Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL1869
2008-09-19 06:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
FORMER FM YOO ON NORTH KOREA
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #1869/01 2630620 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 190620Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1700 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4760 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8979 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4885 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2805 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001869
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: FORMER FM YOO ON NORTH KOREA
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001869
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: FORMER FM YOO ON NORTH KOREA
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Former FM Yoo Chong-ha told poloffs
September 18 that President Lee Myung-bak had not yet come up
with a formula for conducting successful foreign policy. Yoo
said he was personally committed to helping Lee get it right
since he felt, as one of the co-chairs of the election
committee, partly responsible for Lee's election. In a
lengthy discussion that ranged from the French journalist's
book Sortie de Communisme to conditions in Sudan, the dapper
septuagenarian regaled poloffs with lessons learned from his
career, and, drawing on his experience, made three main
observations about President Lee. First, he noted that Lee's
announcement on July 11 that he would attempt further dialog
with North Korea just hours after a South Korean tourist had
been shot and killed at the North Korean Mt. Kumgang resort
was a colossal failure; second, he explained why he thought
China would not attempt to turn North Korea into a satellite
country if the current leadership collapsed; and finally he
commented on the prospects for the infusion of legislators
into the Cabinet in a major cabinet reshuffling likely at the
end of 2008. End Summary.
--------------
Bad Idea
--------------
2. (C) Former Foreign Minister (1996-8) Yoo Chong-ha
explained over lunch that President Lee Myung-bak had made a
huge mistake by announcing at a speech July 11 that opened
the National Assembly that the ROKG would attempt to open
further dialog with North Korea. First, any such
announcement should be pre-arranged with North Korea so at
least the reclusive regime did not refute the overture as was
the case this August. Second, on the heels of the tragic
shooting death of a tourist, this statement was rejected by
the vast majority of South Koreans and furthered the image
many detractors have that Lee is out of touch. To boot, the
surprise gesture made the North Koreans lose face, Yoo said.
3. (C) Yoo said President Lee asked him what he should have
done instead and Yoo replied Lee should not have made such a
statement. Lee gave a lengthy (3-4 minute) explanation why
he had but Yoo said he was not convinced and told Lee he had
no justification for such a gaffe. Yoo said he admonished
Lee for making such a poor decision and could not understand
why Lee made such a move. He speculated that Lee never
received a full briefing on the shooting at Mt. Kumgang. As
Yoo told us, Lee was responsible for foreign policy and could
not make such mistakes. He attributed the proposal to
Minister of Unification Kim Ha-joong and noted he would
almost certainly go in a cabinet shuffle expected by many at
the end of 2008.
--------------
Will KJI's Heart Go On and On?
--------------
4. (C) Yoo said that the consensus of North Korea watchers
was that North Korea would not last more than 20 years.
Therefore, it could collapse during Lee Myung-bak's term and
Yu said he recently told Lee he must be prepared for such an
eventuality. Yu said that Lee told him he had not thought
about this much and agreed that Lee's preparations to deal
with North Korea's eventual demise could be his legacy. The
most important way to prepare would be to work very closely
with China and the U.S. so that all three parties were ready
when the time came to work together.
5. (C) Yoo added that Kim Jong-il drank so much when he was
younger that it was surprising he had lasted as long as he
had. According to first-hand reports, nightowl Kim, in his
younger years, would start drinking alcohol at 4pm and would
drink until 4am daily, Yoo claimed.
--------------
China's Support Not Likely to Go On and On
--------------
6. (C) Yoo, who attended the Beijing Olympic closing ceremony
as a VIP guest of the Chinese Government, said that several
highly-ranked Chinese diplomats had told him that China did
not want to develop North Korea as a satellite because of two
reasons: first, the PRC knew that eventually North Korea
would be absorbed by South Korea, and second that Koreans
were the ethnic group that was hardest to assimilate in China
so there was no interest in bringing more into China. Yoo
said the Chinese had learned an important lesson from
Russia's experience with Afghanistan. Yoo said 150,000 PRC
troops were stationed on the North Korea border, signaling an
end to the "friendship" that existed when Kim Il-Sung was
alive and the PRC agreed to only post security guards. Yoo
speculated the PRC army was there to prevent any mass exodus
of North Koreans. Yoo did say that, in the event of a
collapse, the Chinese Government would probably extend some
consideration to the North Korean military because of "a
close affinity."
