NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR INTELLECTUAL SAYS ELITE KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002382 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: PREL KS KN SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR INTELLECTUAL SAYS ELITE KEY TO CHANGE, EXPECTS CLOSER DPRK-CHINA TIES Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Kim Heung-kwang of North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, a group of predominantly elite North Korean defectors formed in June, and North Korea Reform Radio Representative Kim Seung-chul met with poloff on December 3 to describe plans to target elite North Koreans with messages and information creatively packaged in a variety of media, including DVDs, USB drives, and MP3 files. The group had yet to identify a source of funds for this project. Holder of a DPRK Ph.D in information technology, Kim Heung-kwang defected to South Korea in 2004. In his view, Pyongyang had restricted access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex to show that it could do without economic incentives should its demands not be met. The DPRK had no desire to reform its planned economy system or to move toward inter-Korean reconciliation with the South under Lee Myung-bak. Instead, Kim said, he anticipated North Korea's ties with China to become closer in the coming years. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Calling him the "best-educated North Korean in South Korea," North Korea Reform Radio founder Kim Seung-chul introduced poloff on December 3 to Kim Heung-kwang, holder of an information technology Ph.D from Pyongyang who defected in ¶2004. Kim Heung-kwang serves as Chairman of North Korean Intellectuals Solidarity, an organization established in June that Kim said counts 39 of the approximately 200 elite North Korean defector intellectuals in South Korea among its membership. A professor in Hamheung before leaving the North, Kim spoke without a hint of North Korean accent as he explained that change in the DPRK was most likely to come from its elites, intellectuals, and middle class. He said North Korean Intellectuals Solidarity had the capacity to receive information from 15 middle and elite class contacts and relatives dispersed throughout 10 North Korean cities and hoped to create a database with this information. The ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) would not fund the plan without taking charge of it, Kim Seung-chul explained, expressing interest in approaching the U.S. intelligence community next. -------------- Anticipating Closer DPRK-China Ties -------------- ¶3. (C) Assessing the poor state of inter-Korean relations, Kim Seung-chul (who defected in the 1990s) said that he did not believe North Korea saw any hope of reconciliation with the South under Lee Myung-bak. Pyongyang was using the current leaflet issue as an excuse to distance itself from Seoul and would probably grow closer to China over the next few years. He pointed to Kim Jong Il,s visit to the Chinese Embassy in May as a turning point in bilateral relations. Concurring with this view, Kim Heung-kwang added that the DPRK would guard against undue influence by China, citing the North's sale of exclusive rights to Najin port to both China and Russia as an example of Pyongyang's adeptness at playing its neighbors off each other. The Six-Party process, he said, would ultimately serve to enhance China,s importance to North Korea. -------------- -- Pyongyang Wants Economic Assistance, Not Reform -------------- -- ¶4. (C) On Kaesong, Kim Heung-kwang said DPRK restrictions of border crossings and access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) were intended to show Seoul and the international community that Pyongyang was prepared to reject economic incentives if its demands were not met. While the North wanted economic assistance, Kim explained, it did not want to undertake economic reform. The DPRK saw itself as being different from China and Vietnam and believed its planned economy system would work with a guaranteed inflow of resources. Securing this was North Korea,s chief objective in negotiations with the outside world, in particular with the U.S. and Japan. ¶5. (C) Kim Seung-chul added that there were not many in South Korea who viewed North Korea's actions this way. While the South Korean government had changed with the election of Lee Myung-bak, he said, the bureaucracy retained much of the character of previous Sunshine Policy administrations, even in the NIS. -------------- -------------- Targeting the North Korean Elite and Middle Classes -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In accordance with the view that the elite would play a decisive role in the DPRK's future, Kim Seung-chul said he began in 2007 to tailor his radio broadcasts to North Korea to listeners among the DPRK leadership. Kim Heung-kwang, meanwhile, described plans to send digital media, including DVDs, USB thumb drives, and MP3 files, into North Korea. These media would have the appearance of domestic or legally imported products, making them relatively safe for the North Korean user to possess. The DVDs, in fact, would contain material routinely approved by DPRK censors such as Hong Kong or Chinese movies, sporting event footage, and technical training videos. However, messages and information interspersed between or trailing movie scenes would catch viewers off-guard and, hopefully, receptive. Being a defector himself, Kim explained, he understood how best to tailor messages to those in the North. Unfavorable comparisons of North Korea and other countries, for example, would be rejected as propaganda. ¶7. (C) Supplementing visual media with meaty textual media was the best way to influence North Korea,s intellectual classes, Kim Heung-kwang continued. This was because these thoughtful groups craved more information than visual or audio media alone could provide. USB thumb drives, perhaps disguised as common objects such as lighters, could store up to 10,000 e-books, Kim said. Though relatively few in number, elites allowed to possess computers would be able to view the contents of the USB drives free from scrutiny as security services did not monitor computer activity as they did radios and DVDs. ¶8. (C) Both Kim Heung-kwang and Kim Seung-chul said they hoped to distribute the media they described through the North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity network inside North Korea and in markets. They planned to obtain feedback on their distribution strategies from their North Korean network and adapt media accordingly. Market price research would also be needed as North Koreans would automatically be suspicious of media priced too low or offered freely. -------------- Obsessive Demand for Foreign Media -------------- ¶9. (C) Demand for foreign media in North Korea has become almost obsessive, Kim Heung-kwang said, especially among the younger generation. Even when people witness public executions of those caught watching DVDs, they return to watching them within a few days. While 10 years ago offenders went to political prison camps or were executed, illegal possession of foreign DVDs was too common for that now. Those caught were generally interrogated and sentenced to one month in a labor camp, Kim said. The demand was so great that South Korean television dramas taped in China were often available one day after the programs were aired. ¶10. (C) While DVDs were valued primarily as entertainment, over time perceptions of the outside world changed, even without viewers being aware of it. Younger North Koreans, for example, exhibited a preference for foreign music, action movies, and melodramas and had begun to imitate South Korean accents, shorter shirt sleeves, and haircuts. Kim Heung-kwang's own children wore jeans inside his house while in North Korea, not being allowed to wear them in public. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) These two Kims -- and their organizations -- represent a growing activism among North Korean defectors. Their work on promoting change in North Korea receives material support from South Korean conservatives and charities, but not from the ROKG. STEPHENS