ROK MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION ON DPRK BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002282 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: ROK MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION ON DPRK BORDER RESTRICTION MEASURES REF: A. SEOUL 02270 ¶B. SEOUL 002206 Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The DPRK's November 24 announcement of measures to restrict economic exchange activity and border crossings continued to reverberate in Seoul. On November 26, ROK Unification Minister Kim Ha-joong reported to the National Assembly on the state of affairs, pointing out that restrictions to be imposed December 1 may be followed by subsequent measures. The ROK initiated plans to begin an "orderly withdrawal" of personnel from Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),but MOU officials felt that activity there would continue at some level even after December 1. National Assembly members discussed how best to approach North Korea, which only revealed deep political division that runs throughout the Korean public and media. END SUMMARY -------------- MOU Reports to National Assembly -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Reporting to the National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee on November 26, ROK Unification Minister Kim Ha-joong described the ROKG's response to the DPRK's November 24 announcement of measures restricting cross-border passage and activity at Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). Calling the North's moves "deeply regrettable," Minister Kim stated the measures appeared to be part of an ongoing attempt to pressure Seoul to change its policies toward the DPRK and an expression of discontent about continued leafleting by South Korean NGOs. If carried out, the measures would violate inter-Korean agreements, Minister Kim continued, urging the DPRK to refrain from implementing them. The ROKG would consult with the North on withdrawal of personnel and equipment from Kaesong and develop measures to ensure the safety and security of South Koreans visiting or residing in the North. Seoul would also continue to call for dialogue to resolve the situation. ¶3. (SBU) Minister Kim pointed out that the North had emphasized the December 1 measures would be initial ones, implying that more would follow. Given the "special guarantee" extended to company activity at KIC, Kim said he expected the complex would continue to operate at some level for the time being. In addition, as the North had said it would selectively allow South Koreans to travel across the border for economic exchange projects, Kim did not expect Pyongyang to cut off exchanges with NGOs completely. ¶4. (SBU) Seoul had repeatedly expressed its respect for the spirit of the inter-Korean summit accords, urged the North to resume dialogue on their implementation, and asked NGOs to restrain their leafleting, Minister Kim said, but the North rejected dialogue with the South and continued to misunderstand its policies. Pyongyang continued to demand abandonment of the Denuclearization, Opening 3000 Plan, complete implementation of the June 15, 2000 and October 4, 2007 Inter-Korean Joint Declarations, and discontinuation of NGO leaflet activity. Seoul would nevertheless continue to review and pursue realistic measures demonstrating the sincerity of its commitment to North-South ties. -------------- KIC Developments -------------- ¶5. (C) MOU Director of the KIC Development Planning Bureau Kim Ki-woong meanwhile confirmed November 26 press reports saying that the ROKG is preparing what he called an "orderly withdrawal" of ROK employees and managers from KIC, starting as early as November 27. However, the extent of the withdrawal the DPRK would require was still not clear. Kim said that the current total number of ROK employees at KIC was about 1,600, but, he said smiling, the ROKG submitted a list almost twice that large including all those authorized to enter KIC, hoping that the DPRK will cut from the larger figure instead. ¶6. (C) In line with what we heard from MOFAT on November 25, Kim said that individual companies at KIC had approached DPRK authorities there to ask what drawdowns would be required. Some of the companies had only one ROK manager, so the expectation was that they would be allowed to remain; others had only three employees. Kim had asked an employee of the Kaesong Industrial Management Committee (KIDMAC),the quasi-official presence at KIC, to inquire with the DPRK authorities at KIC about the status of answers to these questions. The answer from the senior-most DPRK official at KIC was that he was waiting on answers from Pyongyang. Kim's supposition was that the National Defense Commission was making the decisions. ¶7. (C) Kim said that companies were asking the ROKG for compensation for the to-be-withdrawn employees, but no decision had been made on this yet. Another issue was possible compensation