7. (C) Yoo cautioned against thinking that the North Korea
regime would slowly fade away. Invoking a metaphor from the
French book "Sortie de Communisme," Yoo said that
authoritarian regimes tended to break the same way a
tombstone does. They seem very solid even in the strongest
wind, until one day they just crack and fall over. That, Yoo
predicted, would be North Korea's fate.
--------------
Reshuffle - Possible Power for Park?
--------------
8. (C) Park Jin recently won an election among GNP
legislators that awarded him the chairmanship of the
prestigious Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification (FATU)
committee over fourth term lawmaker Nam Kyung-pil. Yoo
explained that Park could have waited two years and let Nam
be Chair first but that Park was "aggressive" and did not
want to wait. He vociferously stated that Nam was "no
competition" for Park and that, while Park's power play was
not popular with many, he had won. In politics, winning was
what mattered most. Lee Myung-bak did not particularly like
Park, Yoo said, because of Park's wishy-washy support for Lee
last year during the campaign, but still Park would be one of
the first to become minister if there were a GNP-initiated
cabinet shuffle in late 2008 as most considered Park
qualified to be the next foreign minister. Since the GNP
helped Lee get elected and legislators had stayed out of the
first cabinet to run for election in the April elections, the
GNP could request 3-5 ministerial posts in a potential
reshuffle.
--------------
Free, But Bogey-Free?
--------------
9. (C) Yoo claimed that he turned down several positions
that Lee offered him because, at 72, he did not want to be
held down by the ethical rules applicable to public
officials. These included not being able to play golf on
weekdays or take weekend trips to Japan or China for golf.
Since he requests no personal favors when he sees President
Lee, he said he has access to see Lee occasionally and had
earned his title as the bluntest of Lee's advisors.
STANTON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: FORMER FM YOO ON NORTH KOREA
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Former FM Yoo Chong-ha told poloffs
September 18 that President Lee Myung-bak had not yet come up
with a formula for conducting successful foreign policy. Yoo
said he was personally committed to helping Lee get it right
since he felt, as one of the co-chairs of the election
committee, partly responsible for Lee's election. In a
lengthy discussion that ranged from the French journalist's
book Sortie de Communisme to conditions in Sudan, the dapper
septuagenarian regaled poloffs with lessons learned from his
career, and, drawing on his experience, made three main
observations about President Lee. First, he noted that Lee's
announcement on July 11 that he would attempt further dialog
with North Korea just hours after a South Korean tourist had
been shot and killed at the North Korean Mt. Kumgang resort
was a colossal failure; second, he explained why he thought
China would not attempt to turn North Korea into a satellite
country if the current leadership collapsed; and finally he
commented on the prospects for the infusion of legislators
into the Cabinet in a major cabinet reshuffling likely at the
end of 2008. End Summary.
--------------
Bad Idea
--------------
2. (C) Former Foreign Minister (1996-8) Yoo Chong-ha
explained over lunch that President Lee Myung-bak had made a
huge mistake by announcing at a speech July 11 that opened
the National Assembly that the ROKG would attempt to open
further dialog with North Korea. First, any such
announcement should be pre-arranged with North Korea so at
least the reclusive regime did not refute the overture as was
the case this August. Second, on the heels of the tragic
shooting death of a tourist, this statement was rejected by
the vast majority of South Koreans and furthered the image
many detractors have that Lee is out of touch. To boot, the
surprise gesture made the North Koreans lose face, Yoo said.
