea will need to reopen the beef market in line with international scientific (OIE) guidelines by the time Lee arrives in Washington on April 16. Lee's team has told us it will be politically impossible for them to be seen negotiating with us before Korea's April 9 legislative elections. The politics of the beef issue are too sensitive in agricultural constituencies. At the same time, Korea's trade team is working hard behind the scenes to tee up a deal that will meet our needs and can be announced by President Lee's visit. ¶4. (C) Our challenge is that all the bad news on trade in the United States ever since the Ohio primary has made Koreans increasingly pessimistic about the prospect of Congressional ratification of the FTA. This, in turn, is prompting a few of Lee's political advisors to question whether rapid action on beef, or a complete rather than partial or two-phase solution, is truly warranted. Polls show that the majority of Koreans currently believe that U.S. beef is unsafe. Lee's Government thinks it can nonetheless SEOUL 00000592 002 OF 005 justify reopening the beef market as a necessary payment for ratification of the FTA, which the vast majority of Koreans support. Still, some advisors fear that if Lee opens the beef market right now, against the public's wishes, and then no headway is made on Congressional ratification, it will open him up to domestic criticism of apparent incompetence or at least over-eagerness to please the United States. ¶5. (C) Accordingly, we are redoubling our efforts to convince the Koreans -- FM Yu included -- both that fully reopening the beef market now is necessary to preserve any hope of KORUS ratification in 2008, and that KORUS FTA ratification by Congress this year remains do-able, despite opposition from a few vocal Congressmen and the general U.S. disenchantment with foreign trade. Koreans eagerly lapped up Senator Maria Cantwell's remarks in Seoul last week that, given the huge U.S. business interests at stake, she thought there was considerable latent Congressional support for KORUS ready to be mobilized once beef was resolved; she even suggested that the actual vote on KORUS might prove easier than the vote on Colombia or Panama once the Congressional leadership allowed KORUS to come to a vote. ¶6. (C) The Korean Government understands that the Administration cannot promise the outcome or timing of Congressional deliberations on the FTA. They also know that we are committed to seeing the Colombia process through first, even though a protracted Colombia debate that eats up all the legislative time for KORUS is their nightmare. But as Lee's Government continues its own internal efforts to come up with a beef solution, it would be useful for Yu to hear that the Bush Administration remains committed to KORUS, and that while achieving ratification this year may be difficult, it is do-able (as has been the case with every major trade agreement). -------------- NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Yu told me on March 4 that he expected the DPRK eventually would make an acceptable declaration of its nuclear programs, but that additional time would be required. Under Yu's guidance, MOFAT can be expected to stay closely in synch with the USG on North Korea policy, as well as providing able leadership of the Economy and Energy Cooperation Working Group established under the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions agreement. Yu will want to hear how the ROK can be helpful in pressing the DPRK to produce a complete and correct declaration. He will also want to know what will be our response if the deadlock cannot be resolved. ¶8. (C) In keeping with President Lee Myung-bak's emphasis on reciprocity in the ROK-DPRK relationship, FM Yu can be expected to coordinate closely with fellow diplomat and Minister of Unification Kim Ha-joong to make sure that assistance to the North -- still an open question -- remains in line with progress on denuclearization. In our March 4 meeting, Yu indicated that he was in no hurry to reach out to the North, preferring to wait for the DPRK to make the first move. This attitude marks a subtle but important shift from the Sunshine Policy era, when the ROKG's judgment was that it was important to continue reaching out to the DPRK even in the face of the North's recalcitrance. ¶9. (C) We have also heard from MOFAT that during FM Yu's visit to Beijing last week he had used "strong language" with the Chinese to convey his Government's views on the North Korea nuclear issue, taking a much tougher stance toward the DPRK than his predecessors had. The ROKG has already adopted a more critical public position on human rights in North Korea and indicated increased interest in North Korean refugees, as well as South Korean abductees and prisoners of war. Even so, Yu and others have been careful, especially in public, to characterize the new Government's stance as seeking cooperation with the North rather than as a radical departure from past policies. On balance, we expect there will be changes, possibly to include a narrower definition of what qualifies as humanitarian aid, with increased attention to monitoring and reciprocity. FM Yu would likely welcome a frank discussion on coordinated U.S.