in case companies had to withdraw entirely. The ROKG insured companies for 90 percent of the value of their KIC investments, he said, but such compensation would only be available if (a) North Korea violated the KIC agreement (i.e., closed KIC) and (b) the companies had to remain out of KIC for at least three months. Kim said companies were already seeing the effect of the uncertainty: some buyers had canceled orders and banks were withholding loans. Newspapers reported orders were down 20 to 30 percent. Still, like Minister Kim, his sense was that KIC would continue to operate despite the restrictions after December 1. ¶8. (C) A former chairman of KIDMAC, Kim Dong-keun, who managed the facility until mid-2007, was also cautiously optimistic about KIC continuing operations despite the restrictions. Reduced orders would be an issue for some companies, but others would continue unaffected. Companies with facilities under construction were evaluating the situation now; his estimate was that half would decide to cancel their projects. -------------- Hyundai Asan Caught Off Guard -------------- ¶9. (C) Hyundai Asan Vice President Jang Whan-bin -- who had assured us after the November 12 DPRK threat of border restrictions that DPRK contacts had told him Kaesong City tourism would not be touched -- told us on November 26 that the November 24 announcement had caught his company off guard. He shook his head when asked about the prospects for getting Hyundai Asan's North Korean projects (KIC, Kaesong City tours and Mt. Kumgang tourism) back to normal, saying that he thought the DPRK would decide by February 2009 whether to close KIC, based on KJI's health condition, potential changes in President Lee Myung-bak's attitude toward the DPRK, and the new U.S. Administration's stance toward North Korea. On President Lee's attitude, he saw little prospect for change, unless a pro-engagement Minister of Unification such as Lee Jae-oh, currently in the United States, were to be appointed, or unless the ROKG made clear that it would uphold the June 2000 and October 2007 summit agreements without reservation. ¶10. (C) Noting that Hyundai Asan was the main construction company for the 60 factories now being built in KIC, Jang said that decisions on continuing construction would be made this week, based in part on how many ROK workers had to be withdrawn. His sense was that factories that were more than half complete would be finished, those in the early stages would be stopped, and those in the middle stage would progress slowly based on available labor and capital. Despite the uncertainty about KIC's future, he expected production companies to continue operating after December 1. Noting that Hyundai Group Chair Hyun Jeung-eun had met and dined with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in November 2007, Jang said that the company continued to receive assurances, about once a month by fax, that the DPRK authorities trusted and respected the company, but that the messages also said that current inter-governmental circumstances were difficult. Jang, who had told us earlier that DPRK officials that Hyundai Asan had cultivated over years seemed to have disappeared this year, said that he saw growing military influence in recent DPRK announcements. For example, the November 24 statement that the DPRK civilian agency, the Central Special District Development Management Bureau, had deliverd to ROK officials and companies ended with an ambiguous reference to being sent "on behalf of" another unspecified agency, which Jang took to be the National Defense Commission. -------------- National Assembly Fallout -------------- ¶11. (SBU) ROK media reported that Democratic Party (DP) and Democratic Labor Party (DLP) leaders had discussed the possibility of an emergency meeting on the inter-Korean developments, at which time DP Chair Chung Se-kyun urged President Lee to abandon the Denuclearization, Opening 3000 Plan and recognize the June 15, 2000 and October 4, 2007 inter-Korean Joint Declarations. DLP Chair Kang Ki-kab added that both inter-Korean relations and the economy were "upside-down." ¶12. (SBU) GNP leaders expressed "deep regret" that the North had threatened to take measures even while the ROKG was working to stop NGOs from leafleting. They criticized the DPRK for dishonoring past agreements with the South, calling on the Lee administration to react calmly but firmly to "straighten out" relations. Some GNP representatives were critical of the government's response. Floor leader Hong Joon-pyo told KBS radio that President Lee needed be "more flexible" in his approach to North Korea. The JoongAng Daily quoted Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee member Nam Kyoung-phil arguing for a more "proactive role" rather than continuation of a "passive stance" on Pyongyang's escalating threats. Even within the GNP, it seems, policy toward the North will continue to be a topic of debate. STEPHENS