3. (C) Yoo said President Lee asked him what he should have
done instead and Yoo replied Lee should not have made such a
statement. Lee gave a lengthy (3-4 minute) explanation why
he had but Yoo said he was not convinced and told Lee he had
no justification for such a gaffe. Yoo said he admonished
Lee for making such a poor decision and could not understand
why Lee made such a move. He speculated that Lee never
received a full briefing on the shooting at Mt. Kumgang. As
Yoo told us, Lee was responsible for foreign policy and could
not make such mistakes. He attributed the proposal to
Minister of Unification Kim Ha-joong and noted he would
almost certainly go in a cabinet shuffle expected by many at
the end of 2008.
--------------
Will KJI's Heart Go On and On?
--------------
4. (C) Yoo said that the consensus of North Korea watchers
was that North Korea would not last more than 20 years.
Therefore, it could collapse during Lee Myung-bak's term and
Yu said he recently told Lee he must be prepared for such an
eventuality. Yu said that Lee told him he had not thought
about this much and agreed that Lee's preparations to deal
with North Korea's eventual demise could be his legacy. The
most important way to prepare would be to work very closely
with China and the U.S. so that all three parties were ready
when the time came to work together.
5. (C) Yoo added that Kim Jong-il drank so much when he was
younger that it was surprising he had lasted as long as he
had. According to first-hand reports, nightowl Kim, in his
younger years, would start drinking alcohol at 4pm and would
drink until 4am daily, Yoo claimed.
--------------
China's Support Not Likely to Go On and On
--------------
6. (C) Yoo, who attended the Beijing Olympic closing ceremony
as a VIP guest of the Chinese Government, said that several
highly-ranked Chinese diplomats had told him that China did
not want to develop North Korea as a satellite because of two
reasons: first, the PRC knew that eventually North Korea
would be absorbed by South Korea, and second that Koreans
were the ethnic group that was hardest to assimilate in China
so there was no interest in bringing more into China. Yoo
said the Chinese had learned an important lesson from
Russia's experience with Afghanistan. Yoo said 150,000 PRC
troops were stationed on the North Korea border, signaling an
end to the "friendship" that existed when Kim Il-Sung was
alive and the PRC agreed to only post security guards. Yoo
speculated the PRC army was there to prevent any mass exodus
of North Koreans. Yoo did say that, in the event of a
collapse, the Chinese Government would probably extend some
consideration to the North Korean military because of "a
close affinity."
7. (C) Yoo cautioned against thinking that the North Korea
regime would slowly fade away. Invoking a metaphor from the
French book "Sortie de Communisme," Yoo said that
authoritarian regimes tended to break the same way a
tombstone does. They seem very solid even in the strongest
wind, until one day they just crack and fall over. That, Yoo
predicted, would be North Korea's fate.
--------------
Reshuffle - Possible Power for Park?
--------------
8. (C) Park Jin recently won an election among GNP
legislators that awarded him the chairmanship of the
prestigious Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification (FATU)
committee over fourth term lawmaker Nam Kyung-pil. Yoo
explained that Park could have waited two years and let Nam
be Chair first but that Park was "aggressive" and did not
want to wait. He vociferously stated that Nam was "no
competition" for Park and that, while Park's power play was
not popular with many, he had won. In politics, winning was
what mattered most. Lee Myung-bak did not particularly like
Park, Yoo said, because of Park's wishy-washy support for Lee
last year during the campaign, but still Park would be one of
the first to become minister if there were a GNP-initiated
cabinet shuffle in late 2008 as most considered Park
qualified to be the next foreign minister. Since the GNP
helped Lee get elected and legislators had stayed out of the
first cabinet to run for election in the April elections, the
GNP could request 3-5 ministerial posts in a potential
reshuffle.
--------------
Free, But Bogey-Free?
--------------
9. (C) Yoo claimed that he turned down several positions
that Lee offered him because, at 72, he did not want to be
held down by the ethical rules applicable to public
officials. These included not being able to play golf on
weekdays or take weekend trips to Japan or China for golf.
Since he requests no personal favors when he sees President
Lee, he said he has access to see Lee occasionally and had
earned his title as the bluntest of Lee's advisors.
STANTON