MINISTER HAN SEUNG-JOO SLAMS LMB'S FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000575 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KS KN SUBJECT: MINISTER HAN SEUNG-JOO SLAMS LMB'S FOREIGN POLICY Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In remarks delivered at the monthly dinner meeting of DCMs in Seoul on March 19, former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the U.S. Han Seung-Joo presented a surprisingly negative assessment of the foreign policy direction of the new Lee Myung-bak Government. While acknowledging that LMB's Government had only been in power a month, he thought that it was off to a bad start, and was already facing a series of domestic and international challenges, including unrealistically high expectations both domestically and internationally that LMB would not be able to meet. LMB also faced political problems both inside and outside of the GNP and an upcoming National Assembly election in which the GNP would "at best break even." END SUMMARY. -------------- PRAGMATISM WITH NO SENSE OF DIRECTION -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the U.S. Han Seung-joo told the DCMs that thus far LMB had stressed pragmatism in foreign policy and this was correct if by pragmatism you meant a foreign policy not based on ideology, emotions, or politics. What we were seeing, however, was a "super-pragmatic policy almost devoid of values." He cited as an example LMB's recent meeting at MOFAT where it was reported that 90 percent of the time was given over to a discussion of energy security. Even 10 percent of LMB's attention to this issue, however, would have been too much because energy was primarily in the hands of the private sector, Han said. Meanwhile, according to all accounts, LMB had made no mention of North Korean nuclear weapons or other security problems. Contrasting LMB's approach to foreign policy with his own when he was Foreign Minister in the early 90s, Ambassador Han argued that LMB's policy was not multidimensional and was so pragmatic that there was no overall sense of direction, and that this had been especially apparent in LMB's inauguration speech. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Han expressed concern about where LMB's pragmatism would lead Korea. As an example, he cited the current difficulty in assigning Ambassadors to the most important countries for Korea: the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. Of these, only the Ambassador to Russia had been recently appointed, so he was likely to stay in place. Now that the Korean Ambassador to Japan had been become Foreign Minister, however, and the Korean Ambassador to China had become Minister of Unification, those positions remained unfilled, and there had been no movement on naming a new Ambassador to the U.S. The main reason these positions remained empty, Ambassador Han said, was political. The ROKG was waiting to see which politicians would be elected in April, and if not elected, would need those jobs. -------------- CHALLENGES AHEAD -------------- ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, Ambassador Han continued, major challenges outside of Korea were taking place. For example, all the major countries of importance to Korea had undergone or were facing changes in leadership including in Russia, Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, and the U.S. All these changes would produce a new environment in which Korea would have to operate. In the United States, "the country that matters most to us," we did not know who would be elected or what his or her foreign policy would be like. Economically, contrary to the expectations of immediate economic benefits from the election of LMB, Korea was now facing new economic challenges including the high price of oil, the curiously high value of the U.S. dollar in Korea alone, and high prices for commodities. In addition, financial troubles stemming from the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. were not having a "ripple" effect, but a "wave" effect and possibly in the future might have a "tsunami" effect. Korea would have to deal with all of these challenges but LMB was focusing on energy security where the ROKG, while it might assist, would not be the major player. At the same time, the KORUS FTA was facing more and more difficulties and the prospects were not good for ratification before LMB's visit to Washington. Negotiations with the EU on an FTA were continuing but it would be a long time before a successful outcome would have a major effect on the Korean economy. -------------- DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Han said that the good news on the North Korean nuclear issue, which LMB had either "consciously or unconsciously avoided" at MOFAT, was that it had not developed into a major crisis. The bad news was that denuclearization of North Korea had not really begun, either because Pyongyang was skillfully doling out small concessions or because South Korea and the U.S. eagerly construed any concessions as progress. Moreover, as a China scholar had told Han, China would not put any pressure on North Korea before the Olympics or even before the end of this year. It appeared that no one wanted to make an issue of North Korea's denuclearization even if the price was that North Korea kept its weapons and its secrets about uranium enrichment and nuclear cooperation with Syria. Meanwhile, North Korea continued to use its nuclear weapons as a threat if it did not get what it wanted. -------------- POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to the U.S., Ambassador Han noted that LMB had stressed the need to "restore" and more recently to "strengthen" relations with the United States. This was a reaction to the erosion of U.S. confidence in South Korea during the administration of Roh Moo-hyun, who had tired to balance Korea between China and the United States and was very therefore very reluctant to move ahead on programs such as PSI and Missile Defense. While it was still unclear what Korea would do on Missile Defense, the current administration appeared to be trying to find a way out of the PSI problem by redefining it as an issue of "more or less" rather than "either/or," offering greater PSI participation. Unlike the previous government, it also appeared the LMB administration would be more forthcoming in discussing possible contingencies for dealing with North Korea, including OPLAN 5029 in the event of the North's collapse. At the same time, Ambassador Han said, he did not think South Korea's policy on aid and engagement with North Korea would change all that much, although there would be less "embracing" and more reciprocity and conditionality. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Han noted that late-19th-century pragmatism, especially in the U.S., was to some extent a reaction to German idealism. In a similar way, Ambassador Han thought LMB's pragmatism, which had resonated with the Korean public, had resulted from a rejection of President Roh's "ideologically and sentiment-dominated" policies. But Roh had spoken more ideologically than he had acted. Ambassador Han concluded that if LMB's pragmatism simply meant finding resources, avoiding trouble, and playing politics, it would not compensate for an inadequate foreign policy. LMB's domestic honeymoon was already over, Amb. Han added, but it was still continuing internationally. -------------- POLICY ADVICE -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked what he thought the ROK's policy toward North Korea should be and what advice he would give LMB if he were Foreign Minister, Ambassador Han said the first step should be a very frank discussion with the U.S., China, Japan and Russia before "jumping into action" on the best way to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem and North Korea in general. In recent years there had been more time spent on trying to iron out differences between South Korea and Japan and South Korea and the U.S., and between hard- and soft-liners in the U.S, than in dealing with North Korea in any way other than public pronouncements. South Korea should also be more outspoken about human rights in North Korea and increase the number of North Korean refugees it takes, and take appropriate action on Korean abductees and soldiers still being held in the North. In a broader sense, ROKG policy on human rights needed to be more measured and balanced, and the ROK needed to be more willing to address problems rather than ignore them. The biggest challenge for the ROKG in this regard might be if something even more drastic or tragic occurred in Tibet -- how would the ROKG react if the issue were China? -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Some of Han's criticism should be taken with a grain of salt. Han had hoped for a major position in the LMB administration, perhaps even Prime Minister, which went to another Han, Han Seung-soo. Also, Han's most prominent protege, Hyun In-taek, was the odds-on favorite to be Lee's national security advisor, which ended up going to Kim Byung-kook, another Korea University professor; Hyun went back to academia. Still, former Foreign Minister Han, a conservative himself, has a point. So far, Lee Myung-bak's policies, whether foreign or domestic, have lacked substance and coherence. The most often cited reason is the April 9 National Assembly elections which are trotted out to defend inaction for everything, from resolving our beef issue to replacing the Roh administration's holdover personnel. Even if the Lee administration does get truly busy after April 9, President Lee has already squandered considerable momentum and good will, as Han Seung-joo argues. VERSHBOW