ROK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KWON ON NORTH KOREA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001960

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO INR/B.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018
TAGS: KS KN PREL PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: ROK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KWON ON NORTH KOREA,
ALLIANCE, REGIONAL RELATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: In his meeting with the Ambassador on October
2, First Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak expressed
concern about the North Korean nuclear issue and said further
progress would require strong determination on the part of
all involved parties. It was critical that there be a
timetable for dismantlement, he said, adding that achieving
success might require that we show North Korea a willingness
to take "extreme measures" if it did not comply. Kwon
identified domestic ROK political divisions as a hindrance to
formulating a strong North Korea policy with broad support,
but expressed hope that President Lee Myung-bak's meeting
with the National Assembly opposition leader on September 25
might be a starting point for consensus-building on this
issue. Accentuated by NGO activism, political polarization
affected virtually all other issues, too, VFM Kwon said,
including those related to the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Effective
public diplomacy would help alleviate this, the VFM stated,
underlining his belief that the Ambassador herself could
contribute enormously in this effort. VFM Kwon also told the
Ambassador that efforts to improve ROK ties within the region
were making progress. He planned to lead the first strategic
dialogue with Russia in November; a similar dialogue with
China would also take place later this year. END SUMMARY.

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DETERMINATION NEEDED ON DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE
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2. (C) First Vice Foreign Minister Kwon Jong-rak told the
Ambassador during a courtesy call at MOFAT on October 2 that
it would take a great deal of determination and political
will to convince the North Koreans to dismantle their nuclear
program. Up to this point, he said, the Six-Party process
had succeeded in freezing North Korea's program and moving to
the disablement stage. Kwon observed, however, that
disablement measures had not delayed the restarting of
nuclear facilities as much as was initially thought; North
Korea could start its program again in about one month.


3. (C) The dismantlement phase, if implemented, would
represent concrete, new progress in denuclearizing North
Korea, VFM Kwon said. To get there, however, the parties
needed even more resolve. There needed to be a timeframe and
deadlines. The ROK, for example, could not wait five or ten
years for North Korea to complete its denuclearization,
because to do so would tantamount to accepting North Korea as
a nuclear power. To succeed, Kwon continued, it might be
necessary to "show North Korea we are willing to take extreme
measures."


4. (C) Standing in the way of the formulation and
implementation of a strong ROKG policy on the nuclear issue,
VFM Kwon said, were domestic political divisions. VFM Kwon
pointed out that one element of discussions on September 25
between President Lee and National Assembly opposition leader
Chun Sye-kyun was an agreement to form a united front on
North Korea issues, adding that this was "a good starting
point" for the development of a policy with bipartisan
support.

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DOMESTIC DIVISION ON ALLIANCE ISSUES, TOO
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5. (C) VFM Kwon said that political polarization hindered not
only the development of effective policy on the DPRK, but
also impacted virtually all other policy areas, including
those related to the U.S.-ROK Alliance. NGO activism, he
said, contributed to this polarization and blurred
distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs. For
example, the opposition often portrayed the ROKG as making
policy decisions in response to U.S. pressure rather than in
the national interest.


6. (C) Asked how best to address misperceptions about the
Alliance and the Korean public's desire for a more "equal"
relationship, VFM Kwon said public diplomacy could be quite
effective, especially given the Ambassador's experience. He
suggested the Ambassador's background as a Peace Corps
Volunteer and her previous work in the Embassy made her a
valuable resource in projecting views that would strengthen

the U.S.-ROK alliance.

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CHINA, RUSSIA RELATIONS
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7. (C) VFM Kwon discussed briefly developments in the ROK's
relations with its neighbors. The first ever strategic
dialogue with Russia would be held in November, he said, led
by VFM Kwon himself. A similar dialogue would also take
place for the first time with China later this year, too, he
added. Although policy toward North Korea would probably be
on the agenda for the latter meeting, the VFM said the
discussion of that topic would most likely not transcend
generalities. This was the case when President Lee broached
the subject of North Korea contingencies during President Hu
Jintao's visit in August; there was no response from the
Chinese leader.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) A career diplomat, Kwon retired last year quite
frustrated that his conservative voice was completely ignored
in the Roh Moo-hyun government. He soon joined Lee
Myung-bak's presidential campaign staff, quickly rising to be
a senior foreign policy advisor. Upon LMB's election, Kwon
sought the foreign minister position, which went to Yu
Myung-hwan, who is one-year junior to Kwon in entering MOFAT.
Still, Kwon chose to accept the number two position in
MOFAT, rather than accept an ambassadorial position, mostly
because he still wants to head the ministry. Most MOFAT
hands believe that that is a matter of time, probably sooner
rather than later given the frequency of cabinet shuffles in
Korea. Kwon has a deep background in all matters concerning
the United States, where he has completed several diplomatic
assignments. He is a strong supporter of the U.S.-ROK
Alliance.
STEPHENS