-ROK ground rules for such assistance. -------------- SEOUL 00000592 003 OF 005 STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE -------------- ¶10. (C) Throughout his presidential campaign and in his inaugural address on February 25, President Lee Myung-bak clearly stated that he is committed to strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance. To the USG that means that on the Korean Peninsula the ROK must continue to support, financially as well as politically, implementation of our three alliance transformation agreements: the Yongsan Relocation Plan, the Land Partnership Plan and the Strategic Transition Plan for OPCON transfer (YRP, LPP and STP). Regionally, it means closer security coordination on North Korea and improved trilateral cooperation with Japan. Globally, it means increased ROK contributions of troops, equipment, training and assistance to fight terrorism and address other pressing international security concerns around the world. ¶11. (C) Nonetheless, while the Lee Government has generated detailed plans about how it will fulfill a great many of Lee's campaign promises, it has yet to offer even an outline of actual steps to strengthen the Alliance. To date, President Lee's words of support for the Alliance have given the impression that alliance relations have improved; but he has chosen not to back that up in tangible ways in order to avoid diverting political capital and national treasure from his domestic economic priorities at a time when the Korean economy has worsened. Meanwhile, we are picking up disturbing signs that Lee's Blue House is pushing drastic cuts in defense spending that could undercut alliance transformation and exacerbate burdensharing concerns on Capitol Hill. ¶12. (C) You should take this opportunity and seek Foreign Minister Yu's specific views on the direction of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Kim Byung-kook, the Blue House National Security Advisor, told Steve Hadley last week that the Lee Administration would like to produce a Declaration on the Future of the Alliance in advance of the next summit in July. We think it important that such a declaration include concrete "deliverables" that would put clear meaning behind our mutual goal of strengthening the Alliance. You may want to explore with FM Yu what areas of security cooperation he believes could be included in that declaration. Topping the U.S. list of security priorities are: ROK troops for Afghanistan for a train-and-equip mission; another troop extension in Iraq; endorsement of PSI; and an increased SMA (burdensharing) contribution. Topping the ROK list of security priorities will be: public confirmation of a long-term U.S. security commitment, and elevation of the ROK to NATO-plus-4 FMS status. ¶13. (S) Yu needs to hear directly that alliance management is also about sharing the costs. As noted, President Lee has repeatedly directed the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to cut its budget by 10 percent this year -- a USD 3 billion cut, USD 900 million of which would come out of new and continuing military modernization programs. If reflected in the final budget, these cuts will postpone completion of the ROK military's Defense Reform 2020 plan, or require significant revisions of the Plan. The cuts could also hinder ROK procurement of new systems, such as the U.S.-made Global Hawk UAV. According to MND sources, the Ministry's budget is now likely to fall to 2.5 percent of GDP, lower than during the Roh administration. (Last year Roh increased defense spending by 6 percent -- which was still short of the 11 percent annual increase required to meet the goals of Defense Reform 2020.) ¶14. (S) MND has sensed a storm brewing since Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee met with President Lee on March 12. At that meeting, an aide to President Lee told the Defense Minister very bluntly that there would be budget cuts and to plan accordingly. The aide curtly warned the Defense Minister that the Blue House would not be "writing checks for MND toys." President Lee reportedly said nothing, but kept looking straight ahead, indicating that he agreed with everything his aide was saying. You should discuss with FM Yu the negative effect these deep cuts could have on Congress's already flagging support for the alliance. -------------- VISA WAIVER PROGRAM -------------- SEOUL 00000592 004 OF 005 ¶15. (C) After pressing for years to join the Visa Waiver Program (VWP),the Republic of Korea has made very significant progress toward VWP membership during the last few months. ROK officials hope the Memorandum of Understanding required for VWP participation can be signed during President Lee's visit, perhaps along with a key VWP-related accord on sharing information to screen for terrorists. Diplomatic and official Korean e-passports have just gone into production -- President Lee intends to carry one during his April visit -- and plans continue apace for full-scale production of regular Korean