ROK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KWON ON NORTH KOREA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001960 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO INR/B. E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018 TAGS: KS KN PREL PGOV PINR SUBJECT: ROK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KWON ON NORTH KOREA, ALLIANCE, REGIONAL RELATIONS Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In his meeting with the Ambassador on October 2, First Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak expressed concern about the North Korean nuclear issue and said further progress would require strong determination on the part of all involved parties. It was critical that there be a timetable for dismantlement, he said, adding that achieving success might require that we show North Korea a willingness to take "extreme measures" if it did not comply. Kwon identified domestic ROK political divisions as a hindrance to formulating a strong North Korea policy with broad support, but expressed hope that President Lee Myung-bak's meeting with the National Assembly opposition leader on September 25 might be a starting point for consensus-building on this issue. Accentuated by NGO activism, political polarization affected virtually all other issues, too, VFM Kwon said, including those related to the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Effective public diplomacy would help alleviate this, the VFM stated, underlining his belief that the Ambassador herself could contribute enormously in this effort. VFM Kwon also told the Ambassador that efforts to improve ROK ties within the region were making progress. He planned to lead the first strategic dialogue with Russia in November; a similar dialogue with China would also take place later this year. END SUMMARY. -------------- DETERMINATION NEEDED ON DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE -------------- ¶2. (C) First Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak told the Ambassador during a courtesy call at MOFAT on October 2 that it would take a great deal of determination and political will to convince the North Koreans to dismantle their nuclear program. Up to this point, he said, the Six-Party process had succeeded in freezing North Korea's program and moving to the disablement stage. Kwon observed, however, that disablement measures had not delayed the restarting of nuclear facilities as much as was initially thought; North Korea could start its program again in about one month. ¶3. (C) The dismantlement phase, if implemented, would represent concrete, new progress in denuclearizing North Korea, VFM Kwon said. To get there, however, the parties needed even more resolve. There needed to be a timeframe and deadlines. The ROK, for example, could not wait five or ten years for North Korea to complete its denuclearization, because to do so would tantamount to accepting North Korea as a nuclear power. To succeed, Kwon continued, it might be necessary to "show North Korea we are willing to take extreme measures." ¶4. (C) Standing in the way of the formulation and implementation of a strong ROKG policy on the nuclear issue, VFM Kwon said, were domestic political divisions. VFM Kwon pointed out that one element of discussions on September 25 between President Lee and National Assembly opposition leader Chun Sye-kyun was an agreement to form a united front on North Korea issues, adding that this was "a good starting point" for the development of a policy with bipartisan support. -------------- DOMESTIC DIVISION ON ALLIANCE ISSUES, TOO -------------- ¶5. (C) VFM Kwon said that political polarization hindered not only the development of effective policy on the DPRK, but also impacted virtually all other policy areas, including those related to the U.S.-ROK Alliance. NGO activism, he said, contributed to this polarization and blurred distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs. For example, the opposition often portrayed the ROKG as making policy decisions in response to U.S. pressure rather than in the national interest. ¶6. (C) Asked how best to address misperceptions about the Alliance and the Korean public's desire for a more "equal" relationship, VFM Kwon said public diplomacy could be quite effective, especially given the Ambassador's experience. He suggested the Ambassador's background as a Peace Corps Volunteer and her previous work in the Embassy made her a valuable resource in projecting views that would strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance. -------------- CHINA, RUSSIA RELATIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) VFM Kwon discussed briefly developments in the ROK's relations with its neighbors. The first ever strategic dialogue with Russia would be held in November, he said, led by VFM Kwon himself. A similar dialogue would also take place for the first time with China later this year, too, he added. Although policy toward North Korea would probably be on the agenda for the latter meeting, the VFM said the discussion of that topic would most likely not transcend generalities. This was the case when President Lee broached the subject of North Korea contingencies during President Hu Jintao's visit in August; there was no response from the Chinese leader. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) A career diplomat, Kwon retired last year quite frustrated that his conservative voice was completely ignored in the Roh Moo-hyun government. He soon joined Lee Myung-bak's presidential campaign staff, quickly rising to be a senior foreign policy advisor. Upon LMB's election, Kwon sought the foreign minister position, which went to Yu Myung-hwan, who is one-year junior to Kwon in entering MOFAT. Still, Kwon chose to accept the number two position in MOFAT, rather than accept an ambassadorial position, mostly because he still wants to head the ministry. Most MOFAT hands believe that that is a matter of time, probably sooner rather than later given the frequency of cabinet shuffles in Korea. Kwon has a deep background in all matters concerning the United States, where he has completed several diplomatic assignments. He is a strong supporter of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. STEPHENS