ROK EXPERT ON NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002446

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK EXPERT ON NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEFECTIONS

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Professor Yoon Yeosang, President of NKDB
(Database Center for North Korean Human Rights),in a
December 9 meeting with Poloff, said DPRK authorities seemed
recently to be adhering to two points of the North Korean
criminal code they had previously ignored: limiting detention
periods to no more than two months and refraining from
detaining pregnant women. Professor Yoon attributed these
changes to international human rights allegations and
pressure. Professor Yoon also said defectors, since the year
2000, had exhibited many of the characteristics of a "normal"
immigrant mentality, and compared their reasons for defecting
to those of South Koreans who immigrate to the U.S. END
SUMMARY.

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Tracking North Korean Human Rights Abuses
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2. (C) The principal mission of Database Center for North
Korean Human Rights (NKDB) is to gather evidence of and
document North Korean human rights violations. NKDB uses
defector interviews conducted in both South Korea and third
countries as its primary source of information. These are
supplemented and cross-referenced with testimonies in
publicly available reports, books, and films. The
organization manages a database that currently logs
approximately 8,000 human rights violations and publishes
white papers on its findings. NKDB also uses its small staff
of three psychologists to offer counseling to North Korean
defectors.


3. (C) Professor Yoon said that 70 percent of North Korean
defectors in his database reported being from the provinces
of Hamgyong Namdo and Hamgyong Bukto. However, because many
had actually been expelled from urban centers like Pyongyang
to the Hamgyong countryside, the database recorded larger
numbers of human rights violations in these cities. As there
were very few defectors from Hwanghae-do and Kangwon-do, Yoon
had little information on these regions; nevertheless, he did
not believe the incidence of human rights violations varied
significantly by locale.

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Latest North Korean Human Rights Violations White Paper
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4. (C) Presenting Poloff with the English translation of the
Center's 200QWhite Paper on North Korean Human Rights,
released in October, Professor Yoon said DPRK authorities
seemed recently to be adhering to two points of the North
Korean criminal code they had previously ignored. As
prescribed by the law, security forces appeared to be
limiting detention periods to no more than two months. They
also seemed to be refraining from detaining pregnant women --
also in accordance with the law -- a development Yoon
attributed to international pressure on human rights.


5. (C) Punishment for crimes related to possession or
distribution of foreign media and outside information, or the
leaking of internal North Korean information, seemed to be
increasing in severity. Contacts with religious groups or
ideas were punished harshly, followed next in severity by
meeting with foreigners and telling them information about
North Korea that the regime considered "secret." Yoon said
any contact with South Koreans or ethnic Korean Chinese was
also a crime in North Korea. Listening to foreign radio and
watching DVDs and videos was punished as well, but less
severely. (Note: In 2005, Professor Yoon conducted a study
commissioned by the Korea Press Foundation on defectors,
exposure to foreign media, particularly radio. He said it is
available in hard copy in the ROK National Assembly library.
End Note.)


6. (C) Yoon said those punished in North Korea were sent to
political camps, hard labor camps, or regular prisons,
depending on the crime. Political criminals were overseen by
the government,s security services and were further divided
depending on whether the nature of their crime was "internal"
or "external." Internal political crimes encompassed efforts
to overturn the regime, attempts to hurt or criticize Kim
Jong Il or Kim Il Sung, and criticism of juche ideology.
External crimes included contact with foreign people, ideas
and thinking, ideology, or media. Yoon did not specify the

differences in punishment for these two types of political
crimes, but he noted that the type of crime determined the
type of camp at which offenders were incarcerated.

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Trends in North Korean Defection
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7. (C) The ages, gender, methods, and motivations of North
Korean defectors had changed significantly over the years,
Yoon explained. Defectors before the 1990s tended to be
military men in their 20s and 30s who walked across the DMZ.
From 1991-1994 defectors continued to be primarily young men,
but were mainly students, diplomats, and laborers such as
loggers sent to Russia and Eastern Europe; these had been
prompted to defect by the Soviet collapse. Consequently,
North Korea recalled many of its citizens from former Soviet
countries. After 1994, nearly ninety percent of defectors
left for economic reasons related to the famine; they
exhibited a greater age diversity and there were more females
than in earlier periods.


8. (C) After 2000, familial group defection became more
common; furthermore, females came to constitute a majority of
defectors for the first time. Most tended to be from the
Hamgyong provinces, the largest demographic group was between
20 and 30 years of age, and their reasons for leaving North
Korea were more diverse. During this period defectors
exhibited many of the characteristics of a "normal" immigrant
mentality, Yoon said, their motivations akin to those of
South Koreans who immigrated to the U.S. These defectors
generally sought reunion with family members who had already
defected, economic opportunities, educational opportunities
for their children, and a chance at a more stable life.


9. (C) Additionally, after the year 2000, more defectors made
the decision to defect to South Korea while still in North
Korea, mainly due to contact many had with North Koreans who
had already defected to the South. In the 1990s, most North
Korean defectors had first become aware of the option of
defecting to South Korea after they crossed the border into
China. Since 2000, there has also been greater variation in
time between escape from North Korea and arrival in South
Korea, ranging from -- in rare cases -- one day, to as long
as ten years, with 20-30 percent falling in the six-month
range.


10. (C) Some defectors have expressed interest in residing in
places other than South Korea. Yoon said the second most
desirable location was China, because from there it was
easier to go back and forth to North Korea to see family
members. The third most preferred country was the U.S.,
followed by a rather small number who mentioned Japan or
European countries.


11. (C) Yoon assessed that the number of North Korean
defectors resettled in the U.S. was relatively small because
of technical difficulties for gaining U.S. resettlement.
Also, though preference for resettlement in Europe was fairly
low upon defection, the number of defectors resettling in the
United Kingdom was increasing as more in South Korea opt to
resettle a second time in the UK. Professor Yoon Qd some
defectors whose first choice would have been the U.S. ended
up in South Korea because they knew of the difficulties
associated with the U.S. option.
STEPHENS