SCENESETTER FOR THE 40TH US-ROK SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002034 SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR STEPHENS TO SECRETARY GATES E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV PINS KS KN JA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE 40TH US-ROK SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (SCM) Classified By: AMBASSADOR KATHLEEN STEPHENS, REASONS 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Since your June visit to Seoul, the South Korean domestic political scene has largely returned to normal. President Lee has escaped from the morass that was the beef controversy, but still has much work to do before his government regains the trust and support of the Korean public. The shock of last summer's anti-government/anti-U.S. beef protests was so severely felt, however, that while we have a pro-U.S. government to work with in Seoul it is one that is very sensitive to being seen as doing Washington's bidding. ROK negotiators have therefore been particularly prickly in their approach to concluding the next Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and completing this year's USFK camp returns. The global economic downturn is a complication that has given the Koreans an argument to make against increasing their Alliance burden sharing contribution at this time. At the same time, however, ROK President Lee Myung-bak has pledged to strengthen the Alliance, and uses a new label - a "21st Century Strategic Alliance." You can assure Minister of National Defense (MND) Lee Sang-hee that his president's support for the Alliance is well-placed, for regardless of the outcome of our own general election, the USG government is sure to continue to honor its enduring commitment to the defense of Korea. At the same time, you should ask him, now that LMB's political situation is improving, what steps his government plans to take to make good on President Lee's vow to strengthen and upgrade the Alliance. ¶2. (C) In addition to addressing the impasse over SMA and camp returns, it is perhaps most important to urge MND to speed implementation of our key Alliance Transformation agreements: 1) relocation of USFK from Yongsan; 2) consolidation of other U.S. bases on the peninsula; and 3) the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK military. When Lee raises ROK domestic political woes, you can counter by pointing out the strength of the Alliance depends upon the depth of our shared national interests, not on our respective domestic political problems. You can point to the Alliance's vital contributions to the defense of the Korean Peninsula, its enhancement of regional stability and prosperity. You might also want to encourage Minister Lee to improve mil-to-mil relations with Japan, increase the ROK commitment to PSI, dispatch a naval vessel to deter pirates off the East Coast of Africa, and increase South Korea's contribution to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY -------------- IMPROVED POLITICAL SITUATION -------------- (U) Mr. Secretary, ¶3. (C) When you last visited Seoul for the USFK change of command ceremony in June, you learned first-hand of the large anti-government/anti-U.S. beef protests then taking place nightly in the streets of Seoul. Activists and leftist politicians tried to pressure President Lee Myung-bak (LMB) to re-negotiate the beef deal he signed in April, but Lee held firm, explaining to the public that it would undermine Korea's credibility and our bilateral alliance. As a result of that political unrest, the President's summit meeting in Seoul with Lee was delayed from July to August. When it did take place on August 6, the Blue House had no stomach left for announcing that it had made any new commitments to the United States, and thus asked the White House for a delay in defining President Lee's call for the upgrading of the U.S.-ROK security partnership to "21ST Century Strategic Alliance." ¶4. (C) Since summer, the protests have ceased and the Korean domestic political situation has stabilized, while misinformation propagated by opposition media outlets and NGOs that fed the protests has been publicly discredited. Formation of the new National Assembly was delayed by over 80 days, but it has since been seated, with President Lee's Grand National Party controlling two-thirds of the votes in that legislative body. -------------- BUT NOT ENTIRELY -------------- ¶5. (C) The protests made it clear, however, that a power struggle continues between conservative leaders who won big in both the December 2007 presidential and April 2008 National Assembly elections and the progressives who were ousted from leadership of the country after ten years of liberal rule. The left took a huge body blow in those elections, but can expect to mount significant opposition because they find many conservatives willing to join in kicking President Lee when he is down. ¶6. (C) As a result, we have a pro-U.S. government to work with that is politically skittish about being seen as too accommodating of U.S. interests. Over the past two months, ROKG negotiators have been extremely stubborn in their approach to concluding the next Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for defense burden sharing and completing the return of nine former USFK military facilities slated