SCENESETTER: LEE MYUNG-BAK PROMISES A BETTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 000343 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MNUC KN KS OVIP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: LEE MYUNG-BAK PROMISES A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES SEOUL 00000343 001.3 OF 005 Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Madam Secretary, the election of Lee Myung-bak, his appointment of pro-American advisors, and the likelihood that his party will secure a commanding majority in the National Assembly elections in April, provide an excellent opportunity to build a more substantial U.S.-ROK partnership for the future. The goals before us are: -- To ratify the KORUS FTA, which means billions of dollars for the U.S. economy and the creation of a lasting economic pillar for our Alliance. Support for the FTA remains solid among the Korean leadership, media and public. Korea's National Assembly formally took up the FTA on February 15, thanks to pressure from Lee's supporters; ratification will likely occur some time in the next few months. -- To solve the beef issue, which is a prerequisite to Congressional consideration of the FTA. Lee understands the importance of resolving this by the time he visits Washington in mid-April. While Lee's team has explained that formal signature of a new beef agreement won't be politically possible until after Korea's legislative elections on April 9, we have proposed informal exchanges on a new beef agreement during March. -- To strengthen our cooperation to denuclearize North Korea through the Six-Party Talks. A key challenge for the Lee administration is to balance its demand for substantial reciprocal actions by the North as the precondition for economic assistance against irrevocably damaging inter-Korean relations. My recommendation is for you to welcome Lee's refreshingly tough stance, but also make him aware that we support North-South engagement, provided it is closely synchronized with efforts to achieve denuclearization, through the Six-Party process. -- To upgrade the U.S.-ROK Alliance's mission and structure so that it can play an enhanced role in fostering peace on the Peninsula, the region, and elsewhere in the world. I recommend you convey to Lee that Washington is committed to strengthening the Alliance and expanding its global dimension. Lee will be very receptive as he has repeatedly and publicly voiced his commitment to a stronger Alliance and to a more prominent role for the ROK on the world stage. -- To work effectively with the South Korean government to meet the requirements needed to facilitate the ROK's entry into the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Early admission by the ROK into the VWP is a very high priority for the Lee administration. ¶2. (C) We would like to see progress on all these goals by the time of President Lee's first visit to Washington (April 17-19). It will not be easy, but there is a great sense of renewed hope and a palpable flow of energy that has come back into the U.S.-ROK relationship. With a president and an administration that are instinctively drawn to the United States, there is a real opportunity to restore both momentum and trust to a relationship that has been underperforming in recent years. If there's any danger ahead, it's the risk that no ROK leader can possibly live up to the high expectations that Lee's presidency has generated in South Korea, as well as in Washington. End Summary. -------------- Lee's Domestic Agenda: The Economy First -------------- ¶3. (C) At the top of Lee Myung-bak's Presidential agenda is his pledge to increase economic growth. He ran on a "747" platform, saying he would boost economic growth to 7 percent a year over the next decade, raise per capita GDP to USD 40,000, and make the ROK the 7th largest economy in the world. ROK presidents are elected to only a single 5-year term, but the energetic President-elect plans to set the South Korean economy well on its way toward those goals during his time in office. Is that what the Korean public wants? The answer is clearly yes, as evidenced by the fact that with 49 percent of the vote, "MB" had nearly twice the SEOUL 00000343 002.3 OF 005 public backing of his nearest competitor in a 10-candidate field. Koreans across the political spectrum want a stronger economy (particularly with growing concern about Chinese competition) and believe that Lee Myung-bak is the person best equipped to deliver it. Few expect he will actually achieve his ambitious economic goals, but the ROK has enjoyed tremendous economic growth over the years and clearly does have the potential to soar to still greater heights. To this end, he is focusing on addressing a few key structural impediments (insufficient foreign investment, high taxes, over-regulation, labor friction) that should be able to increase Korea's already respectable 4-5 percent annual growth rate. -------------- FTA Ratification Likely -------------- ¶4. (C) Our highest bilateral priority is the ratification and implementation