NEW MOU MINISTER KIM HA-JOONG: OLD MOFAT HAND,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000454 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018 TAGS: KS KN PROG PREL PINR SUBJECT: NEW MOU MINISTER KIM HA-JOONG: OLD MOFAT HAND, NORTHEAST ASIA SPECIALIST Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Kim Ha-joong, the current ROK Ambassador to China and a career diplomat, has been named Lee Myung-bak's first Unification Minister. Resistance to his nomination from the opposition United Democratic Party is unlikely to be strong; he was one of the architects of the Sunshine Policy when he served as Kim Dae-jung's Senior Secretary for National Security. His nomination surprised many conservatives, including some who question his conservative bona fides with regard to the DPRK. Kim brings significant DPRK, Northeast Asia, and diplomatic experience into the position; he will be comfortable in this policymaking role. The fortunes of the Ministry, however, remain unclear, except that it will be reduced in manpower and interagency authority. END SUMMARY. -------------- - What Kim Brings To The Job: DPRK Experience... -------------- - ¶2. (C) Kim brings experience working on engagement strategies with the DPRK, having served as Senior Secretary for National Security during the Kim Dae-jung administration (2000-2001). Media reports state that he was one of the guiding hands behind the Sunshine Policy, and has met high-level North Korean visitors to Seoul. Kim was considered as a possible MOU Minister during Roh Moo-hyun's administration, but was ultimately passed over for Lee Jae-joung, who stepped down as MOU Minister this week. ¶3. (C) Kim's nomination marks the second time that a former Korean Ambassador to China has been nominated as MOU Minister. Kim has served as Ambassador to China since 2001 and is expected to be well-versed in issues related to the Six Party Talks and DPRK defectors; his background also gives him significant experience on trade issues, which could have an impact on how he views inter-Korean economic cooperation. ¶4. (C) Some MOFAT colleagues note, however, that while Kim was briefed while in Beijing on the state of play in the Six Party Talks, he was not intimately involved in the Six Party Talks. His forte, rather, was in PRC-ROK bilateral issues, including trade and DPRK refugees. -------------- ...NE Asia Expertise... -------------- ¶5. (C) Kim's MOFAT career also reflects a heavy focus on �A;Northeast Asia, which could bode well for the Lee Myung-bak administration's efforts to build regional cooperation. In addition to his seven-year tour as Ambassador to the PRC, he has served as Director-General for Asian Pacific Affairs, Minister at Embassy Beijing, and Counsellor at Embassy Tokyo. Kim majored in Chinese Literature during undergraduate studies at Seoul National University and speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese. -------------- ...Policymaking Experience... -------------- ¶6. (C) As previously mentioned, Kim has had two assignments in the Blue House, both during the Kim Dae-jung administration. Kim has also served three tours in Foreign Minister's office, each time under a different minister. -------------- ...And MOFAT's Work Culture. -------------- ¶7. (C) MOFAT colleagues and media reports have characterized Kim as a tough, hard-working boss who often kept his employees at Embassy Beijing working until late at night. His work ethic should fit in well with an administration that has staffed its senior foreign policy positions with former or current MOFAT personnel, and with a president who has already indicated that he expects his senior staff to put in long hours. Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan was in the same MOFAT entering class as Kim, which could help the two to frankly exchange views and coordinate on relevant issues. -------------- The Mood at MOU -------------- ¶8. (C) Kim is going into a ministry that was almost eliminated entirely. Now, the administration has announced large-scale layoffs and a wholesale restructuring of the Ministry. In short, he will face morale issues. He will certainly be pressed by conservative hardliners to take a stronger line vis-a-vis the DPRK on inter-Korean economic cooperation. Working-level MOU contacts are taking a "wait-and-see" approach to the new Minister, and remain hopeful that he will have no choice but to continue inter-Korean economic projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourism site. Our understanding is that these two main inter-Korean projects will continue but not expand further. -------------- What His Appointment Suggests -------------- ¶9. (SBU) All indications are that Kim,s appointment is another sign that the new administration's North Korea policies will be viewed through a diplomatic rather than a domestic lens. That is, the new ROK government will view North Korea as a security issue to be resolved through diplomatic initiatives, rather than a problem that is shared by Koreans, as characterized by the Roh administration. This will have policy implications ranging from economic assistance to human rights to denuclearization efforts. ¶10. (SBU) Another policy issue that could be affected by Kim's appointment is the new administration,s emphasis on the issue of DPRK refugees in China. Blue House spokesperson Lee Dong-kwan, in his March 2 announcement of Kim,s appointment, mentioned that Kim,s past role in handling the refugee issue with China was recognized as a valuable asset for the Unification Minister job. In an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo on March 3, Kim Ha-joong noted that he had handled around 430 refugee cases during his ambassadorship in China. ¶11. (SBU) Some editorials and news articles have suggested that the appointment of a China expert to the Unification Minister post reflects the new government,s effort to ease Chinese anxiety over signs that the ROK is moving closer to the United States and Japan, as demonstrated by the recent appointments of Kim Byung-kook (an old U.S. hand) as Foreign Affairs Advisor and Yu Myung-hwan (former Ambassador to Japan) as Foreign Minister. ¶12. (C) Since his nomination, Kim has stuck to the party line; in a March 3 interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, Kim said that the new administration,s NK policy will be to "build a Global Korea, promote pragmatism, and bring about North Korean reforms and openness." Faced with an uncertain mandate about inter-Korean engagement, an MOU that looks to lose significant interagency clout, low staff morale, and a North Korea that is increasingly unhappy with the direction of inter-Korean relations, Kim faces a long walk across a tight-rope. VERSHBOW