for return by the end of this year; this despite our own significant displays of flexibility on both issues. In general, when ROK negotiators sit across the table from U.S. officials they feel a need to demonstrate that they are doing due diligence in standing up to any perceived U.S. pressure. This is partly for show, so there is a reasonable expectation that the Koreans will ultimately demonstrate some flexibility of their own nearer to the conclusion of these negotiations. This round has been unusually difficult, however, because the Lee Myung-bak Government feels it must very carefully consider the timing and content of any such agreements with the United States, and is especially concerned about leaving the door open to criticism that is harming Korean interests by caving in to the will of Washington. ¶7. (C) An additional complication is the unwelcome news of a global economic downturn that has already devalued the Korean Won by about 30 percent against the U.S. dollar. This will no doubt prompt the ROK Government to make the same argument it made when negotiating an SMA during last decade's Asian Economic Crisis: namely, that any increase in its burden sharing contribution must await improvements to the economy. You can remind them that they pledged to us back then that if we cut them some slack on the exchange rate in the 1998 agreement, they would make it up to us as soon as their economy recovered by increasing their SMA contribution to 50 percent of USFK's non-personnel stationing costs (NPSC). That promise was never kept. This year, in fact, the ROK SMA contribution will cover only 43 percent of our NPSC. And since NPSC is only a sub-set of the overall cost of our being here, the ROK contribution actually equates to only about 25 percent of our total stationing costs. In short, the ROKG is getting a good deal on its security and should be doing more to make that case to its critics. Furthermore, the global economic problems are affecting us all, and the ROK case for special consideration is no more compelling than our own. -------------- STRONG U.S. COMMITMENT; LOOKING FOR SAME -------------- ¶8. (C) To accentuate the positive you might recall to the DEFMIN that President Lee pledged his commitment to strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance in his inaugural address, and encourage him to do all he can to help his president deliver on that promise. President Lee was elected on a platform that in addition to the call for a strengthened Alliance included support for the Korea-U.S. FTA (which Lee sent to the National Assembly last week),the desire to make improvements in the ROK's relations with Japan, and an insistence on more reciprocity from North Korea in exchange for ROK economic aid. Those are clearly the right directions for Korea to take toward strengthening its own economic, diplomatic and security interests. They are also directions we favor. So with respect to President Lee's domestic political concerns, you might counter that ROK leaders on the Alliance must not allow themselves to be driven by, or deterred from, those important and principled goals because of sensitivity to attacks from minority parties and anti-Alliance NGOs. ¶9. (C) You can offer to help by publicly and privately pointing out the strong and continuing U.S. commitment to the Republic of Korea, for that reassurance will add strength to Lee's pro-U.S. position. Minister Lee will likely be wondering what the upcoming change in U.S. leadership will mean for Korea. He will no doubt use his visit to Washington to meet with representatives of the both the Democrat and Republican presidential campaigns in an attempt to ascertain how American commitment to Korea's security (and to ratifying the KORUS FTA, which Korea concluded at great political cost) might be affected by the victory of either candidate. You can assure him of the U.S. Government's enduring commitment to the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, pointing out that our interests in Northeast Asia are of such great importance to our own national security that the incoming administration (from either party) is very unlikely to alter our alliance relations with either Korea or Japan. Both alliances are too important, and support for them is strongly bipartisan. -------------- KEY ALLIANCE TASKS -------------- ¶10. (C) Key messages to employ with Defense Minister Lee and other senior ROK military officials with whom you will be meeting include the following: --- The U.S.-Republic of Korea relationship remains firmly rooted in the deeply-shared fundamental interests of great importance to both our countries. --- The United States Government is fully committed to working with President Lee to strengthen our economic ties, update our security alliance, and enhance our close people-to-people interchange. --- To further strengthen and appropriately update the U.S.