of the KORUS FTA, which will create an enduring economic pillar for our bilateral partnership, as well as open up billions of dollars in new opportunities for U.S. businesses. Korean support for the KORUS FTA remains solid -- among the political leadership, the media, and the public. In most Korean minds, the FTA is not just a tremendously important trade deal (Korea's largest ever),but also the key to deepening the bilateral partnership with the United States, keeping pace with the larger economies of China and Japan, and breaking with the protectionist policies of Korea's past. Despite pockets of resistance and the reluctance of some legislators to schedule a tough trade vote before the upcoming April 9 legislative election, it is widely expected that once a ratification vote is held in Korea's National Assembly, the FTA will pass by a comfortable margin. ¶5. (C) President-elect Lee ran on a platform of strong support for the FTA, and soon after he won the December election, his GNP party (currently in the legislative minority),began pressing the National Assembly to ratify the FTA quickly. After some debate, the Foreign Affairs Committee officially took up the FTA on February 13. The Government hopes to get the FTA ratified by the full National Assembly before the current legislative session adjourns on February 26 -- a goal that at this point remains possible but difficult. Failing that, the FTA will likely be ratified during a special legislative session in the March-May timeframe, or soon after the newly-elected National Assembly convenes for the first time in June. ¶6. (C) A few Korean legislators have noted the lack of movement on the FTA in the U.S. Congress and the negative comments on the FTA by Democratic presidential candidates, and wondered why Korea should rush to ratify an agreement that faces serious ratification challenges in the United States. But the preponderant view in Seoul seems to be that since the U.S. ratification debate will be tough, prompt ratification by Korea (ideally before Lee arrives in Washington on April 17) could help build pressure on Congress to ratify the FTA, ideally before the U.S. political conventions this summer. -------------- Beef Market Opening -------------- ¶7. (C) While rapid Korean ratification of the FTA would be useful for us, our more urgent priority is for Korea to reopen its market to U.S. beef -- without which our Congress will not even consider the FTA. President Roh committed publicly to reopening that market in line with international science (allowing in U.S. beef of "all cuts and all ages"); but after his party's shellacking in the December 19 Presidential elections, he overruled his advisors and decided to defer any action to the new government. ¶8. (C) Lee and his team understand the importance of the beef issue, and have assured us they will work to get it resolved before the President-elect goes to Washington on April 17. They add, however, that given its political sensitivity, they cannot sign any deal with us before the April 9 legislative elections. While acknowledging that constraint, we have noted that there likely won't be enough time to close a beef deal by the Lee visit unless our two SEOUL 00000343 003.3 OF 005 sides begin informal discussions of a new beef import protocol during March. Some transition team members have expressed concern that Lee will have to take political hits to resolve beef without any certainty that it will lead to Congressional ratification of the KORUS FTA. We have explained that, while no one can guarantee the outcome of Congressional deliberations, finally resolving the beef issue will guarantee that the Administration (and the U.S. business community) will be in a position to make the strongest possible push for the agreement, consistent with President Bush's strong commitment to the FTA, most recently expressed in his State of the Union address (which drew wide and appreciative coverage here). -------------- North Korea: Sunshine Policy Not So Sunny -------------- ¶9. (C) After the economy, North Korea policy is the most important issue of concern to South Koreans. Early moves by Lee Myung-bak and his team regarding North Korea have rattled the ROK establishment. These included: the repudiation of ten years of Sunshine Policy as appeasement; a plan to weaken, if not eliminate, the powerful Ministry of Unification; and a debate within the Transition Committee about whether even ROK humanitarian aid (fertilizer and rice) should be conditioned on North Korea's cooperation in the denuclearization talks. As a result, the DPRK has yet to officially acknowledge Lee's election, and must be chagrined that he has made it clear that major economic projects agreed upon during the October 2007 North-South summit will be reexamined by his administration case-by-case and in accordance with South Korea's economic interests. Even the flagship projects, the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgang tourist center, will see their subsidies cut. Pyongyang's response thus far has been to adopt what could