Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL2154
2008-11-04 06:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

19TH SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE PLENARY

Tags:  PREL PINS MARR KS KN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002154 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR KS KN
SUBJECT: 19TH SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE PLENARY

Classified By: DCM WILLIAM A. STANTON. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002154 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PINS MARR KS KN SUBJECT: 19TH SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE PLENARY Classified By: DCM WILLIAM A. STANTON. REASONS 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The 19th Security Policy Initiative (SPI-19) talks were held in Seoul on September 10, 2008. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia (DASD) David Sedney. Ministry of National Defense Deputy Minister (DM) for Policy Jeon Jei-guk led the ROK Delegation. The following were the major points of agreement: -- The U.S. and ROK delegations agreed on the importance of increasing assistance to Afghanistan and pledged to do so. -- Both sides expressed satisfaction with the steady progress being made on the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the success of Ulchi Freedom Guardian 08 military exercise. -- They reconfirmed that a five phase process would be utilized to complete the return of nine USFK facilities to the ROK by the end of this year. -- They agreed to establish a Missile Defense Program Analysis Team. -- The War Reserves Stockpile for Allies - Korea (WRSA-K) MOU was highlighted as a success, with a signing ceremony planned for the 40th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on October 17 in Washington. ¶2. (C) Despite the overall positive tone and good progress reported in the plenary on internal Alliance matters, several U.S. requests for increased international security cooperation were turned aside by DM Jeon. -- He would not commit to participating in the U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Talks (although he later did so). -- The ROK side also declined to provide direct military assistance to the Afghan National Army. -- DM Jeon stated that the ROK would not be able to provide a ROK naval vessel for anti-piracy operations off the east coast of Africa without National Assembly approval. ¶3. (SBU) SPI-20 is tentatively proposed to be held on December 11-12 in Washington, DC. END SUMMARY ¶4. (U) The 19th Security Policy Initiative (SPI-19) U.S.-ROK Alliance talks were held in Seoul on September 10, 2008. The U.S. Delegation was headed by DASD David Sedney. MND DM for Policy Jeon Jei-guk led the ROK Delegation. -------------- INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) IRAQ: Although this topic was discussed during the closed session, both DASD
Sedney and Mr. Kurt Tong, Director for Korean Affairs at State, reiterated that the U.S. was proud to have served with the ROK for a common cause in Iraq. Mr. Tong noted the recent speech by President Bush at the National Defense University where he expressed his deepest respect and admiration for the ROK military forces in Iraq. DASD Sedney stated that, based on improved security conditions in Iraq, the U.S. would begin to redeploy about 8,000 troops by February 2009, and that some members of the multinational coalition would not be asked to stay. DASD Sedney emphasized that the goal from the beginning was to have the people of Iraq provide their own security, and not to have coalition forces stay in Iraq any longer than that. He noted that CENTCOM was planning for the operational transition of responsibilities to prepare for the relief in place of the Zaytun Unit. DM Jeon also congratulated the U.S. for its success in Iraq and for setting the stable security conditions in Iraq that would permit the redeployment of forces. ¶6. (C) AFGHANISTAN: DM Jeon stated that MND would look into the feasibility of sending a survey team to Afghanistan and that it was possible the survey team could be ready to travel to Kabul as early as the end of September. He said that MND would review the latest U.S. request for assistance to the Afghan National Army, and that it was likely that MND could meet the request to provide helmets, body armor, and boots. ¶7. (C) ANTI-PIRACY: Following up with a topic of discussion from SPI-18, DASD Sedney asked DM Jeon if the ROK MND had considered the U.S. request for a ROK Navy ship in the Indian Ocean, and further noted that the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations staff, and the Joint Staff continued to agree that such a ROKN presence would support anti-piracy and freedom of navigation objectives. Jeon said that deploying a ROK Navy ship would require approval from the National Assembly as well as a bilateral agreement with the USG. ¶8. (C) PKO: Jeon said the ROK National Assembly was reviewing several versions of new legislation to stand up a permanently-trained peace keeping operations (PKO) force. MND reported that the current version of the PKO legislation is not