-ROK Alliance, we must work together to speed up implementation of our three key bilateral Alliance Transformation agreements: 1) relocation of USFK from Yongsan; 2) consolidation of other U.S. bases on the peninsula; and 3) the transfer, as scheduled, of wartime operational control to the ROK military. ¶11. (C) It is important to point out that while the U.S. commitment to the Alliance is enduring, Washington strongly believes we need to take steps to improve the structure and political posture of our 58-year old security relationship. We must do that by implementing needed Alliance Transformation through the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP),the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and the Strategic Implementation Plan (STP) for the transfer of OPCON. To implement those agreements, political will must be sustained and national treasure must be expended by both our governments. If we fail to do that the Alliance will fall out of step with the rapid changes taking place in Korean society and throughout the region today. Many have advised that is already the case, and that such adjustments to our military posture are, in fact, long overdue. Our approach to the Alliance must therefore embody both enduring commitment and appropriate evolutionary change. ¶12. (C) Implementations of those changes are clearly a problem. YRP and LPP were set to be completed this year, but have as yet barely gotten off the ground. In just the last 24 months their estimated completion dates have reportedly slipped by more than seven years (to 2015!). On top of that there are extremely worrisome indications that MND may be looking to back away from the OPCON agreement. Money is a big part of the problem, with the slow progress to date largely due to an inadequate financial commitment by the ROKG. The situation hasn't been helped by the fact that prices for construction materials and the fuel to operate heavy machinery have continued to climb throughout the delays, dramatically raising the estimated cost of the projects. Since delays will only serve to damage American views of the dependability of the Alliance and cost the ROKG more in the end, wise and committed leadership is needed to speed completion. Now is the time for the ROKG to increase the relatively low percentage of GNP that it spends on defense. ¶13. (C) As you may have already experienced, Minister Lee is fond of lecturing senior U.S. officials on the need for us to develop a better understanding of the Korean perspective. While he no doubt makes a good point, the problem with his message is that he seems to equate understanding of Korea with greater compromise on the part of the United States, while viewing the converse - greater understanding of the U.S. position - as caving in to Washington. This is reflected in the ROKG's aforementioned approach to Alliance negotiations. The truth is that the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance is primarily dependent upon the depth of our shared national interests, and that is where the focus from both Seoul and Washington should be directed. You can redirect the conversation there when the Minister pulls out his violin. -------------- KEY ALLIANCE ROLES -------------- ¶14. (C) --- Specifically, you can point to the North Korean threat and our shared commitment to defend against it -- the Alliance's peninsular role. --- You might also point out that the Alliance also serves to strengthen regional stability by sending a clear message to other powers in the region that our two strong militaries share a strong commitment to peace -- the Alliance's regional role. --- Finally, you can deliver the important compliment that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is becoming more of a global partnership, and that together we are helping to enhance international security through our combined contributions to addressing serious challenges around the world -- the Alliance's global role. ¶15. (C) At this point in your conversation with Lee you might urge greater U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation through the military trilateral talks set to take place in early November, pointing out how it could lead to improved response to future natural and humanitarian disasters in the region. You may wish to explore the Minister's recent statement to the National Assembly that he favors full ROK commitment to the important work of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Since we have indications MND is exploring the idea, you could also urge him to send a ROK Naval vessel to help protect commercial shipping from pirate attacks off the East Coast of Africa, and to escort UN food and medical assistance in that troubled region. You could thank him for the ROKG decision to send an interagency survey team to Afghanistan, and encourage an increased Korean contribution to the ongoing stabilization effort there. Finally, you can favorably inquire about legislation that is expected to pass the National Assembly authorizing MND to stand up a permanently-trained and ready peacekeeping force of 2,000 to 3,000 troops. All are indications of "Global Korea" and its commitment to applying its impressive capabilities to help address problems around the world. ¶16. (C) In conclusion, I would say that in light of all the good the United States and the Republic of Korea are doing in the world it is beneath us as great countries, close allies, and firm friends, to incessantly debate every step we take in the base relocation process, haggle over a few percentage points of burden sharing money, or argue about what are relatively minor environmental issues relating to camp returns. Put simply: the U.S.-ROK Alliance is greater than that, and should be treated as such. STANTON