be a prolonged "wait-and-see" attitude. ¶10. (C) We share a keen interest in the question of how the two Koreas will now interact, and what ground rules they will use. Radio silence would benefit neither side and could lead the North to engage in another of its periodic provocations. That, in turn, could upset the Lee Administration's ambitious economic agenda by increasing a sense of instability in the marketplace. It could also erode support among a Korean public that has grown comfortable with engagement, despite being disappointed with its one-sided results under Roh Moo-hyun. A breakdown in North-South interaction would also be unhelpful to the Six Party Talks. I would suggest that you welcome the President-elect's refreshing toughness on the need for reciprocity and giving priority to denuclearization; you might also express how much we look forward to more closely synchronizing North-South cooperation with progress in the Six Party Talks. -------------- Japan and China -------------- ¶11. (C) Beyond the peninsula, I am also optimistic that Lee will significantly improve Japan-ROK relations and U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation. Born in Osaka, the President-elect has far less animosity toward the Japanese than his predecessor who, as you know, subjected visiting Washington officials to anti-Japanese tirades. Lee also recognizes that his goals for economic growth and further progress in the Six-Party Talks will require Japanese cooperation. He has already made an important overture toward improving relations with Japan by sending his older brother (who is the vice speaker of the National Assembly) as his personal envoy to Tokyo to establish personal ties with Prime Minister Fukuda. Fukuda will reciprocate that gesture by joining you at Lee's inauguration. ¶12. (C) The South Korean caveat to Lee Myung-bak's desire to improve relations with Japan -- and also upgrade the U.S.-ROK Alliance -- is that he and his administration must take care not to inadvertently worsen the ROK's good relations with China. In fact, Lee has made an effort to assure the Chinese that Sino-South Korean relations will not suffer under his administration. I also recommend that you assure Lee that Washington does not desire any friction in Seoul's relationship with Beijing. Rather, as allies that share deeply rooted regional interests, we value Seoul's good SEOUL 00000343 004 OF 005 relations with Beijing, which can be helpful in managing regional and global challenges, including but not limited to North Korea. -------------- Opportunity to Expand the U.S.-ROK Alliance -------------- ¶13. (C) Lee Myung-bak's security policy advisors have made it clear to us that he would like his first summit with President Bush to include a joint declaration in which the two Presidents would articulate a vision of a redefined U.S.-ROK Alliance. The Foreign Ministry, acting on instructions from Lee's transition team, is already working on proposed wording for such a statement. Likely elements could include the call for a more strategic alliance partnership with added peninsular, regional and global dimensions. Some influential academics in Lee's camp prefer that the two leaders call for a study, but most recognize that we should seize this important opportunity for the two Presidents to chart the direction in broad yet bold strokes. Doing so would demonstrate not only that the U.S. and South Korea remain committed to their continuing mission of deterring North Korean aggression, but that the Alliance also has an important future role to play in underpinning the peace process that is to come. Senior MOFAT and transition team officials also point to the presence of U.S. forces on the Asian land mass as playing an important stabilizing role in the region by helping steer China toward responsible policies, while encouraging better Japan-ROK cooperation. Finally, offering the Lee Administration a true strategic partnership with the United States would appeal to South Korea's aspiration to be taken more seriously on the world stage. The ROK has played a global role by dispatching troops to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, and its highly-capable military does not labor under political constraints as does Japan's. But the Koreans could do much more (e.g. equipping and training the Afghan army, joining PSI in the years ahead). Expressing interest in working with South Korea to craft an updated vision for the Alliance would prompt our ally to give more serious consideration to future contributions around the world. ¶14. (C) It is also important to implement the agreements we have reached with Roh Moo-hyun on Alliance transformation. These include an agreement to relocate our forces from the middle of Seoul to new facilities 60 kilometers to the South and a companion agreement to consolidate our previously scattered military presence on the peninsula into three strategic military hubs. Another, the OPCON transfer agreement, means that after April 17, 2012 a South Korea 4-star general would lead ROK troops