adequate, and that they were working on inputs to improve the current draft legislation prior to National Assembly consideration later this year. Mr. Tong noted that the ROK legislation would be an important demonstration effect for others in the region that are also considering the development of a legal framework for PKO. ¶9. (C) TRILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION: DM Jeon responded to the request for a U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Meeting stating that due to the current political situation in regards to the Liancourt Rocks issue (Tokdo in Korean),it would be difficult to hold talks at this time. However, the MND supports trilateral talks and asked for U.S. patience on this matter. DASD Sedney noted that if the ROK is having trilateral agreements with Japan and China, the ROK should also be able to meet with the U.S. and Japan. Deputy Minister Jeon acknowledged the ROK-Japan-PRC Summit and Foreign Minister's Meeting, as well as hinting that a Defense Ministerial Trilat could take place when the situation improved. DASD Sedney reiterated that the current situation demands greater trilateral security cooperation. (Note: On September 22, he sent a letter to Assistant Secretary of Defense James Shinn stating that he would now be willing to join in trilateral talks in November 2008). -------------- NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶10. (C) DPRK MISSILE THREAT: DM Jeon stated that the ROK was reviewing the U.S. request to establish a senior-level working group to provide policy guidance for the Missile Defense Program Analysis Team. However, DM Jeon suggested that the Program Analysis Team meet first, and if there was a need for a policy-level group to have oversight of the team's activities, the ROK MND would reassess the requirement for the senior working group. MND agreed that the Program Analysis Team should be a research group headed by scientists in order to ensure continuity of work that might not be possible with the short-term rotations and personnel assignments in both the MND and ROK JCS. DM Jeon stated that the ROK-side of the Program Analysis Team would be a 7-member group composed from a research organization, KDIA, MND, JCS, and missile experts from each of the ROK services. DM Jeon suggested that the first step is to establish points of contact who would discuss the team composition and select a roadmap for the working group. DASD Sedney noted that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) offered to host the first meeting in Washington in late October. -------------- OPCON -------------- ¶11. (C) DM Jeon reported that preparations for OPCON transition were on course and noted the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) combined military exercise in August marked the first time that ROK military commanders were in the lead throughout, and that the results had been very positive. UFG showed both the U.S. and ROK commands are able to be stood up independently. The exercise also allowed ROK to gain valuable confidence while highlighting areas of improvement that will need to be addressed in order to turn the scheduled OPCON transition in April 2012 into a reality. The MND presentation noted progress on 19 agreed upon tasks in that process, but disagreements remain over the new command structure and more investment is needed in C4I. DM Jeon stated that with close cooperation those issues would be resolved. DASD Sedney agreed that both the U.S. and the ROK are on track for the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012. He thanked DM Jeon for his personal involvement during the exercise, which was a great show of commitment. He also noted that the recent signing of the MOU for OPLANs Development was encouraging and an important step for the development of separate supported and supporting war plans. DASD Sedney cautioned that ROK fielding of AKJCCS in 2012 is too late, especially if the system is to be fully tested and implemented prior to the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012. DM Jeon assured DASD Sedney that C4I will not be an obstacle for OPCON transition. Both MajGen Panter (USFK J-5) and BG Kim, Byung-ki noted that the Alliance Military Coordination Center (AMCC) was an important aspect of the UFG. MajGen Panter reassured the ROK that USFK intends to maintain the AMCC in peacetime as well as in wartime with a permanent staff of 24. DM Jeon noted that a mock Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) would be useful to integrate into the Planning, Decision, Execution (PDE) cycle for future UFG exercises. -------------- ARMISTICE MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES (AMR) -------------- ¶12. (C) The ROK MND stated that after much effort at the working level, the first phase of identifying AMR authorities and responsibilities was now complete but that the second phase of determining a transition plan for those AMRs to the ROK was sure to be more difficult. Phase 1 consisted of identification of responsibilities or tasks specified in the Korean War Armistice Agreement (KWAA),identification of responsibilities or tasks