e-passports later this summer. Although no dates have been announced, DHS may visit Korea as early as June for an in-country technical visit as part of the VWP initial designation review process. At the same time, DHS has not yet provided the ROK with a draft of one of the required "implementing arrangements" mentioned in the MOU that will potentially involve sharing criminal-record information. This could run counter to ROK privacy laws, and therefore might require considerable negotiations before agreement can be reached. ¶16. (C) DHS has pledged that it will have all necessary new systems -- including an exit control system and an electronic pre-clearance mechanism for travelers called an Electronic System of Transportation Authorization (ESTA) -- in place in time for the ROK and several other countries to join the VWP before the end of calendar 2008. However, Senator Feinstein, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, has, along with Senators Kyl and Sessions, written to DHS Secretary Chertoff to express serious concerns that DHS plans for the exit control system do not meet the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Korean citizens as well as ROK officials will be deeply disappointed if DHS is not able to develop the appropriate systems promptly and enlarge the VWP to include Korean visitors by late 2008 or early 2009 -- or if Korean membership in the program falls through for any other reason. -------------- PERSONNEL-LY SPEAKING -------------- ¶17. (C) FM Yu Myung-whan's visit to the U.S. comes after Yu's successful visit to China last week (his first trip abroad as Foreign Minister) and just months after leaving his posting as Ambassador to Japan. Yu, rated as one of the best-ever ROK Ambassadors to Japan, is poised to play a key role harmonizing relations between Japan and Korea without upsetting China. At the same time, Yu has spent over 10 years of his distinguished 35-year career playing a lead role on U.S. policy. ¶18. (C) In the Lee Myung-bak Government, Yu and MOFAT are ascendant; the FM chairs the National Security Council (previously chaired by the Unification Minister). To boot, Yu's confirmation hearing was criticized for being too friendly. Yu has few enemies in Government, he is widely admired in the National Assembly, and most expect his tenure at MOFAT will last two years -- twice the average tenure for ministers in Korea. Unfortunately, not all of President Lee's personnel have been viewed so favorably. Three of Lee's cabinet nominees withdrew their candidacy in the face of allegations of ill-gotten wealth and questions about their qualifications. Lee's approval ratings have slumped to 51 percent, according to a March 23 KBS poll, the lowest ever for a Korean President one month after inauguration. -------------- DOMESTIC POLITICS -------------- ¶19. (C) The expected Sturm und Drang leading up to the April 9 National Assembly election is the main reason why the Lee administration has made little or no progress on several key campaign issues. The KORUS FTA was the first victim, as the new Government, weakened by its nomination battles with the National Assembly, was unable to overcome legislative obstructionism and is now resigned to seeing an FTA ratification vote not occur until after April 9, and perhaps not until the new legislative session begins in June. Officials are reluctant to discuss Alliance issues in detail. Also on hold are domestic projects such as Lee's grand canal SEOUL 00000592 005 OF 005 project and a new education policy. ¶20. (C) Unfortunately for President Lee, the domestic political scene is indeed a mess, and he gets a share of the blame. Within the ruling GNP party, various factions are at war over the process of selecting candidates for the National Assembly election in which 50 of 128 incumbent GNP legislators were rejected. Park Geun-hye, a darling among the conservatives, announced on March 23 that she had lost confidence in Lee Myung-bak because he had not honored his word that he would stay out of the party nomination process, and instead allowed a "purge" of pro-Park candidates (many of whom are running as independents). Pundits note the "loss" of Park was Lee Myung-bak's fault, and a huge blunder, as Park still controls about 30 lawmakers and her faction could cause real problems for Lee if she does not support his policy initiatives. More than that, Park remains an appealing political figure, commanding enormous popular support among Koreans. ¶21. (C) What all this means is that your meeting with FM Yu may fall short on specifics, especially on politically sensitive issues such as beef. Still, this is a very different Administration than the one we have had to deal with under Roh Moo-hyun. On Monday, MOFAT let us know that Korea was ready to recognize Kosovo; a few weeks ago, the ROKG UN delegation heavily criticized the North on human rights; in the near future, we expect the Koreans will sign on to PSI. All of this could not have taken place with Roh in the Blue House. We all remain hopeful that Lee can stabilize his political base and that we can make more significant progress soon. VERSHBOW