in time of war with support from the U.S. military, rather than the other way around. All three agreements are important evolutionary steps that will serve to transform the Alliance into a more balanced security partnership, while also making it more politically sustainable in the South Korean domestic environment. Some in Lee Myung-bak's conservative Grand National Party (GNP) want to turn back the clock, especially on the OPCON agreement, but their views don't reflect the majority of Koreans who prefer greater self-reliance and to be treated as an equal partner within the Alliance structure. While President Lee will see that political-military relations with us are conducted in a more constructive manner, he will need appropriate political cover before moving in our direction on contentious issues, like burden-sharing or sensitive environmental concerns surrounding camp returns. -------------- National Assembly Elections -------------- ¶15. (C) When it comes to the South Korean economy, the fate of FTA ratification, North Korea policy, and Alliance issues, much will depend on the outcome of the April 9 ROK parliamentary elections when the entire National Assembly is up for election. The 299 seats in the unicameral body are composed of both direct and proportional representatives and turn over once every four years. The proximity of the National Assembly elections to the presidential election is unusual and presents a unique opportunity for Lee Myung-bak. Still in the post-election honeymoon phase, Lee's popularity and that of his Grand National Party virtually assure him of SEOUL 00000343 005 OF 005 a large majority in the next National Assembly, which will take office on June 1. The liberal parties, which are still in disarray after their resounding loss in the presidential election, are unlikely to succeed in mounting a serious challenge outside of a few traditional strongholds. Some political pundits predict the GNP may win more than 200 seats, giving the party a two-thirds (constitutional) majority. The prospect of a GNP-dominated National Assembly bodes well for Lee's ability to push through legislation. It would also give him significant leeway in pursuing potentially unpopular endeavors -- such as elimination of the Ministry of Unification or his grand canal project. Some observers worry, however, that such latitude would allow Lee to wield even more authority than his predecessors, who were criticized for being too powerful. -------------- The Popular Appeal of Visa Waiver -------------- ¶16. (C) Finally, ROK entry to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) will be a high priority for the Lee administration and, when it is realized in the near future, will give a significant boost to our bilateral relationship. Korea is the fifth largest source of foreign travelers to the United States after Canada and Mexico. Our Non-Immigrant Visa Unit processes more visa applications than any other Foreign Service post (over 460,000 in FY 07) with an approval rate in excess of 95 percent. DHS-hosted negotiations in late January yielded progress on a U.S.-ROK Memorandum of Understanding on sharing terrorist/criminal information and other security cooperation required by the "9/11 Law." Mechanisms to share information about Korean travelers still have to be hammered out, but progress is being made. Less certain is DHS's timetable for meeting the law's requirements that the U.S. institute an exit control mechanism and Electronic Travel Authorization system for new VWP members. Another critical item is the ROKG's production of electronic passports, scheduled to begin later this year. While it is unlikely that sufficient progress will be made in all these areas to allow announcement of a timetable for Korea's accession during Lee's April trip to Washington, the ROKG is determined to see Korea join the VWP, perhaps even by the end of 2008, as part of the first tranche of new members since 9/11. -------------- MB's Pragmatic Leadership Style -------------- ¶17. (C) The inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as President of the Republic of Korea marks a shift to a more pragmatic, business-like style of governance in South Korea. Lee has been a successful private sector businessman (Hyundai Group) and a respected public sector administrator (Mayor of Seoul). He has earned the nickname "The Bulldozer" owing to his construction industry background and straight-ahead style of leadership. During his time as mayor, he was best known for unearthing a buried stream called Cheonggyecheon that flowed beneath the center of Seoul, beautifying what had been the site of a hideous elevated highway. He turned it into a urban ecological attraction where residents and visitors alike enjoy taking long pleasant strolls along the waterway. As president, Lee will bring similar energy and focus to national governance. He looks forward to meeting you and the President. You will find him refreshingly frank in his desire to improve the ROK's relations with us, and an amiable, good-humored interlocutor. VERSHBOW