implied required to meet specified responsibilities, specifying authorities required to meet identified responsibilities, and identifying the command authorities that currently hold those responsibilities. Of the 61 tasks identified in the KWAA, the AMR Senior Working Group agreed that the ROK currently has responsibility for 3 tasks, the UNC for 44 tasks, and that the ROK and the UNC share responsibility for an additional 14 tasks. The working group determined that there were no implied responsibilities from the KWAA. The ROK briefer concluded his presentation by stating that an AMR Senior Working Group meeting would be held to finalize the completion of Phase 1 prior to the October 17 SCM. -------------- USFK REALIGNMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) U.S. ARMY GARRISON (USAG)-HUMPHREYS: DM Jeon opened the discussion by stating that progress on land development at Camp Humphries was on track. An outline of progress to date was then given on each of the respective land parcels being developed (Parcel 1, Parcel K and Parcel 2). The ROK side reported that groundwork at Parcel 1 was 55 percent complete, Parcel K was 33 percent complete, and that bidding for the work to be done on Parcel 2 would be completed in October, with significant construction set to begin in March ¶2009. However, DM Jeon followed up on the report by remarking that finalization of the work of the Project Management Consortium (PMC) had been further delayed. The PMC report was to have been submitted at SPI-19, but due to an inability to resolve issues of baseline cost and scheduling, it remained incomplete. ¶14. (C) DASD Sedney stressed that a better of understanding of completion dates for YRP and LPP were needed, and that without establishing one, it would be difficult to determine a baseline cost as costs will change over time. He noted the importance of not just starting construction but finishing it, so that realignment of the troops could begin in earnest. Alongside these comments, DASD Sedney pointed out that it was USFK's intention to fund LPP with the USFK budget, which would include the use of SMA funds. DM Jeon opined that the SMA for LPP issue should be resolved through the SMA negotiations, where he was sure a mutually acceptable resolution would be found. ¶15. (C) CAMP RETURNS: USFK J5 Major General Frank Panter stated that he had had a good meeting with MOFAT's Deputy Director General Lee Baek-soon earlier in the morning to discuss Camp Returns. He remarked that at the July 30 meeting both sides had agreed to a five-phased process for the completion of the 9 camp returns scheduled to take place by the end of this year. He reinforced the idea that once an agreement had been reached on the assessment process, a decision could then be made on the ROK-requested extension of the Camp Hialeah survey period. In conclusion, Panter suggested that the SOFA Special Joint Committee meet again on September 30 to make further progress on the issue. He emphasized the need for all the relevant parties to be present and to come to the meeting prepared to work out a joint environmental assessment process. ROK and U.S. officials agreed on the need to keep the highly-politically charged issue out of the Korean media. ¶16. (C) As he has done in the past, DM Jeon urged that the Camp Return issue be discussed within the SOFA channel, rather than at the SPI. DM Jeon queried as to whether it would be possible to move forward on the survey extension for Camp Hialeah sooner than planned. MajGen Panter replied that once an agreement on the joint environmental assessment had been reached, it may be possible to do so. -------------- -------------- WAR RESERVE STOCKPILE FOR ALLIES - KOREA (WRSA-K) -------------- -------------- ¶17. (C) DASD Sedney reported that the WRSA-K transfer MOA had been agreed upon and initialed on August 26. He said he looked forward to the formal signing ceremony at the 40th SCM in October. He also observed that the agreement allowed the ROK to gain a large amount of munitions at a low price compared to purchasing the same munitions at fair market value. Both sides agreed that the completion of the MOA had been a win-win situation. -------------- SPI-20 AND THE 40TH SCM -------------- ¶18. (C) DM Jeon concluded SPI-19 by stating the importance of using the 40th SCM to symbolize the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. He recounted how the SCM had been held once a year, every year, since 1968, with 1980 being the only exception, due to the bombing of the ROK cabinet in Burma. He encouraged that both sides make a special effort to make this year's SCM a great success. DASD Sedney agreed, adding that even after forty years the SCM remained an important forum for the U.S. and ROK defense ministers to meet annually. He pointed out that recent events in North Korea had made it clear that both our militaries and their civilian leaders need to continue to communicate very effectively. DASD Sedney stated that he would be hosting the next SPI (SPI-20) on December 11 or 12. ¶19. (U) DASD Sedney has cleared this message. STEPHENS

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